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Brian W. Steffensen, P.C. (3092) 
Huntsman Building, Suite 200 
3760 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801) 273-3962 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALLAN B. THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
3D COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 
VON GORDON, RON DAVIES and 
PHIL DAVIES, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff, Allan B. Thomas ("Thomas"), by and through his 
undersigned counsel, for his causes of action against the 
defendants, alleges as follows: 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Plaintiff is an individual residing in Spanish Fork, 
Utah. 
2. Defendant 3D Communications, Inc. ("3D"), is a Utah 
corporation doing business in Salt Lake County, Utah. Defendants 
Ron Davies and Phil Davies are individuals residing in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. Defendant Von Gordon is an individual residing in 
Utah County, Utah. These individual defendants are the principal 
and controlling shareholders of defendant 3D. 
3. Plaintifffs claims for relief exceed $10,000, thus 
jurisdiction in the District Courts for the County of Salt Lake 
JL 
* 
* 
* COMPLAINT 
tJQ}0irtf0<~\J 
* 
C i v i l No. 
is proper. 
4. In the late summer or early fall of 1988, a 
representative of 3D contacted J.D. West Associates, Inc., a Utah 
corporation doing business in Utah County, Utah ("J.D. West"), 
about purchasing a telephone switching system from 3D. J.D. West 
determined that it would like to purchase a Harris 20/20 switch 
and related equipment and software (the "Switch") from 3D, but 
did not have the ability to finance the purchase. 
5. 3D helped J.D. West contact several commercial equipment 
leasing companies about the possibility of financing the 
telephone Switch. J.D. West made application for an equipment 
lease for the Switch with several of these companies. 
6. 3D contacted the leasing companies independently from 
J.D. West and then told J.D. West that it was willing to install 
the Switch in J.D. Westfs Provo, Utah telemarketing facility even 
though 3D had not been paid for the Switch. Apparently 3D felt 
that the lease for the Switch was close to being approved and 
finalized. Thereafter, 3D installed the Switch at J.D. West's 
facility. 
7. Several months passed without the equipment lease being 
approved by the various equipment lease companies. 3D contacted 
J.D. West as to what J.D. West could do. J.D. West informed 3D 
that J.D. West did not have the ability to finance the purchase 
of the Switch and that either a third party would have to be 
found to purchase and then lease the Switch to J.D. West, or 3D 
would have to remove and take the Switch back. 
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8. An employee of J.D. West, Joe L Thomas, approached his 
father, the plaintiff, about the possibility of the plaintiff 
purchasing the Switch from 3D and thereafter leasing it to J.D. 
West. The plaintiff indicated that he might be interested, but 
that he wanted to make sure that there was a ready market for 
used switches so that the Switch could be easily resold to a 
party other than J.D. West in the event that J.D. West was unable 
to meet its obligations under the proposed equipment lease. 
9. As agent for the plaintiff, Joe Thomas contacted 
representatives of 3D to inquire as to market for used switches. 
Joe Thomas explained to defendant Ron Davies as well as 3D's 
sales representative, "Rick," that Joe was contacting them on 
behalf of his father and that his father was concerned that J.D. 
West might not be able to make the payments on the proposed lease 
of the Switch and that he might need to find someone else to 
purchase and/or lease the Switch. Joe Thomas explained that the 
plaintiff would not be willing to purchase the Switch from 3D 
unless there was a good market for used switches so that he could 
easily remarket the Switch. 
10. After learning of plaintifffs concerns, Mr. Davies 
and/or his sales representative represented and warranted the 
following to plaintifffs agent, Joe Thomas: 
a. that the Harris 20/20 was a "top-of-the-line" switch 
and in very high demand; 
b. that there was an excellent market for used switches 
like the Harris 20/20 and that 3D would be able to easily resell 
3 
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the switch for the plaintiff in just a few months in the event 
that J.D. West couldn!t pay the lease payments; 
c. that the Switch had gone up in price and value 
since the time that it had been installed at J.D. West's 
facility; 
d. that the Switch could be resold within a few short 
months for no less than 80% of the price of $38,500 that 3D had 
originally quoted to J.D. West and was now quoting the plaintiff; 
e. that the only reason for the 20% discount was to 
cover a sales commission to 3D for reselling the switch and to 
cover the expenses of moving and installing the switch, and not 
that the resale value of the switch would be 20% less than the 
$38,500 price that 3D quoted to the plaintiff. 
11. In reliance upon these representations and warranties 
made to his agent, Joe Thomas, and communicated to the plaintiff, 
the plaintiff agreed to purchase from 3D the Switch which 3D had 
installed in J.D. West's facility in Provo, Utah. The total 
purchase price paid by the plaintiff for , the Switch was 
$38,500.00. The purchase of the Switch by the plaintiff from 3D 
was completed on or about November 28, 1988. The representations 
and warranties set forth above in paragraph 10 constitute an 
integral part of the original agreement between the plaintiff and 
3D to purchase the Switch. 
12. On March 10, 1989, J.D. West went out of business and 
informed the plaintiff that he should make arrangements to remove 
the Switch from J.D. West's premises. 
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13. Joe Thomas immediately contacted Von Gordon of 3D on 
behalf of the plaintiff and informed Mr. Gordon of the problem. 
Mr. Gordon told Joe Thomas that he would help the plaintiff 
remove the Switch and that 3D would immediately begin looking for 
a new buyer for the Switch. 
14. Within a few days after the Switch was so removed, Mr. 
Gordon telephoned Joe Thomas and asked if 3D could also borrow 
the Central Processing Unit ("CPU") and other parts from the 
Switch for a few days. Prior to the removal of the Switch, Mr. 
Gordon had asked if he could borrow the monitor and key board 
from the Switch for a short while. Mr. Gordon explained that 
one of 3Dfs customers' switches had malfunctioned and that 3D did 
not have an extra CPU and other parts to install in the switch. 
Mr. Gordon represented that the CPU and other parts would only be 
borrowed for one week. With the understanding that the CPU 
would be needed for only one week, the plaintiff agreed to allow 
Mr. Gordon to remove the CPU and other parts from the Switch. 
15. Several weeks passed without the CPU and other parts 
being returned or anyone from 3D contacting the plaintiff 
concerning- 3D*s efforts to resell the Switch. Consequently, Joe 
Thomas contacted Von Gordon to inquire as to 3Df s intentions. In 
his conversation with Mr. Gordon, Joe Thomas reviewed the 
representations and warranties that had been made to the 
plaintiff through him with respect to the resale market for used 
switches and the resaleability of the Switch and 3Dfs agreement 
to help resell the Switch for the plaintiff. Mr. Gordon said 
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that he would talk to Ron Davies about the matter. 
16. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Gordon and Ron Davies 
telephoned Joe Thomas. In this conversation, Ron Davies denied 
that anyone at 3D had made any of the representations and 
warranties set forth in paragraph 10 above, and denied that 3D 
had any obligation to the plaintiff with respect to the resale of 
the Switch or otherwise. He did represent, however, that 3D 
would use its best efforts to resell the Switch for the best 
price that 3D could arrange. He further threatened to cease any 
efforts to resell the Switch in the event that the plaintiff 
brought suit against 3D. 
17. Joe Thomas responded that he had a clear recollection 
of the representations and warranties referred to in paragraph 10 
above because the plaintiff would never have agreed to purchase 
the Switch from 3D in the absence of such assurances and 
warranties. Mr. Thomas informed Messrs. Gordon and Davies that 
3D needed to either comply with its obligations or the plaintiff 
would pursue legal action against 3D and its principals. Joe 
Thomas further stated to Mr. Davies that the plaintiff would 
appreciate 3Dfs efforts to sell the Switch, but that if 3D was 
unable to timely sell the Switch for a price that would net the 
plaintiff 80% of the $38,500.00 purchase price ($30,800), the 
plaintiff would sue 3D for the difference, if not the entire 
$38,500 paid by the plaintiff for the Switch. 
18. Over the next several weeks, Joe Thomas contacted a 
number of potential purchasers of the Switch and inquired into 
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prices on the national market for used telephone switches similar 
to the plaintiff's Switch. Through these inquiries, Joe Thomas 
learned that used switches seldom bring more than 50% of their 
original price. Joe Thomas learned that one reason for this is 
that the manufacturer of the Switch, the Harris/Lanier company, 
has a policy of charging a higher amount for software that it 
supplies to purchasers of used switches than it charges to 
purchasers of new switches. Consequently, sellers of its new 
switches have a competitive advantage over sellers of used 
switches unless the used switches are substantially discounted. 
19. Furthermore, after obtaining an indication of interest 
in the Switch from several parties over the next few months, Joe 
Thomas told the parties to contact 3D directly (at 3Dfs 
suggestion) to get the technical details concerning the Switch. 
After these parties contacted 3D, in every instance they 
indicated to Joe Thomas that they were no longer interested in 
plaintiff's Switch. At least one of these parties, Nuskin 
International, bought a new Harris 20/20 switch from 3D instead 
of purchasing the plaintiff's used Switch. 
20. In September of 1989, Von Gordon informed Joe Thomas 
that 3D had found an entity that wanted a switch like the 
plaintiff's Switch, but that the price had to be around $20,000 
or else 3D would sell another switch to the entity instead of the 
plaintiff's Switch. Joe Thomas complained to Mr. Gordon that not 
only had 3D refused to fulfill its obligations arising from the 
representations and warranties set forth in paragraph 10 above, 
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but had not even used its best efforts to sell the Switch as Ron 
Davies represented that it would in Joe Thomas1 first 
conversation with him referred to in paragraph 16 above. Mr. 
Gordon responded simply that if the plaintiff wanted to sell the 
Switch he would have to agree to sell it to 3D for approximately 
$20,000. 
21. Joe Thomas discussed the situation with the plaintiff, 
who agreed to sell the switch to 3D for $22,000 so long as it was 
understood that the issue of whether 3D was liable to the 
plaintiff for additional damages was not resolved and waived 
thereby. Pursuant to these instructions by the plaintiff, Joe 
Thomas informed 3D of the foregoing offer. 3D agreed to the 
terms, and, specifically in response to the condition that 
plaintiff was reserving the right to pursue 3D for additional 
damages, Ron and/or Phil Davies stated that one of their brothers 
was an attorney and that the plaintiff was free to sue them if he 
so desired. 
22. On or about October 21, 1989, Von Gordon visited 
personally with Joe Thomas and signed an agreement on behalf of 
himself, Ron Davies and 3D for the purchase of the Switch from 
the plaintiff for $22,000. The agreement signed by Mr. Gordon 
provided that the Switch was to be paid for in full on or before 
November 20, 1989. In the event that it was not paid for in full 
on that date, the agreement provides that plaintiff is to be paid 
interest on the purchase price of $22,000 at the annual 
percentage rate of 18% until paid in full, and that plaintiff is 
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entitled to his attorney's fees and court costs. Furthermore, 
the agreement specifically states ". .. Payment constitutes 
purchase of the switch and not a settlement of differences. All 
rights reserved....11 A true and correct copy of this agreement 
is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
23. Several days after the signing of the aforementioned 
agreement, representatives of 3D took possession of the Switch 
from the plaintiff. At the time that 3D removed the Switch from 
the plaintiff's storage facility, Joe Thomas reiterated to 3Dfs 
representatives there present that the plaintiff was not waiving 
his rights to seek additional recourse from 3D and its 
principals. 
24. On or about November 20, 1989, the plaintiff received a 
check from 3D in the amount of $22,000. However, on the reverse 
of the check, 3D had typed the following restriction: 
"Endorsement of this check in the amount of $22,000.00 
constitutes payment in full for 1 Harris 20/20 PBX & its 
contents, 1 WYSE Terminal, & 1 Optic Teleset. We agree 
to release 3D Communications Inc. and any of its agents or 
employees from any potential claims prior to 11-16-89." 
A true and correct copy of this check, both front and back, is 
attached hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
25. Upon receipt of the aforementioned check, the plaintiff 
and Joe Thomas telephoned 3D and complained that the restrictive 
endorsement violated the agreement of the parties as embodied in 
the October 21, 1989 Agreement referred to in paragraph 22 above. 
9 
In this telephone conversation, Ron Davies and Von Gordon said 
that it was always their understanding that the $22,000.00 
purchase price would settle all differences between the parties 
and accused the plaintiff of violating his agreement with 3D. 
The plaintiff responded that if 3D did not remove the restrictive 
endorsement from the $22,000 check, he would not accept it and 
would bring suit against 3D. 3D refused to remove the 
restrictive endorsement from the check. 
26. As of the date hereof, 3D is still in possession of the 
Switch and has not replaced the $22,000 check with one that does 
not have a restrictive endorsement. 
27. It is clear from the foregoing that the 
representations, warranties and promises of 3D and its principals 
to the plaintiff, usually through plaintiff's agent, Joe Thomas, 
were false in every regard and that 3D and its 
principals/representatives knew that they were false and/or never 
intended to comply with their promises at the time that all of 
the same were made. The individual defendants have operated 3D 
as a corporation as a sham entity to protect themselves from 
liability for their wrongful acts such as those alleged herein. 
3D is the alter ego of these individual defendants. Consequently, 
the corporate veil should be pierced and the individual 
defendants held liable personally for all of the wrongful conduct 
of 3D alleged herein. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
28. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference 
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herein all of the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 
27 above. 
29. The failure of the defendants to perform their 
obligations arising from the representations and warranties set 
forth in paragraph 10 above constitute a substantial breach of 
the original agreement by the plaintiff to purchase the Switch 
from 3D for the original purchase price of $38,500.00. 
30. As a result of this substantial breach of the terms of 
the original agreement to purchase the Switch, plaintiff is 
entitled to rescission of said agreement and a return of the 
$38,500.00 purchase price that he paid therefore, plus 
prejudgment interest thereon at the legal rate. 
31. Plaintiff has been required, as a result of the 
wrongful conduct of the defendants, to obtain the services of an 
attorney to enforce his rights against the defendants herein. 
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of his costs and attorney's 
fees herein as a matter of right under common law, and/or as a 
result of the application of the provisions of U.C.A. Sections 
78-27-56 and/or 78-27-56.5. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
32. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by 
reference as if set forth in full all of the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 31 above. 
33. The failure of the defendants to perform as 
represented, warranted and/or promised in paragraph 10 above, 
and/or the failure of the representations, warranties and/or 
11 
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promises set forth in paragraph 10 above to ultimately be true, 
constitutes breach of warranty. 
34. As a result of this breach of warranty, Plaintiff is 
entitled to recover from the defendants the purchase price of 
$38,500.00 paid for the Switch, together with interest thereon at 
the legal rate from November 28, 1988, and his costs and 
attorney's fees. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
35. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference 
herein as if set forth in full all of the allegations contained 
in paragraphs 1 through 34 above. 
36. The failure of the defendants to resell the Switch for 
a net purchase price to the plaintiff of $30,500 within a few 
short months after plaintiff informed the defendants of J.D. 
West's default constitutes a breach of contract. 
37. As a result of this breach of contract, the plaintiff 
is entitled to a judgment against the defendants for the sum of 
$30,500.00, together with interest thereon at the legal rate from 
March 10, 1989, and his costs of suit and attorney's fees. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
38. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by 
reference as if set forth in full all of the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 37 above. 
39. At the time that the representations, warranties and/or 
promises set forth in paragraphs 10, 16 and 22 above were made to 
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the plaintiff, the defendants knew that said representations, 
warranties and/or promises were false, or should have known that 
they were false and allowed them to be made with reckless 
disregard for the truth. Nevertheless, the defendants made these 
representations and omissions of material fact to the plaintiff 
with the intent that plaintiff would rely on them and agree to 
initially purchase the Switch, then to temporarily refrain from 
suing the defendants, and finally to allow the defendants to 
retake possession of the Switch, all to the substantial benefit 
of the defendants. Plaintiff did in fact rely on these 
representations, warranties and promises in agreeing initially to 
purchase the Switch, then to temporarily refrain from suing the 
defendants, and finally to allow the defendants to retake 
possession of the Switch, and such reliance was reasonable. 
40. As a result of the defendants' fraud in inducing 
plaintiff to enter into the original agreement to purchase the 
Switch, plaintiff is entitled to rescission of that agreement and 
the return of the $38,500.00 purchase price that he paid for the 
Switch, together with interest thereon at the legal rate from 
November 28, 1988, and his costs and attorney's fees in the 
amount of not less than $17,500.00. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
41. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by 
reference as if set forth in full all of the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 40 above. 
42. The defendants' failure to deliver an unrestricted 
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check for $22,000.00 for the Switch as was agreed as alleged in 
paragraph 22 above, constitutes a breach of said agreement that 
entitles the plaintiff to a judgment against the defendants 
for the sum of $22,000.00, together with interest thereon at the 
annual percentage rate of 18% from November 20, 1989, until paid 
in full, together with plaintiff's costs of suit and attorney's 
fees. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
43. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by 
reference as if set forth in full all of the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 42 above. 
44. At the time that the representations, warranties and/or 
promises set forth in paragraphs 10, 16 and 22 above were made to 
the plaintiff, the defendants knew that said representations, 
warranties and/or promises were false, or should have known that 
they were false and allowed them to be made with reckless 
disregard for the truth. Nevertheless, the defendants made these 
representations and omissions of material fact to the plaintiff 
with the intent that plaintiff would rely on them and agree to 
initially purchase the Switch, then temporarily refrain from 
suing the defendants, and finally to allow the defendants to 
retake possession of the Switch, all to the substantial benefit 
of the defendants. Plaintiff did in fact rely on these 
representations, warranties and promises in agreeing initially to 
purchase the Switch, then to temporarily refrain from suing the 
defendants, and finally to allow the defendants to retake 
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possession of the Switch, and such reliance was reasonable. 
45. As a proximate result of such reasonable reliance upon 
the aforementioned knowingly false representations, warranties 
and promises, the plaintiff has been damaged not only in the 
amount of $38,500.00, together with interest thereon at the legal 
rate from November 28, 1988, both before and after judgment 
until paid in full, his costs of court and attorneys1 fees; but 
also because plaintiff has been forced to expend considerable 
time and resources in his attempts to sell or lease the switch 
and at the same time obtain performance of their obligations from 
the defendants. Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against the 
defendants for additional damages proximately caused by this 
fraudulent activity in an amount to be determined at trial, but 
not less than $15,000.00, together with punitive damages in an 
amount to be determined by the Court, but not less than 
$100,000.00. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
46. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by 
reference as if set forth in full all of the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 45. 
47. The defendants1 wrongful conduct set forth above 
constitutes a breach of the implied covenant of due care, good 
faith and fair dealing and bad faith. 
48. As a result of the breach of the implied covenant of 
due, care, good faith and fair dealing and the bad faith of the 
defendants, the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against the 
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defendants, jointly and severally, for $38,500.00, together with 
interest thereon at the legal rate from November 28, 1988, his 
additional general damages in an amount to be determined at trial 
but not less than $15,000.00, punitive damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial but not less than $100,000.00, his costs of 
suit and attorney's fees. 
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
49. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by 
reference as if set forth in full all of the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 48 above. 
50. The defendants have benefitted personally from the 
wrongful conduct set forth above in amounts that approximate and 
perhaps exceed the damages sought herein. Consequently, the 
defendants should be equitably estopped from raising any defenses 
to the plaintiff's causes of action herein. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for relief against the defendants 
as follows: 
1. With respect to the First, Second and Fourth Causes of 
Action, for judgment against the defendants, jointly and 
severally, in the principal amount of $38,500.00, together with 
interest thereon at the legal rate from November 28, 
1988, until paid in full, his costs of court and attorneys1 fees. 
2. With respect to the Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action, 
for judgment against the defendants, jointly and severally, in 
the principal amount of $38,500.00, together with interest 
thereon at the legal rate from November 28, 1988, until paid in 
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full, his costs of court and attorney's fees, and for additional 
damages proximately caused by the defendant's fraud upon the 
plaintiff and/or bad faith in an amount to be determined at 
trial, but not less than $15,000.00, together with punitive 
damages in an amount to be determined by the Court, but not less 
than $100,000.00. 
3. Sith respect to the Third Cause of Action, for judgment 
against the defendants, jointly and severally, in the principal 
amount of $30,500.00, together with interest thereon at the legal 
rate from March 10, 1989, until paid in full, his costs of court 
and attorney's fees. 
4. With respect to the Fifth Cause of Action, for judgment 
against the defendants, jointly and severally, in the principal 
amount of $22,000.00, together with interest thereon at the 
annual percentage rate of 18% from November 21, 1989, both before 
and after judgment until paid in full, his costs of court and 
attorney's fees. 
5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and equitable under the circumstances. 
DATED this yf day of February, 1990. 
Plaintiff's address: 
160 East 900 North 
Spanish Fork, Utah 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLAN B. THOMAS, * 
* MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
Plaintiff, * AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT 
* OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
vs. * TO DISMISS 
* (Rule 12(b)(6)) 
3D COMMUNICATIONS, INC., * 
VON GORDON, RON DAVIES, and * 
PHIL DAVIES, * Civil No. 900900894 CN 
Defendants. * Judge David S. Young 
Defendants 3D Communications, Inc., as well as the 
individual defendants, Von Gordon, Ron Davies and Phil Davies, 
have filed Motions to Dismiss the plaintiff's Complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
This Memorandum is respectfully submitted in support of those 
Motions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff's seventeen-page Complaint, 
containing eight Causes of Action, arises out of two simple 
transactions: (1) 3D Communications, Inc.'s (hereinafter 3D) 
sale of a Harris 20/20 telephone "switch" to J.D. West in 
August of 1988; and (2) the resale of that telephone switch by 
3D for plaintiff Allan Thomas, J.D. West's financier, after 
J.D. West had defaulted on its obligations to plaintiff 
Thomas. 
2. All involvement of any defendants in the 
transactions allegedly giving rise to the causes of action set 
forth in plaintiff's Complaint, were performed through 3D 
Communications, Inc., a Utah corporation. (Affidavit of 
Ronald G. Davies, paras. 5 and 8.) The individual defendants, 
Von Gordon, Ron Davies and Phil Davies, were involved only as 
employees of 3D. (Id. , para. 5.) 
3. 3D Communications, Inc., is a bona fide 
corporation and at all times has operated as such. Plaintiff's 
only allegations purportedly setting forth a cause of action 
against the individual defendants and attempting to pierce the 
corporate veil are contained in paragraph 27, which states: 
The individual defendants have operated 3D 
as a corporation as a sham entity to 
protect themselves from liability for their 
wrongful acts such as those alleged 
herein. 3D is the alter ego of these 
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individual defendants. Consequently, the 
corporate veil should be pierced and the 
individual defendants held liable 
personally for all of the wrongful conduct 
of 3D alleged herein. 
4. The First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and 
Eighth Causes of Action of plaintiff's Complaint contain claims 
relating in whole in part to the original sale of the telephone 
switch by 3D Communications, Inc. to J.D. West. (Plaintiff's 
Complaint, pp. 10-16.) However, as set forth in the Affidavit 
of Ronald G. Davies, 3D never had any involvement whatsoever 
with plaintiff Allan B. Thomas until after Mr. Thomas had 
repossessed the telephone switch from J.D. West and asked 3D to 
resell the switch for him. (Affidavit of Ronald G. Davies, 
paras. 11-12.) 
5. Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action, as well as 
parts of his Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action, are based on an 
alleged "contract" signed by Von Gordon on October 21, 1989. 
(Complaint, pp. 12-14.) However, Mr. Gordon has never been an 
officer or director of 3D, nor has he ever had authority to 
bind 3D by entering into anything other than pre-drafted and 
pre-approved written sales agreements. (Affidavit of Ronald G. 
Davies, para 13.) Nevertheless, the purported "agreement" 
provides for the payment to plaintiff Thomas of $22,000.00 on 
the resale of the switch, and 3D in fact sent a check for 
$22,000.00 to Mr. Thomas when the switch was sold. (Id., 
para 13.) 
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6. Plaintiff Thomas has never cashed the check 
for $22,000.00 to him from 3D, because it contained a 
restrictive endorsement not to his liking. (Complaint, 
paras. 24-26 at pp. 9-10.) However, 3D remains ready, willing 
and able to honor the check to Mr. Thomas for $22,000.00 for 
the Harris 2 0/2 0 switch, as full and complete payment. (See 
Affidavit of Ronald G. Davies, para. 14.) 
7. 3D had no involvement whatsoever in the 
arrangements between plaintiff Thomas on the one hand, and 
Brian Steffensen or J.D. West on the other, pertaining to 
Mr. Thomas1 financing of the switch for J.D. West. If J.D. 
West or Mr. Steffensen defaulted on their obligations to 
Mr. Thomas, then presumably Mr. Thomas1 appropriate redress 
would be against Mr. Steffensen or J.D. West for the difference 
between the amount financed and the $22,000.00 available to him 
from 3D. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS VON GORDON, RON DAVIES AND PHIL DAVIES 
ACTED AS MERE EMPLOYEES OF A CORPORATION, AND 
PLAINTIFF THOMAS HAS ALLEGED NO BASIS TO 
PIERCE THE CORPORATE VEIL. 
As set forth in the Affidavit of Ronald G. Davies, 3D 
Communications, Inc. has always acted as a corporation. It 
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has corporate officers and a Board of Directors. It maintains 
separate and distinct financial accounts and employs the 
services of an accountant to maintain corporate distinction it 
its financial activities. It has corporate offices and 
corporate-owned equipment. All Work Orders, Sales Agreements 
and invoices pertaining to the sale of the telephone switch 
were from 3D Communications, Inc. When Mr. Thomas requested 3D 
to resell the telephone switch for him, he received a check 
from 3D Communications, Inc. 
Plaintiff has made no effort whatsoever to state any 
specific factual basis for piercing the corporate veil. The 
only such allegation is contained in paragraph 27 of his 
Complaint, and consists only of conclusory and completely 
unsubstantiated allegations. He states only that 3D is lfa sham 
entity" and nthe alter ego of these individual defendants.11 
No. factual support for such is provided, nor could any be 
provided. Such allegations could not have been brought in good 
faith; they provide not only the basis for dismissal of 
plaintiff's Causes of Action against the individual defendants 
but also for appropriate sanctions and for attorney's fees 
incurred in defending these claims pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended). 
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POINT II 
DEFENDANT 3D COMMUNICATIONS, INC. HAD NO CONTRACT 
OR OTHER INVOLVEMENT WITH PLAINTIFF RELATING TO 
THE ORIGINAL SALE OF THE SUBJECT TELEPHONE 
SWITCH, SO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS RELATING TO 
THAT SALE SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
The Affidavit of Ronald G. Davies establishes that 
the sale of the subject telephone switch was from 3D 
Communications, Inc. to J.D. West and/or Brian Steffensen, not 
to plaintiff Allan Thomas. (Affidavit of Ronald G. Davies, 
para. 8-10). Furthermore, all invoices from 3D Communications, 
Inc. for the subject switch were addressed to J.D. West and/or 
Brian Steffensen. (See Exhibit "A" to Affidavit to Ronald G. 
Davies). 3D Communications, Inc. was aware that plaintiff 
Thomas was providing financing to J.D. West, but had no further 
involvement with plaintiff (Affidavit of Ronald G. Davies, 
para. 10). Therefore, plaintiff cannot even state a cause of 
action against 3D for any matters pertaining to the telephone 
switch prior to plaintiff's repossessing that switch and 
requesting 3D Communications to resell it for him. Prior to 
that time, 3D had no privity of contract with plaintiff nor any 
other legal relationship with him. Accordingly, the court 
should dismiss those portions of plaintiff's Complaint 
pertaining the original sale of the telephone switch, 
specifically including the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, 
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Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action insofar as they pertain to 
the original sale. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
BECAUSE IT IS BASED ON AN ALLEGED "CONTRACT" SIGNED 
BY A PERSON WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO BIND 3D. 
Ronald G. Davies has established in his Affidavit 
that Von Gordon had no authority to bind 3D to any contract 
or agreement other than Work Orders and Sales Agreements on 
pre-approved forms. In fact, Ronald G. Davies, as supervising 
officer on the subject transactions, was not even aware of that 
purported "contract" until the time that he sent a check for 
$22,000.00 to plaintiff. (Affidavit of Ronald G. Davies, 
para. 13.) Inasmuch as Von Gordon was neither an officer nor 
director of 3D Communications and given the very rough and 
inartful form of the "contract," plaintiff would be 
hard-pressed even to argue that Von Gordon had apparent 
authority to bind 3D to such an agreement. Therefore inasmuch 
as the Fifth Cause of Action is based upon a contract signed 
without authority from 3D Communications, that Cause of Action 
should be dismissed. 
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POINT IV 
THE EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION DOES NOT STATE A 
COGNIZABLE LEGAL CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Plaintiff's Eighth Cause of Action is without legal 
foundation. It suggests that through some kind of dubious 
theory, defendants should be estopped from raising any 
defenses herein. This theory, if ever adopted by the 
courts, would truly provide a unique method of trimming the 
court's docket. Certain defendants, for reasons yet unclear, 
should apparently be prevented by the court from defending 
themselves. This Cause of Action should be dismissed not only 
because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, but because it is patently ridiculous. 
, 1990. DATED this 7 ^ day of I^'AJYU 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
< . 
) 
/ 
LYNN S. DAVIES 
'Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was HAND DELIVERED on this 7 ^ day of 
//1/ttcJL , 1990, to the following counsel of record: 
Brian W. Steffensen 
Huntsman Building, Suite 200 
3760 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LA£ET"C6UNTYM 
(801) 273-3962 ,/p 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALLAN B. THOMAS, * 
* PLAINTIFF ALLAN THOMAS' 
Plaintiff, * MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
* DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
vs. * 
3D COMMUNICATIONS, INC., * 
VON GORDON, RON DAVIES and * 
PHIL DAVIES, * Civil No. 900900894 CN 
• 
Defendants. * Judge David S. Young 
This Memorandum is respectfully submitted in opposition to 
the defendants' Motions to Dismiss. 
PLAINTIFF7 S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Ranee Larsen, at all times pertinent to this case, was 
general manager of J.D. West Associates, Inc., a Utah corporation 
("J.D. West"), doing business at 547 West Columbia Lane, Provo, 
Utah. As general manager, Mr. Larsen had responsibility for the 
day to day operations of J.D. West. (Affidavit of Ranee Larsen 
(hereinafter "Larsen"), paras. 2 and 3., Affidavit of Brian 
Steffensen (hereinafter "Steffensen"), para. 4) 
2. Brian W. Steffensen, at all times pertinent to this 
case, was the president and co-owner of J.D. West; but, was not 
involved in the day to day operations of J.D. West due to his 
full-time law practice in Salt Lake City, Utah. (Steffensen, 
paras. 2, 3 and 4) 
3. During the months of July and August, 1988, Mr. Larsen 
began to have discussions with respect to the possible 
acquisition of a telephone switch for J.D. West with Von Gordon 
and Rick Wood, who represented themselves to Mr. Larsen to be 
co-owners and sales representatives of 3D Communications, Inc. 
("3D"). (Larsen, para. 4; Steffensen, para. 5) 
4. Mr. Larsen informed Messrs. Gordon and Wood that J.D. 
West would like to arrange for the use of a new telephone switch, 
but did not have the financial resources to purchase the switch 
outright. (Larsen, para. 5) 
5. Mr. Gordon and/or Mr. Wood informed Mr. Larsen that 3D 
had connections with several equipment leasing companies that 
might agree to purchase the switch from 3D and then lease it to 
J.D. West, and offered to help J.D. West make application with 
these companies for such a lease. (Larsen, para. 6) 
6. At no time did Mr. Larsen or anyone else on behalf of 
J.D. West ever represent to 3D that J.D. West could or would ever 
be the purchaser of the switch. Rather, it was always 
contemplated and understood by Mr. Larsen and 3D that a third 
party would have to purchase the switch from 3D and then lease it 
to J.D. West in order for any transaction with respect to the 
switch to be completed. (Larsen, para. 7; Steffensen, para. 9) 
7. 3D obtained lease application forms for J.D. West from 
several lease companies and delivered them to Mr. Larsen, which 
applications J.D. West filled out and returned to the lease 
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companies. (Larsen, para. 8) 
8. 3D kept in close contact with these lease companies in 
an attempt to learn as quickly as possible whether or not one or 
more of them would agree to purchase the switch from 3D for lease 
to J.D. West. (Larsen, para. 9) 
9. Toward the end of August, 1988, either Mr. Gordon or Mr. 
Wood from 3D contacted Mr. Larsen and informed him that one of 
the lease companies had indicated to 3D that the lease company 
had preliminarily approved the purchase of the switch for lease 
to J.D. West. 3D further said that it was willing to install the 
switch in J.D. West's premises immediately even though the actual 
sale to the lease company had not been completed because 3D was 
confident that the lease company would finalize the purchase of 
the switch in the very near future. (Larsen, para. 10) 
10. Prior to installing the switch, however, 3D asked Mr. 
Larsen to have someone sign a "work order" with respect to the 
switch to "authorize installation" of the switch at J.D. West. 
Consequently, Mr. Larsen brought a "work order" form to Salt Lake 
City to be signed by Mr. Steffensen on or about August 31, 1988. 
This "work order" signed by Mr. Steffensen is attached to the 
Affidavit of Ron Davies as Exhibit "A". (Larsen, paras. 11 and 
12) 
11. The document signed by Mr. Steffensen referred to in 
paragraph 10 above was intended and understood by Mr. Larsen of 
J.D. West and 3D to merely authorize the installation of the 
switch and did not constitute or represent an agreement on the 
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part of J.D. West and/or Mr. Steffensen to purchase the switch. 
(Larsen, paras. 11 and 12; Steffensen, para. 6) 
12. Shortly thereafter, 3D installed the switch at J.D. 
West's business premises in Provo, Utah. (Larsen, para. 13) 
13. Approximately one month later, the lease of the switch 
had not been approved and finalized, but J.D. West needed 3D to 
install the remainder of the 64 individual telephone hand sets 
that were to be included in the lease transaction. Since the 
lease had been delayed, 3D asked Mr. Larsen if J.D. West would 
pay $1,000.00 toward the handsets, which amount 3D agreed to 
refund to J.D. West when the lease was finalized. Mr. Larsen 
agreed to this request and paid 3D $1,000.00 in order to get the 
remainder of the handsets installed by 3D. (Larsen, para. 14) 
14. When the leasing companies had still not agreed to 
finalize the purchase of the switch to be leased to J.D. West by 
the end of October, 1988, or the beginning of November, 1988, 3D 
began to be very concerned. In particular, defendant Phil 
Davies telephoned Mr. Larsen and asked him if he could talk to 
Mr. Steffensen about the situation. Mr. Larsen then asked Mr. 
Steffensen to telephone Phil Davies. (Larsen, para. 15) 
16. Mr. Steffensen telephoned Phil Davies, who represented 
to Mr. Steffensen that he was "Chairman of the Board" of 3D and 
that he was very concerned about the fact that the sale of the 
switch to the leasing company had apparently fallen through. 
Phil Davies then asked Mr. Steffensen if he had any ideas about 
how to resolve the situation. Mr. Steffensen reminded Phil 
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Davies that J.D. West had never represented that it would 
purchase the switch from 3D and that J.D. West still did not have 
the resources to purchase the switch. Mr. Steffensen told Phil 
Davies that the only options were to either identify a private 
individual who might be willing to purchase the switch from 3D, 
or 3D would have to remove the switch. Mr. Davies encouraged Mr. 
Steffensen to pursue locating a private individual to purchase 
the switch because 3D "really needed the money." (Steffensen, 
para. 9) 
17. This conversation with Phil Davies was Mr. Steffensen's 
first contact with anyone at 3D regarding the telephone switch. 
(Steffensen, para. 9) 
18. Shortly thereafter, Joe Thomas, an employee of J.D. 
West, indicated that his father, Allan B. Thomas, the plaintiff 
herein, might be willing to purchase the switch and then lease it 
to J.D. West. Joe Thomas then contacted 3D directly and had the 
conversations with representatives of 3D set forth in paragraphs 
8, 9, 10 and 11 of plaintiff's complaint and proposed First 
Amended Complaint. In these conversations, Joe Thomas identified 
the plaintiff Allan Thomas as a potential purchaser of the switch 
to defendants Ron Davies and Rick Wood of 3D and informed them of 
the plaintiff's concerns about purchasing the switch. (J. 
Thomas, paras. 2, 3 and 4; Affidavit of Allan Thomas (hereinafter 
"A. Thomas"), paras. 2, 3 and 4; Larsen, para. 16) 
19. Desperate to have the plaintiff agree to purchase the 
switch and bail them out of a bad financial situation arising as 
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a result of the failed sale of the switch to one of the leasing 
companies, defendants Ron Davies and/or Rick Wood made the 
representations, warranties and promises set forth in paragraph 
10 of the complaint and proposed First Amended Complaint despite 
the fact that the defendants either knew or should have known 
them to be false or incapable of performance. (J. Thomas, paras. 
2, 3 and 4; A. Thomas; para. 4) 
19. In reliance upon the representations, warranties and 
promises of the defendants set forth in paragraph 10 of the 
complaint and proposed First Amended Complaint, the plaintiff 
decided to go ahead with the purchase of the switch from 3D and 
informed J.D. West of this decision. (A. Thomas, para. 5) 
20. Upon learning of Mr. Thomas' decision to purchase the 
switch from 3D, Mr. Steffensen telephoned defendant Phil Davies 
to inform him that a purchaser had been located for the switch 
and that the details were close to being finalized. In this 
telephone conversation, Mr. Steffensen confirmed to Mr. Davies 
that plaintiff Allan Thomas was the prospective purchaser of the 
switch. (Steffensen, para. 14) 
20. On or about November 28, 1988, the plaintiff and his 
accountant met with Ranee Larsen, Brian Steffensen and Richard 
Roth (the other co-owner of J.D. West and it's Chairman), to 
finalize the terms of the proposed lease transaction. In order 
for the plaintiff to be able to claim the tax benefits associated 
with the ownership and subsequent lease of the switch to J.D. 
West, the plaintiff Allan Thomas had to get a bill of sale from 
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3D for the switch. Consequently, after the lease terms were 
finalized between the plaintiff and J.D. West, Allan Thomas asked 
Mr. Larsen and Mr. Steffensen to telephone 3D to coordinate 
finalizing the purchase of the switch by the plaintiff. (Larsen, 
para. 20; A. Thomas, paras. 8 and 9; Affidavit of Richard Roth 
(hereinafter "Roth"), para. 10) 
21. In a conference call with Phil Davies, Mr. Larsen and 
Mr. Steffensen told Mr. Davies that plaintiff Allan Thomas would 
leave his check for $38,500.00 (the purchase price of the 
telephone equipment) at J.D. West's office and that 3D would need 
to deliver a bill of sale for Mr. Thomas in order to pick up the 
check. Phil Davies indicated that there would be no problem 
giving Mr. Thomas a bill of sale and asked for the exact spelling 
of the name(s) to be put on the bill of sale. (Larsen, para. 21; 
Steffensen, para. 16) 
22. The next day, Mr. Larsen telephoned Mr. Steff ensen to 
inquire as to the language that should be included in the bill of 
sale for Mr. Thomas. Mr. Steffensen dictated the language for a 
bill of sale over the telephone to Mr. Larsen's secretary, who 
typed it out. Mr. Larsen placed the bill of sale from 3D to Mr. 
Thomas in a file with the lease documents for Mr. Thomas and 
delivered Mr. Thomas7 check to 3D's representative. (Larsen, 
para. 22; Steffensen, para. 17) 
23. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Larsen asked Mr. Steffensen to 
drop by the offices of 3D in Salt Lake City to pick up a check 
for the refund of the $1,000.00 that J.D. West had advanced for 
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handsets back in September as set forth in paragraph 12 above. 
(Larsen, para. 23; Steffensen, para. 18) 
23. Pursuant to Mr. Larsen's request, Mr. Steffensen 
visited the offices of 3D and met with Ron Davies on or about 
December 14, 1990. In this meeting, Ron Davies indicated that he 
had been preoccupied with personal matters (a seriously ill young 
daughter) during much of the previous several months and was not 
very familiar with the details of the transaction with J.D. West 
and/or the plaintiff. Specifically, he acted like he did not 
understand why J.D. West was requesting a refund of monies. Mr. 
Steffensen telephoned Mr. Larsen, who explained over the phone to 
Mr. Steffensen and Ron Davies the sequence of events and why a 
refund was due J.D. West. Reluctantly, Ron Davies agreed to 
refund $959.00 (which was less than the amount J.D. West claimed 
was due) and asked Mr. Steffensen to sign a final receipt 
regarding the matter. Mr. Steffensen consulted again with Mr. 
Larsen, and then agreed to accept the lesser amount offered by 3D 
and to sign the document prepared by Mr. Davies, a copy of which 
is attached to the Affidavit of Ron Davies as Exhibit "B". After 
signing this document, Ron Davies gave Mr. Steffensen a check for 
$959.00 made out to J.D. West. (Steffensen, para. 19; Larsen, 
para. 24) 
24. The document signed by Mr. Steffensen referred to in 
paragraph 23 above merely acknowledged J.D. West's agreement to 
accept only the $959.00 offered by 3D rather than the full amount 
originally claimed by J.D. West, and was never intended to 
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represent or document that the switch had been purchased by J.D. 
West. At that time, there was no doubt in anyone's mind that Mr. 
Thomas had purchased the switch. (Steffensen, para. 18; Larsen, 
paras. 25 and 26; Roth, para. 13) 
25. Thereafter, the events outlined in paragraphs 12 
through 26 of plaintiff's complaint occurred as alleged therein. 
Mr. Steffensen had absolutely no involvement of any kind in any 
of the interaction between the defendants and the plaintiff 
and/or the plaintiff's agent, Joe Thomas, set forth in paragraphs 
12 through 26 of the complaint. (J. Thomas, paras. 2, 3 and 4; 
Steffensen, para. 23) 
26. During several of the conversations that Joe Thomas had 
with the defendants herein, the defendants derided Joe Thomas and 
the plaintiff for being naive and "not understanding how 
business works." The defendants further warned Joe Thomas and 
the plaintiff that the plaintiff would be foolish to sue them 
because they would easily "outlast" the plaintiff in court 
because their brother was an attorney and they wouldn't have to 
pay for attorney's fees. (J. Thomas, paras. 2, 3 and 4) 
27. The facts set forth above and in plaintiff's complaint 
indicate a pattern on the part of the defendants wherein they 
initially did not hesitate to make whatever representations, 
warranties and/or promises that they deemed necessary to induce 
the performance that they desired from the plaintiff Allan 
Thomas, regardless of the untruthfulness of the representations 
and warranties or the defendants' complete lack of intention to 
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fulfil the promises being made. Thereafter, the defendants not 
only refused without hesitation to fulfil their previously 
promised obligations, but also categorically and shamelessly 
denied ever even having made the representations, warranties 
and/or promises in the first place. (J. Thomas, paras. 2, 3 and 
4; A. Thomas, para. 10) 
Plaintiffs Complaint Properly Pleads a Cause of Action 
Against Defendants For Piercing the Corporate Veil. The 
plaintiff seeks to find the individual defendants liable to the 
plaintiff on each of the causes of action of the complaint on two 
separate grounds: 1) that they personally participated in the 
wrongful and fraudulent conduct alleged in the complaint and are 
therefore personally liable to plaintiff for the consequences of 
their wrongful actions regardless of whether they were acting 
individually or as agents for 3D, and 2) as a result of the 
individual defendants' personal participation in the alleged 
fraudulent and bad faith conduct, and the fact that they are the 
controlling shareholders of 3D, they should be held personally 
liable for the wrongful conduct of 3d and for all of 3D's 
obligations to plaintiff under an "alter ego" theory. 
These assertions and this form of pleading by the plaintiff 
is entirely consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's most recent 
pronouncement on the issue of piercing the corporate veil. In 
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power and Water, Inc., 
129 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah March 6, 1990), the Court noted: 
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"We have said that to invoke the equitable alter ego 
doctrine, 
there must be a concurrence of two circumstances: (1) there 
must be such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer 
exist, viz., the corporation is, in fact, the alter ego of one or 
a few individuals; and (2) the observance of the corporate form 
would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable 
result would follow. 
Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P. 2d 1028, 
1030 (Utah 1979) 
Specifically, in Transamerica, supra, the Court ruled that 
despite the fact that the corporate formalities had been entirely 
ignored such that the corporation there in question was clearly 
the alter ego in fact of the individual, the corporate veil would 
not be pierced because the corporation had not been involved in 
the perpetration of any alleged fraudulent or unjust scheme. 
The defendants in this case seem to think that the plaintiff 
must allege specific instances of corporate formalities not being 
followed in order to plead a claim to pierce the corporate veil. 
This is not necessary under Utah law, and places undue emphasis 
on the first prong of the test. The true test for whether the 
corporate veil should be pierced is whether or not the 
individuals involved have engaged in any fraudulent or bad faith 
conduct and then whether an injustice will be worked upon the 
claimant if the individuals are allowed to assert the corporate 
shield to avoid answering personally to the claimant for such 
fraudulent or bad faith conduct. See 18A Am. Jur. Corporations 
Section 852 p 724 (" . . . shareholders may be held individually 
liable to prevent fraud or injustice, to enforce or achieve 
paramount equity, to protect the rights of innocent parties where 
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recognition of corporate separateness would result in 'a manifest 
absurdity,' or to prevent the avoidance of a legal obligation or 
duty", and the cases cited therein). 
Plaintiff believes that his original pleading was consistent 
with these pronouncements of the law with respect to piercing the 
corporate veil and the alter ego theory, but does not wish to 
risk any chance of his causes of action being dismissed for 
failing in any technical fashion to state a proper claim for 
relief. Consequently, plaintiff has made a motion 
contemporaneously herewith for leave to file a First Amended 
Complaint which includes, among other changes, additional 
language regarding the "alter ego" theory. 
There Is A Genuine Issue of Fact as to Whether the Plaintiff 
Was the Purchaser of the Switch From 3D Communications. The 
defendants assert that plaintiff cannot state a cause of action 
against 3D or any of the other defendants for matters pertaining 
to the telephone switch prior to plaintiff's repossessing the 
switch from J.D. West because plaintiff was not the purchaser of 
the switch from 3D. This assertion of fact by the defendants is 
entirely false and will be asserted by the plaintiff as an 
additional indication of the defendants' bad faith and fraudulent 
conduct vis a vis the plaintiff. 
Furthermore, the issues of fact as to whether plaintiff had 
any privity of contract with the defendants and whether the 
defendants made any representations, warranties and/or promises 
to the plaintiff to induce him to purchase the switch from the 
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defendants are disputed. The defendants' Motions to Dismiss on 
the ground that this issue is not in dispute must be denied. 
Whether Von Gordon Had Actual or Apparent Authority To Enter 
Into the Agreement That Forms The Basis of Plaintiffs Fifth 
Cause of Action is a Factual Issue in Dispute. The defendants 
argue that plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action must be dismissed 
because Von Gordon did not have any actual authority to sign the 
written agreement upon which that Cause of Action is based. 
Defendants further state that because the agreement signed by 
defendant Gordon is in a "very rough and inartful form 
plaintiff would be hard-pressed even to argue that Von Gordon had 
apparent authority to bind 3D to such an agreement." 
Nevertheless, the plaintiff has alleged that Von Gordon 
represented himself to be a co-owner of 3D with the other 
individual defendants, and was the individual through whom 3D did 
most of its negotiating and communicating with J.D. West and then 
with Allan Thomas. Not only are these factual allegations 
sufficient to support a finding that Mr. Gordon had apparent 
authority to bind the other defendants to the written agreement 
he signed on their behalf, but they indicate that he may have had 
actual authority to do so as well. At the very least, the issue 
of whether Mr. Gordon was the agent of the other defendants is a 
disputed issue of fact. Since the defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
the Fifth Cause of Action requires a finding by this Court that 
the issue of Mr. Gordon's agency is not in dispute, this Motion 
to Dismiss must also be denied. 
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Furthermore, Mr. Gordon should clearly be held personally 
liable on the agreement that he signed and gave to plaintiff 
Allan Thomas even if the other defendants did not authorize him 
to act as their agents. Mr. Gordon's liability to the plaintiff 
in this regard includes not only the specific requirements of the 
contract in question that he signed, but also includes a claim 
for breach of his warranty of agency vis a vis the other 
defendants should they prevail on their claim that they did not 
authorize him to act as their agents. (This means that there is a 
very real and serious conflict of interest between Von Gordon and 
the other the defendants in this case, yet they are represented 
by the same counsel). For this reason the plaintiff has moved 
the Court to allow him to allege a Breach of Warranty of Agency 
claim against defendant Von Gordon, 
Plaintiff's Eighth Cause of Action Was Intended to Raise the 
Theory of Equitable Estoppel. Plaintiff intended to plead a 
cause of action for equitable estoppel for his Eighth Cause of 
Action. In reviewing the defendants argument regarding this 
Cause of Action, plaintiff is persuaded that the Cause of Action 
as currently pleaded does not clearly reflect the intended 
theory. Consequently, plaintiff also respectfully requests the 
Court for leave to amend the Eighth Cause of Action to more 
clearly plead this theory as is set forth in plaintiff's proposed 
First Amended Complaint. See Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor 
Control, 602 P. 2d 689 (Utah 1979). 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that all of defendants' 
14 
Motions to Dismiss be denied and that defendants not recover any 
costs, attorney's fees or the other sanctions that they also seek 
in said Motions to Dismiss. 
DATED this /,? day of March, 199 0. 
Brian JW. St 
Attorney for P 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
2&1 day of A 
of the 
tu.cA. I hereby certify that on this 
1990, I caused a true and correct copy of thfe foregoing 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motions to Dismiss to be 
hand-delivered to: Lynn S. Davies, Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALLAN B. THOMAS, * 
Plaintiff, * 
* 
vs. * 
* 
3D COMMUNICATIONS, INC., * 
VON GORDON, RON DAVIES and * 
PHIL DAVIES, * 
Defendants. * 
State of Wyoming ) 
: ss. 
County of ) 
Ranee Larsen, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
says: 
1. Affiant is currently a resident of the State of Wyoming 
and is over the age of 18. 
2. From June of 1988 until February of 1989, Affiant was 
employed as general manager of J.D. West Associates, Inc., a Utah 
corporation ("J.D. West"). 
3. In this position, Affiant had complete responsibility 
for all aspects of the day-to-day operations of J.D. West in 
Provo, Utah, subject to final approval of major decisions by 
Brian W. Steffensen and/or Richard Roth, co-owners of J.D. West. 
4. During the months of July and August, 1988, Affiant 
P* 
Brian W. Steffensen, P.C. (3092) 
Huntsman Building, Suite 200 
3760 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801) 273-3962 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
RANCE LARSEN 
Civil No. 900900894 CN 
Judge David S. Young 
began to have discussions with respect to the possible 
acquisition of a telephone switch and related equipment and 
software for J.D. West with Von Gordon and Rick Wood, who 
represented themselves to Affiant to be a co-owner and sales 
representative, respectively, of 3D Communications, Inc (fl3D,f). 
5. Affiant informed Mr. Gordon and Mr. Wood that J.D. West 
would like to arrange for the use of a new telephone switch, but 
did not have the financial resources to purchase the switch 
outright. 
6. Mr. Gordon and Mr. Wood informed Affiant that 3D had 
connections with several equipment leasing companies that might 
agree to purchase the switching equipment from 3D and then lease 
it to J.D. West, and offered to help J.D. West make application 
with these companies for such a lease. 
7. At no time did Affiant, or anyone else at J.D. West to 
Affiantfs knowledge, ever represent to 3D that J.D. West could or 
would ever be the purchaser of the switch. Affiant and the 
representatives of 3D with whom Affiant negotiated the terms of 
the lease transaction always understood that a third party would 
have to purchase the switch from 3D and then lease it to J.D. 
West in order for any transaction with respect to the switch to 
be completed. 
8. Affiant received lease application forms from 3D for 
several different leasing companies and caused them to be filled 
out and returned to the leasing companies. 
9. Mr. Gordon and/or Mr. Wood informed Affiant that they 
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were in close touch with the leasing companies and would know 
soon whether a lease would be approved or not. 
10. Toward the end of August, 1988, either Mr. Gordon or 
Mr. Wood from 3D contacted Affiant and informed him that one of 
the lease companies had indicated to 3D that the lease company 
had preliminarily approved the purchase and lease of the switch 
to J.D. West. He also said that 3D was willing to install the 
switch in J.D. West's premises immediately even though the sale 
to the lease company had not been completed because 3D was 
confident that the lease company would finalize the purchase of 
the switch in the very near future. 
11. Prior to installing the switch, however, Mr. Gordon or 
Mr. Wood asked Affiant to have someone sign a "work order" with 
respect to the switch and related equipment to "authorize 
installation" of the equipment and software at J.D. West. 
12. Affiant then telephoned Brian Steffensen and informed 
Mr. Steffensen that 3D was prepared to install the proposed new 
switch in J.D. West's premises in Provo, Utah, because a leasing 
company had told 3D that the proposed lease was preliminarily 
approved. Affiant further explained to Mr. Steffensen that 3D 
wanted an authorization from J.D. West for the installation of 
the switch. Mr. Steffensen agreed to authorize the installation 
of the switch. Affiant then took documents prepared by 3D to 
Salt Lake City for Mr. Steffensen to sign on or about August 31, 
1988. A true and correct copy of these documents is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A". 
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13. Shortly thereafter, 3D installed the switch at J.D. 
West's premises in Provo, Utah. 
14. Approximately one month later, the lease of the 
switching equipment had not been approved and finalized, but J.D. 
West needed 3D to install the remainder of the 64 telephone 
handsets that were to be included in the proposed lease 
installed. Since the lease had been delayed, Mr. Gordon told 
Affiant that 3D would only install the handsets if J.D. West 
would agree to pay $1,000.00 toward the handsets. Mr. Gordon 
told Affiant that if J.D. West would pay this amount now, 3D 
would refund it back to J.D. West when the lease company paid 3D 
for the purchase of the switch. Affiant discussed the matter 
with Mr. Steffensen and then agreed to this request and paid 3D 
$1,000.00 in order to get the remainder of the handsets installed 
by 3D. 
15. Sometime during the first week of November, 1988, 
Affiant began to receive telephone calls from various 
representatives of 3D who were all very concerned about the fact 
that none of the leasing companies had agreed to purchase the 
switch for lease to J.D. West. In particular, Phil Davies called 
Affiant and asked if he could talk to Mr. Steffensen about the 
situation. Affiant then telephoned Mr. Steffensen and asked him 
to telephone Phil Davies. 
16. Shortly thereafter, an employee at J.D. West, Joe L 
Thomas, approached the Affiant and said that he had learned that 
J.D. West was looking for someone to purchase the switch from 3D 
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and then lease it to J.D. West. Joe Thomas further said that his 
father, Allan Thomas, might be willing to do that if there wasnft 
too much risk involved and if his accountant felt that the tax 
benefits would help him. Affiant encouraged Joe Thomas to 
contact Mr. Steffensen and to pursue the matter further. 
17. Several days later, Joe Thomas informed Affiant that he 
had talked to Ron Davies and Rick Wood at 3D about the possible 
purchase of the switch by his father. He said that he explained 
to Ron Davies and Rick Wood that his father was retired and was 
only interested in a safe investment that would generate some tax 
benefits. He said that he told them that if there was any chance 
that his father could get stuck with the switch with no one to 
sell or lease it to, his father would not be interested in 
purchasing the switch. 
18. Joe Thomas told the Affiant that, in response to these 
concerns and questions, Ron Davies and Rick Wood assured him that 
the switch was highly marketable and that they would help him 
resell the switch if J.D. West couldn't make the lease payments. 
Affiant encouraged Joe Thomas to investigate the matter 
thoroughly before he got his father involved. Joe Thomas told 
Affiant that based on the assurances and promises of 3D, he was 
convinced that his father's investment in purchasing the switch 
would be relatively safe. 
19. A few days later, Joe Thomas told Affiant that his 
father had agreed to purchase the switch from 3D if a suitable 
lease agreement could be worked out with J.D. West. Affiant 
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informed Von Gordon that Joe Thomas• father had agreed to 
purchase the switch from 3D. 
20. On or about November 28, 1988, Allan Thomas and his 
accountant met with Affiant, Brian Steffensen and Richard Roth ( 
co-owner of J.D. West and its Chairman) to finalize the proposed 
lease of the switch from Mr. Thomas. After the details of the 
lease were agreed upon, Allan Thomas1 accountant emphasized that 
Mr. Thomas needed to have ownership of the switch clearly in his 
name so that he could take advantage of certain tax benefits 
associated with lease transactions. To facilitate this, the 
Affiant and Mr. Steffensen agreed to telephone 3D to arrange for 
a bill of sale for Mr. Thomas. 
21. Affiant and Mr. Steffensen then telephoned Phil Davies 
at 3D on a conference telephone. Affiant and Mr. Steffensen told 
Phil Davies that the terms of the lease from Allan Thomas to J.D. 
West had been agreed upon and that Mr. Thomas had brought a check 
with him to J.D. West's offices for the switch. Affiant and Mr. 
Steffensen further told Phil Davies that Mr. Thomas needed to get 
a bill of sale from 3D for the switch in order to make his 
ownership position clear. Phil Davies told Affiant and Mr. 
Steffensen that there would be no problem with a bill of sale 
being prepared for Mr. Thomas and that he was very happy that the 
sale of the switch was finally being consummated. Affiant told 
Mr. Davies that Affiant would have the check in his office 
awaiting the delivery of a bill of sale for Mr. Thomas from 3D. 
Phil Davies told Affiant that someone from 3D would be by the 
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next day with the bill of sale and to pick up Allan Thomas' 
check. 
22. The next morning, Affiant became confused as to the 
appropriate wording for the bill of sale and telephoned Mr. 
Steffensen*s law office in Salt Lake City. Mr. Steffensen then 
dictated the language of a bill of sale from 3D to Mr. Thomas 
over the telephone to Affiant's secretary. Affiant then obtained 
the signed bill of sale from 3D for Mr. Thomas and delivered Mr. 
Thomas' check to 3D's representative. 
23. Sometime later, Affiant reminded Mr. Steffensen that 3D 
owed J.D. West a refund for the $1,000 that J.D. West had paid 
back in September for the handsets that were included in the 
lease. Now that Allan Thomas had purchased the switch and 
handsets from 3D, and paid 3D in full for them, 3d needed to 
refund J.D. West's money. Affiant suggested that Mr. Steffensen 
go to 3D's office in Salt Lake City to pick up the refund. 
24. Affiant received a telephone call from Mr. Steffensen 
from 3D's offices in Salt Lake City. Mr. Steffensen told Affiant 
that Ron Davies had told Mr. Steffensen that Ron Davies had not 
had much to do with the transaction involving the switch at J.D. 
West because his daughter had been injured or ill and in the 
hospital over the past several months. For this reason, Ron 
Davies was complaining that he didn't understand why J.D. West 
was entitled to a refund. Affiant then reviewed the details of 
what had transpired with Mr. Steffensen and/or Ron Davies. Mr. 
Steffensen later told Affiant that he had agreed that even though 
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J,D.West legally didn't owe 3D any money because of the delay the 
sale/lease closing, J.D. West would agree to accept lee© than 
what was due as a show of good faith. 
25 . Mr- Steffensen gave Affiant a document to be put in 
J.D. West's records that Ron Davies had typed up to evidence the 
agreement by J.D. West to accept the refund of $959*00 instead of 
the entire amount J.D.West claimed. A copy of this document is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "B11. 
26. The document signed by Mr. Steffensen attached hereto 
as Exhibit MB,f was understood to reflect only J.D. West's 
agreement to accept rhe $959.00 refund, and not as an indication 
or evidence that J.D. West had purchased the switch and other 
telephone equipment from 3D instead of Allan Thomas. There was 
no doubt in Affiant's mind that at the time of the execution of 
this document that von Gordon and the other 3D principals 
understood that Allan Thomas had purchased the switch from 3D. 
27. Almost all of the interaction between 3D and J.D. west 
with respect to the telephone switchinq equipment referred tp 
above occurred between Affiant and Von Cordon and sometimes Rick 
Wood. Mr. Steffensen did not have much involvement/ if eny, in 
the transaction until November of 1988; and Affiant had very few 
conversations with either Phil or Ron Davies. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE" COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
"JR| 
rCT 
ALLAN B. THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
3D COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 
VON GORDON, RON DAVIES and 
PHIL DAVIES, 
Defendants. 
* 
* 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN 
Civil No. 900900894 CN 
Judge David S. Young 
State of Utah ) 
ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Brian W. Steffensen, being first dully sworn upon oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. Affiant is a resident of the State of Utah and is over 
the age of 18. 
2. From March of 1988 until the present time, Affiant has 
been the president of J.D. West Associates, Inc., a Utah 
corporation ("J.D. West"). 
3. Affiant is a member of the Utah State Bar in good 
standing and during all times relevant hereto has maintained an 
office engaged in the full-time practice of law. 
4. Because of Affiant's full-time law practice, Affiant 
hired Ranee Larsen to be general manager of J.D. West. In this 
position, Mr. Larsen had complete responsibility for all aspects 
of the day-to-day operations of J.D. West in Provo, Utah. 
5. In August of 1988, Mr. Larsen informed Affiant that he 
was discussing the acquisition of a telephone switch for J.D. 
West with representatives of 3D Communications, Inc. ("3D"). 
Affiant and Mr. Larsen agreed that J.D. West did not have the 
resources to purchase a new switch, but Mr. Larsen told Affiant 
that 3D thought that it could find a leasing company to purchase 
the switch and then lease it to J.D. West. Affiant authorized 
Mr. Larsen to negotiate the terms of a lease for the proposed new 
switch. 
6. Toward the end of August, 1988, Mr. Larsen informed 
Affiant that 3D was prepared to install the proposed new switch 
in J.D. West's premises in Provo, Utah, because a leasing company 
had told 3D that the proposed lease was preliminarily approved. 
Mr. Larsen told Affiant, however, that 3D wanted an authorization 
from J.D. West for the installation of the switch. Affiant told 
Mr. Larsen that Affiant would be happy to authorize the 
installation of the switch. Mr. Larsen then brought documents 
from 3D to Salt Lake City for Affiant to sign, which documents 
Affiant signed on or about August 31, 1988. A true and correct 
copy of these documents is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" . 
7. Toward the end of September, 1988, Mr. Larsen informed 
Affiant that J.D. West needed the remainder of the 64 telephone 
handsets that were to be included in the proposed lease 
installed, but that the lease had not yet been finalized. Mr. 
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Larsen further told Affiant that 3D would not install the 
handsets unless J.D. West paid 3D $1,000 for the handsets, which 
amount would be refunded to J.D. West from the proceeds of the 
sale to the lease company. Affiant authorized Mr. Larsen to pay 
3D for the handsets on the condition that 3D reimburse J.D. West 
for them when the lease was finalized. 
8. Sometime during the first week of November, 1988, Mr. 
Larsen informed Affiant that representatives of 3D had called him 
several times recently and were very concerned about the fact 
that none of the leasing companies had agreed to purchase the 
switch for lease to J.D. West. Mr. Larsen further said that Phil 
Davies wanted to talk to the Affiant about the situation. Mr. 
Larsen asked Affiant to telephone Phil Davies. 
9. Shortly thereafter, Affiant telephoned Phil Davies at 
3D. Mr. Davies told Affiant that he was the Chairman of the 
Board of 3D and that he was concerned that the sale of the switch 
that had been installed at J.D. West had not been finalized and 
wondered what J.D. West could do about the situation. Affiant 
asked Mr. Davies whether any of the lease companies were still 
considering the purchase of the switch. Mr. Davies told the 
Affiant that he didn't think that any of the leasing companies 
were still considering the lease. Affiant then told Mr. Davies 
that J.D. West had never indicated that it could or would 
purchase the switch, and that nothing had changed in that regard. 
Mr. Davies then said that something had to be done soon because 
3D was in a cash crunch and really needed the money from the sale 
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of the switch. Affiant told Mr. Davies that there was a 
possibility that a private individual could be found to purchase 
the switch and then lease it to J.D. West. Mr. Davies asked 
Affiant to try and find such an individual and to keep him 
informed of Affiant's progress in that regard. This conversation 
was Affiant's first contact with anyone at 3D concerning the 
switch. 
10. Shortly thereafter, an employee at J.D. West, Joe L 
Thomas, approached the Affiant and said that he had learned that 
J.D. West was looking for someone to purchase the switch from 3D 
and then lease it to J.D. West. Joe Thomas further said that his 
father, Allan Thomas, might be willing to do that if there wasn't 
too much risk involved and if his accountant felt that the tax 
benefits would help him. Affiant encouraged Joe Thomas to 
contact 3D directly and to pursue the matter further. 
11. Several days later, Joe Thomas telephoned Affiant and 
said that he had talked to Ron Davies and Rick Wood at 3D about 
the possible purchase of the switch by his father. He said that 
he explained to Ron Davies and Rick Wood that his father was 
retired and was only interested in a safe investment that would 
generate some tax benefits. He said that he told them that if 
there was any chance that his father could get stuck with the 
switch with no one to sell or lease it to, his father would not 
be interested in purchasing the switch. 
12. Joe Thomas told the Affiant that, in response to these 
concerns and questions, Ron Davies and Rick Wood assured him 
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that: 
a. the Harris 20/20 switch installed at J.D. West was a 
"top-of-the-line" switch and in very high demand; 
b. there was an excellent market for used switches like the 
Harris 20/20 and that 3D would be able to easily resell the 
switch for Allan Thomas in just a few months in the event that 
J.D. West were to default in its lease obligations; 
c. the switch had actually gone up in price and value since 
the time that 3D had installed it at J.D. West's facility; 
d. the switch could be resold within a few short months for 
no less than 80% of the price of $38,500 that 3D had originally 
quoted J.D. West and the other equipment leasing companies, and 
would now be quoting Allan Thomas; and 
e. the only reason for the 20% discount from the full 
$38,500 price was to cover a sales commission to 3D for reselling 
the switch and to cover 3D's expenses of moving and reinstalling 
the switch, and not that the resale value of the switch would be 
20% less than the $38,500 price being quoted to Allan Thomas. 
13. Joe Thomas further told Affiant that he had disclosed 
this information to his father, Allan Thomas, who said that he 
was interested purchasing the switch based on these assurances. 
14. Affiant then telephoned Phil Davies at 3D and told him 
that Allan Thomas appeared to be willing to purchase the switch 
from 3D. Phil Davies expressed great relief over this news and 
asked how soon Mr. Thomas would be able to pay 3D for the switch. 
Affiant said that the details of the lease between Mr. Thomas and 
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J.D. West needed to be worked out first, but that it shouldn't be 
more than a few days. Phil Davies encouraged Affiant to proceed 
as quickly as possible. Affiant assured Mr. Davies that he would 
expedite things as quickly as he could. 
15. On or about November 28, 1988, Allan Thomas and his 
accountant met with Affiant, Ranee Larsen and Richard Roth (the 
other co-owner with Affiant of J.D. West and its Chairman) to 
finalize the proposed lease of the switch from Mr. Thomas. After 
the details of the lease were agreed upon, Allan Thomas' 
accountant emphasized that Mr. Thomas needed to have ownership of 
the switch clearly in his name so that he could take advantage of 
certain tax benefits associated with lease transactions. To 
facilitate this, the Affiant and Mr. Larsen agreed to telephone 
3D to arrange for a bill of sale for Mr. Thomas. 
16. Affiant and Mr. Larsen then telephoned Phil Davies at 
3D on a conference telephone. Affiant and Mr. Larsen told Phil 
Davies that the terms of the lease from Allan Thomas to J.D. West 
had been agreed upon and that Mr. Thomas had brought a check with 
him to J.D. West's offices for the switch. Affiant and Mr. 
Larsen further told Phil Davies that Mr. Thomas needed to get a 
bill of sale from 3D for the switch in order to make his 
ownership position clear. Phil Davies told Affiant and Mr. 
Larsen that there would be no problem with a bill of sale being 
prepared for Mr. Thomas and that he was very happy that the sale 
of the switch was finally being consummated. Mr. Larsen told Mr. 
Davies that Mr. Larsen would have the check in his office 
6 
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awaiting the delivery of a bill of sale for Mr. Thomas from 3D. 
Phil Davies told Mr. Larsen that someone from 3D would be by the 
next day with the bill of sale and to pick up Allan Thomas' 
check. 
17. The next morning, Mr. Larsen telephoned Affiant in Salt 
Lake City and asked Affiant how the bill of sale should be 
written up. Affiant then dictated the language of a bill of sale 
from 3D to Mr. Thomas over the telephone to Mr. Larsen's 
secretary. Mr. Larsen subsequently informed Affiant that he had 
obtained the signed bill of sale from 3D for Mr. Thomas. 
18. Sometime later, Mr. Larsen reminded Affiant that 3D 
owed J.D. West a refund for the $1,000 that J.D. West had paid 
back in September for the handsets that were included in the 
lease. Now that Allan Thomas had purchased the switch and 
handsets from 3D, and paid 3D in full for them, 3d needed to 
refund J.D. West's money. Mr. Larsen suggested that Affiant go 
to 3D's office in Salt Lake City to pick up the refund. 
19. Affiant then went to 3D's Salt Lake City office and met 
with Ron Davies to discuss the refund. Ron Davies told Affiant 
that he had not had much to do with the transaction involving the 
switch at J.D. West because his daughter had been injured or ill 
and in the hospital over the past several months. For this 
reason, Ron Davies told Affiant that he didn't understand why 
J.D. West was entitled to a refund. Affiant then telephoned Mr. 
Larsen to review the details of what had transpired with Ron 
Davies. After this discussion, Ron Davies said that he thought 
7 
that J.D. West should "split the difference" because it had taken 
so long for 3D to get its money. Affiant told Mr. Davies that 
even though J.D.West legally didn't owe 3D any money because of 
the delay, J.D. West would agree to accept less than what was due 
as a show of good faith. 
20. Upon reaching this agreement, Ron Davies had a document 
typed up to evidence the agreement by J.D. West to accept the 
refund of $959.00 instead of the entire amount J.D.West claimed. 
Affiant signed this document and received a check from 3D made 
out to J.D. West in the amount of $959.00. A copy of this 
document signed by Affiant is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
21. The document signed by Affiant attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B" was understood to reflect only J.D. West's agreement 
to accept the $959.00 refund, and not as an indication or 
evidence that J.D. West or Affiant had purchased the switch and 
other telephone equipment from 3D instead of Allan Thomas. There 
was no doubt in Affiant's mind at the time of the execution of 
this document that Ron Davies understood that Allan Thomas had 
purchased the switch from 3D. 
22. Shortly thereafter, Ron Davies retained Affiant to 
represent 3D in connection with the collection of a relatively 
small amount of money from Dictaphone/Pitney Bowes. Ron Davies 
also retained the Affiant to represent him personally in 
finalizing a settlement between Mr. Davies and an insurance 
company, whereby Mr. Davies paid a small amount of money to the 
insurance company's insured. 
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23. These matters entailed a relatively small amount of 
time over the next several months, and were concluded 
satisfactorily and completely by April or May of 1989. 
24. Other than these two single matters, Affiant has not 
represented any of the defendants herein. Furthermore, during 
the course of Affiant's representation of 3D and Ron Davies 
referred to above, no information of any nature other than that 
relating directly to the specific legal representation was 
disclosed by 3D or Ron Davies to the Affiant. Affiant did not 
represent any of the defendants in a "general" capacity and was 
never made privy to any information that is not of public record 
in the case files associated with the two instances of 
representation. 
25. Furthermore, 3D and its principals were all aware of 
Affiant's relationship with J.D. West and Allan Thomas. For this 
reason, 3D and its principals knew that any disclosure of 
information to Affiant relating to the switch and Allan Thomas 
and/or J.D. West would be tantamount to a de facto disclosure of 
said information to Allan Thomas and/or J.D. West. 
26. Because Affiant's representation of 3D and Ron Davies 
had concluded entirely and was wholly unrelated to the problems 
being experienced between Allan Thomas and the defendants herein 
as alleged in plaintiff's complaint, Affiant did not feel that he 
would have a conflict of interest in representing the plaintiff 
in this action. 
27. In this regard, Affiant sent a letter to Ron Davies on 
9 
or about June 30, 1989. In this letter, Affiant encouraged 3D to 
resolve the situation with Allan Thomas honorably. Affiant also 
warned 3D and Ron Davies that if the matter were not resolved, 
Affiant would necessarily become involved on behalf of Allan 
Thomas in obtaining satisfaction from 3D and its principals. 
This letter specifically put the defendants on notice that 
Affiant did not feel that he would have a conflict of interest in 
representing Allan Thomas7 interests against 3D. Until the 
making of the Motion to Disqualify herein, none of the defendants 
made any objection whatsoever to Affiant's stated intention to 
assist Allan Thomas to recover his losses from the defendants 
herein. A copy of this letter is attached hereto. 
28. Affiant has read Plaintiff Allan Thomas' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Disqualify Brian Steffensen 
as Plaintiff's Counsel and hereby affirms that, based upon 
Affiants personal knowledge and information, all of the factual 
statements contained therein are true and correct. 
28. Because Affiant did not ever suppose that the 
defendants would have the temerity to deny selling the switch to 
Allan Thomas, Affiant did not foresee that there was any 
possibility that he might be called as a witness in this matter. 
Affiant has had no involvement at all in the interaction between 
Allan Thomas and/or Joe Thomas and the defendants herein that is 
alleged in paragraphs 9 through 26 of the complaint. 
Consequently, with the possible exception of additional details 
relating specifically thereto, the general facts set forth in 
10 
lis 
this affidavit constitute the entirety of the testimony that 
Affiant would be able to give in this matter. 
FURTHER AFFIANT saith naught. 
Dated this day of MMCA 1990. 
o?** SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN b e f o r e me t h i s J>?_£___ d a y o f 
flln^cA , 1990. 
jS^sioBr-Expites:{ 
NOTARY raSLlC 
R e s i d i n g a t : 
**
 C T * ***!'• U" J, j. 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this day of 
1990, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
instrument to be hand delivered to: 
Lynn S. Davies 
RICHARD, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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JttRlAN W- STEFFENSEN, P.C. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
3760 HIGHLAND OFFICE PLAZA, SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84106-4206 
June 3 0 , i 9 ^ E P H O N E (801) 273'3962 
FAX (801) 273-3932 
Ron D a v i e s 
3D Communications, Inc. 
6101 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Re: Allen Thomas v. J.D. West, Steffensen and 3D 
Communications, Inc. 
Dear Ron: 
I was visited by Allen and Joe Thomas this past week 
concerning the Harris 20/20 switch that they purchased from you 
that was installed at J.D. West in Provo, Utah. In this 
conversation, they indicated that Mr. Thomas had no choice but to 
bring legal action against the appropriate parties to resolve 
this problem. 
I have a clear obligation to Mr. Thomas and intend to 
fulfill it to the best of my ability. However, in discussing the 
situation with them, I was reminded of the representations that 
your company made to the Thomases at the time that they were 
making up their minds as to whether or not to purchase the 
switch. I think that it is clear that 3D has an obligation to 
either sell that switch or purchase it from the Thomases at the 
price that was represented to them. 
Since I will be sued by the Thomases in .this matter, and 
therefore will have a personal interest in seeing that 3D 
fulfills its obligation to resell or purchase the switch at the 
represented price, I obviously will be an adverse party to you. 
In this event, even though I do not look forward to such a turn 
of events, I will be forced to participate in the litigation 
against your company. I do not see any conflict in this because 
I am not presently involved in representing your company or any 
of your principals. 
If you are willing to avoid this litigation by fulfilling 
the obligations that you have to the Thomases, then contact 
either Joe Thomas or me as soon as possible. I was informed by 
Allen that he needed to see some progress along these lines by 
July 10, 1989, or he would pursue his remedies. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. I am hopeful 
that we will not have to become at odds with one another. 
Sincerely, 
TabF 
Brian W. Steffensen, P.C. (3092) 
Huntsman Building, Suite 200 
3760 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801) 273-3962 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE; COUNTY ' 
STATE OF UTAH 
* 
ALLAN B. THOMAS, * 
Plaintiff, * 
* 
vs. * 
3D COMMUNICATIONS, INC., * 
VON GORDON, RON DAVIES and * 
PHIL DAVIES, * 
Defendants. * 
State of Utah ) 
: ss. 
County of Utah ) 
Joe L Thomas, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
says: 
1. Affiant is a resident of the State of Utah and is over 
the age of 18. 
2. Affiant has read the complaint filed herein and hereby 
affirms that, based upon Affiant's personal knowledge and 
information, the factual allegations contained therein are true 
and correct. 
3. Affiant has read the proposed First Amended Complaint 
attached to plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend filed herein 
and hereby affirms that, based upon Affiant's personal knowledge 
and information, the factual allegations contained therein are 
k , ? r -
!:- p 7 r-j *-A »c? 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
JOE L THOMAS 
Civil No. 900900894 CN 
Judge David S. Young 
true and correct. 
4. Affiant has read Plaintiff Allan Thomas1 Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss filed herein and 
hereby affirms that, based upon Affiant's personal knowledge and 
information, the factual statements contained therein are true 
and correct. 
5. On or about March 27, 1990, Affiant telephoned defendant 
Von Gordon and asked him if he was familiar with the defendants1 
Motions to Dismiss filed herein. Mr. Gordon informed Affiant 
that he was no longer associated with 3D Communications, Inc. 
("3D") as an owner or employee. Mr. Gordon further indicated 
that 3D had discovered that there were absolutely no documents in 
3D's possession showing that Allan Thomas had purchased the 
switching equipment from 3D instead of J.D. West. Mr. Gordon 
told Affiant that Allan Thomas would not be able to prove that he 
had purchased the switch. 
6. Affiant protested this assertion and asked Mr. Gordon if 
Mr. Gordon knew in November of 1988 that Allan Thomas was the 
purchaser of the switch. Mr. Gordon said that he didn't know 
that the purchaser's name was "Allan Thomas", but admitted to 
Affiant that he did know back then that "your father" was going 
to purchase the switch. Mr. Gordon insisted, though, that Allan 
Thomas wouldn't be able to prove this "verbal contract" because 
Mr. Gordon had lost such a lawsuit himself. 
7. Mr. Gordon further told Affiant that the defendants 
understood that plaintiff's attorney would now have to withdraw 
because the defendants had disputed that Allan Thomas was the 
purchaser of the switch. 
8. Mr. Gordon also asked Affiant why Rick Wood wasn't named 
as a defendant in the law suit since Mr. Wood had made many of 
the statements that plaintiff complained of in his complaint and 
since Rick Wood is also a co-owner of 3D. 
9. This same Von Gordon told Affiant on one or more 
ocassions in the spring and summer of 1988 that he wouldn't be 
surprised if Rick Wood had in fact made the representations, 
warranties and promises to Affiant referred to in paragraph 10 of 
plaintiff's complaint. Von Gordon also told Affiant that Rick 
Wood had created problems for 3D before by making similar 
statements and promises to other 3D customers. 
9. During the summer and fall of 1988, during several of 
the many conversations that Affiant had with Von Gordon, Ron 
Davies or Phil Davies, Affiant represented to these individuals 
that if the 3D did not comply with its obligations to Allan 
Thomas as it had promised, Allan Thomas would retain Brian 
Steffensen to represent him in the litigation of this matter, 
accordance with 
FURTHER AFFIANT saith naught. 
DATED this <9d day of ^ ^ L s ^ , 1990. 
Joe L Thomas 
\~Kk 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN 
, 1990. 
t o b e f o r e me t h i s 
Sutherland & England 
3760 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City Uianw.u6 
v ^ ) > ' 
• ' y My Commission Expires 11/3/93 ^ 
V»lX QTATE OF UTAH 1 
rJJ^ d a y of 
UWfefeY PUBjtfC 
R e s i d i n g ' a t : 
S TE^O^UTAH^J 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby ce r t i fy tha t on t h i s /ffi" day of 
1990, I caused a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of 
instrument to be hand delivered addressed t o : 
Lynn S. Davies 
Richards, Brandt, Miller 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FILED DiiTPCT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE p#dUgSSfe| D'Strict 
JUL j j 1997 
* * * 
(SIAC^AJ fijJU 
ALLAN B. THOMAS, 
PLAINTIFF, 
-VS-
3D COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL, 
DEFENDANTS. 
CIVIL NO. C-90-090-0894 
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS AND DISQUALIFY 
COUNSEL 
* * * 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON MONDAY, THE 21ST DAY 
OF MAY, 1990, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 9:21 O'CLOCK 
A.M., THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE 
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH. 
* * * 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 
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A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANTS: 
BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
3 6 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SUITE #2000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
LYNN S. DAVIES 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & 
NELSON 
50 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SUITE #700 
P.O. BOX 2465 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110 
* * * 
I N D E X 
DISCUSSION BETWEEN COURT AND COUNSEL 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
PAGE 3 
MR. DAVIES' ARGUMENT 
MR. STEFFENSEN'S ARGUMENT 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
MR. DAVIES' ARGUMENT 
5 
12 
10 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: THE MATTER TO BE CONSIDERED IS THOMAS 
VERSUS 3D COMMUNICATIONS. 
MR. DAVIES: AGAIN, YOUR HONOR, LYNN DAVIES 
APPEARING FOR THE DEFENDANTS. YOUR HONOR, THESE ARE OUR 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND OUR MOTION TO DISQUALIFY MR. 
STEFFENSEN AS COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS MATTER. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. SO THERE ARE TWO MOTIONS. 
I HAVE READ THE PLEADINGS. I JUST WANT TO BE SURE I'M 
CLEAR. 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY — 
MR. DAVIES: CORRECT, YOUR HONOR, ON BEHALF OF 
ALL DEFENDANTS. AND ALSO A MOTION TO DISQUALIFY. 
THE COURT: AND THE MOTION TO DISQUALIFY MR. 
STEFFENSEN. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: YOUR HONOR, POINT OF CLARIFICA-
TION. WE HAD, IN OUR OPPOSITION RESPONSE TO THEIR MOTIONS, 
FILED A MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
THERE'S BEEN NO OBJECTION FILED IN CONNECTION WITH THAT 
MOTION TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT. WE'VE ASKED THAT 
THE MATTER BE SUBMITTED. PERHAPS THE COURT MIGHT INDICATE 
WHETHER OR NOT THAT LEAVE WILL BE GRANTED AND IF WE'LL BE 
DEALING WITH THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT OR THE ORIGINAL 
COMPLAINT. 
THE COURT: WELL, MR. DAVIES, WHAT IS YOUR POSI-
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TION IN THAT REGARD? 
MR. DAVIES: YOUR HONOR, MY UNDERSTANDING WAS 
THAT AFTER THE COURT RULED ON THESE MOTIONS TODAY THAT WE 
WOULD KNOW BETTER WHICH CAUSES OF ACTION WERE GOING TO BE 
PERMITTED AND WHICH WERE NOT AND WE'D END UP WITH AN AMEND-
ED COMPLAINT IN ANY EVENT. 
THE COURT: SO WOULD YOU ANTICIPATE — THE QUES-
TION I HAVE, MR. STEFFENSEN, IS, IS YOUR AMENDED COMPLAINT 
GOING TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE MERITS OF ANY OF THE MATTERS ON 
THE MOTION TO DISMISS? 
MR. STEFFENSEN: YOU'RE ASKING ME, YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: YES. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: YES, WITH RESPECT TO, I FORGET 
THE EXACT CAUSE OF ACTION, BUT THEY HAVE INDICATED, AND I 
THINK RIGHTFULLY SO, THAT WE PLED VAGUELY THE CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND WE HAVE, I HAVE RE-PLED 
THAT CAUSE OF ACTION TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CASES 
IN THAT REGARD. 
WE HAVE INCLUDED SOME ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE WITH 
RESPECT TO ALTER EGO WHICH, I BELIEVE, WOULD ADDRESS SOME 
OF THE CONCERNS THAT MR. DAVIES HAS. 
AND THEN WE ALLEGED, BROUGHT IN AN ADDITIONAL 
PARTY DEFENDANT, WHICH HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THEIR MOTION, 
AND ALSO PLED ADDITIONAL CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST MR. 
GORDON FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY AND AGENCY. 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 5 
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THE COURT: SO I TAKE IT THEN, MR. STEFFENSEN, 
THAT IN YOUR AMENDED COMPLAINT YOU STILL INTEND TO CLAIM A 
RIGHT TO RECOVERY UNDER THE THEORIES THAT MR. DAVIES HAS 
REQUESTED — 
MR. STEFFENSEN: THAT IS CORRECT. 
THE COURT: — BE DISMISSED. SO YOU'RE NOT 
ACKNOWLEDGING THE MERITS IN HIS POSITION — 
MR. STEFFENSEN: I'M NOT. 
THE COURT: WELL, IN THAT RESPECT THEN, I THINK 
THE PROPER PROCEDURE IS FOR THE COURT TO DEAL WITH THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS, THEN THE MOTION TO DISQUALIFY, AND 
THEREAFTER, THE MOTION TO CONSIDER THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, 
BECAUSE I THINK THE COURT WOULD GIVE THEN A BASIS FOR ITS 
CONCERNS AS TO THE OTHER ISSUES. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. I APPRE-
CIATE THAT. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. MR. DAVIES, PROCEED, 
PLEASE. I WILL SAY THAT I'VE READ THE PLEADINGS IN THIS 
CASE. IF I RECALL CORRECTLY, THE COMPLAINT WAS SOME 17 
PAGES AND GAVE ME SOME CONCERN, AND THE VOLUME OF MATERIAL 
THAT I HAVE READ, I THINK, WAS BURDENSOME. 
MR. DAVIES: I AGREE, YOUR HONOR. 
YOUR HONOR, JUST BRIEFLY, BY WAY OF BACKGROUND, 
THIS MATTER INVOLVES A SALE OF A TELEPHONE SWITCH AND 
RELATED EQUIPMENT BY 3D COMMUNICATIONS IN 1988 TO A COMPANY 
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KNOWN AS J.D. WEST. WE UNDERSTAND THAT MR. STEFFENSEN WAS 
THE PRINCIPAL OF J.D. WEST WHEN THE SALE OCCURRED IN 1988. 
MR. STEFFENSEN SIGNED THE ORIGINAL SALES AGREEMENT — 
THE COURT: EXCUSE ME, MR. DAVIES. GO AHEAD. I 
KNOW OF THE FACTS IN THIS CASE AS TO THE SALE OF THE 
SWITCHING SYSTEM. 
MR. DAVIES: I UNDERSTAND THAT, YOUR HONOR. I 
WANTED TO POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT WHEN THE SALE ORIGINALLY 
OCCURRED THERE WAS MR. STEFFENSEN, WHO SIGNED THE SALES 
AGREEMENT, AND HE ALSO SIGNED AS GUARANTOR ON THAT ORIGINAL 
SALES AGREEMENT. 
SUBSEQUENTLY, APPARENTLY, J.D. WEST OBTAINED 
FINANCING FROM MR. THOMAS FOR THAT SWITCH AND FOR THE WORK 
THAT WAS DONE INITIALLY BY 3D COMMUNICATIONS. 
THEREAFTER, J.D. WEST, APPARENTLY, WENT INTO 
BANKRUPTCY, DEFAULTED ON HIS OBLIGATIONS TO MR. THOMAS. 
MR. THOMAS IS NOW LOOKING FOR SOME WAY TO RECOVER HIS 
MONEY. 
INITIALLY, HE ASKED 3D COMMUNICATIONS TO SELL 
THIS TELEPHONE SWITCH TO GET WHAT 3D COMMUNICATIONS COULD 
TO RECOUP HIS LOSSES ON THIS TRANSACTION. 3D COMMUNICA-
TIONS ATTEMPTED TO SELL THAT, FINALLY FOUND A PURCHASER FOR 
THAT TELEPHONE SWITCH FOR THE AMOUNT OF $22,000.00, HAS 
TENDERED THAT $22,000.00 TO MR. THOMAS, AND STILL REMAINS 
ESSENTIALLY, WHAT THIS COMES DOWN TO IS THAT MR. 
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THOMAS CONTENDS THAT THE SWITCH WAS WORTH SOMETHING MORE, 
APPROXIMATELY $30,500.00, I BELIEVE. 
THE COURT: NOW WASN'T THE ORIGINAL NOTE 
38,500.00? 
MR. DAVIES: THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. THAT 
INCLUDED INSTALLATION, LABOR, WIRING OF THE BUILDING, A 
VARIETY OF OTHER SERVICES. 
THE AFFIDAVIT FROM RONALD DAVIES, WHICH WAS 
SUBMITTED, INDICATES THAT AT THE TIME THE SWITCH WAS SOLD 
THAT THE SWITCH ITSELF HAD A VALUE OF ABOUT TWENTY-SEVEN 
TO $28,000.00 OUT OF A TOTAL OF 38,000.00. 
IN THIS ACTION, YOUR HONOR, MR. STEFFENSEN HAS 
SUED NOT ONLY 3D COMMUNICATIONS ON BEHALF OF MR. THOMAS BUT 
ALSO THE VARIOUS INDIVIDUALS AFFILIATED WITH 3D COMMUNICA-
TIONS, THOSE BEING VON GORDON, RON DAVIES AND PHIL DAVIES. 
HE NOW SEEKS TO ADD RICK WOOD AS AN ADDITIONAL DEFENDANT. 
OUR MOTIONS TO DISMISS, YOUR HONOR, HAVE TO DO 
PRIMARILY WITH TWO THINGS. ONE IS WE'RE ASKING FOR DIS-
MISSAL OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS BECAUSE ANY TRANSACTION 
THAT OCCURRED HERE, OCCURRED ON BEHALF OF 3D COMMUNICA-
TIONS. ALL INVOICES, SALES AGREEMENTS, OTHER MATERIALS 
THAT WE'VE SUBMITTED ARE ON 3D COMMUNICATIONS DOCUMENTS. 
IN ADDITION TO THAT WE'VE SUBMITTED AN AFFIDAVIT 
FROM RONALD DAVIES ESTABLISHING 3D COMMUNICATIONS IS A BONE 
FIDE CORPORATION, HAS ALWAYS ACTED AS SUCH, HAS ITS OWN 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 
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BANK ACCOUNTS, KEEPS EVERYTHING SEPARATE AND DISTINCT AND 
THAT THE MERE ALLEGATION THAT IS SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 27 
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT THAT 3D COMMUNICATIONS IS A 
SHAM CORPORATION IS NOT SUFFICIENT. THERE'S NOT SUFFICIENT 
FACTUAL UNDERPINNINGS FOR THAT TYPE OF AN ALLEGATION. 
IN ADDITION, YOUR HONOR, IT IS OUR POSITION THAT 
ALL OF THE DEFENDANTS, INCLUDING 3D COMMUNICATIONS, SHOULD 
BE DISMISSED AS TO VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE ALLEGATIONS IN 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT. THE BULK OF THESE ALLEGATIONS HAVE 
TO DO WITH THE ORIGINAL SALE OF THE TELEPHONE SWITCH. THAT 
ORIGINAL SALE, WITHOUT A SINGLE DOUBT, WAS FROM 3D COMMUNI-
CATIONS TO J.D. WEST. ALL THE DOCUMENTS THAT WE'VE SUBMIT-
TED ESTABLISH THAT. 
IN ADDITION, MR. STEFFENSEN, WHO'S AN ATTORNEY, 
SIGNED OFF ON THOSE SALES AGREEMENT. PRESUMABLY, HE KNOWS 
TO WHOM THE SWITCH WAS BEING SOLD. I BELIEVE THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF IS NOW TRYING TO TAKE THE POSITION THAT THE 
SWITCH WAS SOLD FROM 3D COMMUNICATIONS TO MR. THOMAS, THAT 
REALLY THERE'S NOTHING AT ALL IN THE WAY OF DOCUMENTATION 
TO SUPPORT THAT CLAIM. 
I'VE SET FORTH IN MY MOTION, YOUR HONOR, THE 
SPECIFIC CAUSES OF ACTION THAT SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON THAT 
BASIS. THOSE ARE THE FIRST, SECOND, FOURTH, SIXTH, SEVENTH 
AND EIGHTH CAUSES OF ACTION. ALL OF THOSE PERTAIN TO THE 
ORIGINAL SALE. 
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IN ADDITION, THERE WAS — 
THE COURT: FIRST, SECOND, FOURTH, SIXTH AND 
SEVENTH AND EIGHTH? 
MR. DAVIES: THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
MR. DAVIES: IN ADDITION, THERE WAS AN EIGHTH 
CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH SET FORTH A CLAIM THAT WE SHOULD BE 
ESTOPPED FROM DEFENDANT DEFENDING OURSELVES IN THIS LAW-
SUIT. I'M PERSONALLY NOT AWARE OF SUCH A CAUSE OF ACTION. 
AND IN A NUTSHELL, YOUR HONOR, THOSE ARE THE 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS THAT WE'VE BROUGHT. 
WE DID FILE THE AFFIDAVIT OF RON DAVIES WHICH 
ESTABLISHED THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND FOR ALL OF THIS. I DID 
NOT SEE ANYWHERE WHERE ANY OF THESE ALLEGATIONS WERE REFUT-
ED BY THE VARIOUS AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED BY MR. STEFFENSEN. 
THERE WERE QUITE A NUMBER OF AFFIDAVITS AND DOZENS OF 
ADDITIONAL PAGES OF ARGUMENT PERTAINING TO THAT, BUT AGAIN, 
NOWHERE WERE THOSE ESSENTIAL FACTS REFUTED IN THE RESPONSE 
BY MR. STEFFENSEN. 
WITH REGARD TO THE AFFIDAVITS THAT WERE SUBMIT-
TED, YOUR HONOR, WE FILED A MOTION TO STRIKE VIRTUALLY 
EVERYTHING IN THE AFFIDAVIT SUBMITTED BY MR. STEFFENSEN WE 
THOUGHT WAS OBJECTIONABLE. I'VE SET FORTH THE BASIS FOR 
THAT IN MY MOTION. 
UNLESS YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ON THAT, YOUR 
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HONOR, I WILL ADDRESS THE MOTION TO DISQUALIFY'MR. STEFFEN-
SEN. 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
MR. DAVIES: YOUR HONOR, WE HAVE VERY DEEP AND 
FUNDAMENTAL CONCERNS ABOUT MR. STEFFENSEN BEING THE ATTOR-
NEY IN THIS CASE. AS I INDICATED BEFORE, MR. STEFFENSEN 
ACTUALLY SIGNED THE SALES AGREEMENT AND INVOICES THAT WERE 
ORIGINALLY SUBMITTED TO J.D. WEST. HE WAS LISTED AS THE 
PRINCIPAL CONTACT BETWEEN 3D COMMUNICATIONS AND J.D. WEST 
ON A NUMBER OF THE INVOICES AND SALES AGREEMENTS. HE WAS 
INTEGRALLY INVOLVED IN THIS TRANSACTION. HE SIGNED AS A 
GUARANTOR ON THE ORIGINAL SALES AGREEMENT BETWEEN 3D COMMU-
NICATIONS AND J.D. WEST. 
IN ESSENCE, YOUR HONOR, HE HAS SUCH A FUNDAMENTAL 
CONCERN AND SUCH AN INTEGRAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE THAT WE SUSPECT THAT HIS INVOLVEMENT IS ONE OF 
THE MAIN DRIVING FORCES BEHIND THIS LITIGATION. 
IN ADDITION, YOUR HONOR, I DON'T SEE HOW HE CAN 
AVOID BEING A WITNESS IN THIS CASE. I POINTED OUT THE 
VIOLATION OF RULE 3.7 OF THE RULES OF ETHICS THAT INVOLVED 
HIM BEING A WITNESS IN THIS CASE. AGAIN, IN MY MOTIONS, I 
SET FORTH ABOUT HALF A DOZEN DIFFERENT AREAS WHERE HE'S 
GOING TO HAVE TO TESTIFY, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH IS THE 
FACT THAT AS AN ATTORNEY HE SIGNED OFF ON THE SALES AGREE-
MENT, J.D. WEST MADE THE, WAS THE ONE THAT DEFAULTED TO MR. 
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THOMAS. THE REASON MR. THOMAS IS LOOKING FOR A RECOVERY OF 
FUNDS HERE IS BECAUSE OF J.D. WEST'S DEFAULT, AND MR. 
STEFFENSEN IS IMMEDIATELY BEHIND ON IT. 
IN ADDITION, YOUR HONOR, WE DO HAVE A COUPLE OF 
ADDITIONAL CONCERNS. MR. STEFFENSEN WAS ALSO THE ATTORNEY 
FOR 3D COMMUNICATIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THIS SALE OCCURRED. 
HE HANDLED SOME COMMUNICATIONS FOR 3D COMMUNICATIONS. WE 
HAVE NO IDEA WHERE SOME OF THESE ALLEGATIONS THAT ARE MADE 
IN THIS COMPLAINT AGAINST 3D COMMUNICATIONS, IN AN EFFORT 
TO PIERCE THE CORPORATE VEIL, AND REGARDING 3D COMMUNICA-
TIONS BEING A SHAM CORPORATION COME FROM, BUT WE KNOW 
THEY'RE NOT A MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD, AND WE CAN ONLY 
ASSUME THAT MR. STEFFENSEN SOMEHOW DREW SOME ASSUMPTIONS OR 
PRESUMPTIONS FROM HIS REPRESENTATION OF 3D COMMUNICATIONS 
IN MAKING THOSE ALLEGATIONS. THAT, IN AND OF ITSELF WOULD 
BE VIOLATIVE OF RULES 1.8 AND 1.9 OF THE RULES OF ETHICS AS 
WELL. 
SO AGAIN, YOUR HONOR, WE WOULD MOVE FOR THE 
DISQUALIFICATION OF MR. STEFFENSEN, IN ADDITION TO THE 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS. 
WE TOO ARE CONCERNED BY THE BURDENSOME AMOUNT OF 
PAPERS WHICH WE HAD TO RESPOND TO IN THIS MATTER. WE HAD A 
17 PAGE COMPLAINT. WE TRIED TO FILE SOME MOTIONS TO DIS-
MISS TO GET RID OF THE DEADWOOD IN THE CASE. IN RESPONSE 
TO THAT WE GOT ABOUT 100 PAGES OF DOCUMENTS IN RESPONSE. 
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AND I THINK THAT'S JUST ONE MORE INDICATION OF THE IMMEDI-
ATE AND PERSONAL INTEREST THAT MR. STEFFENSEN MUST HAVE IN 
THIS MATTER. 
THE COURT MAY HAVE NOTICED THE LETTER FROM MR. STEF-
FENSEN TO 3D COMMUNICATIONS, WHICH HE SUBMITTED WITH SOME 
OF HIS DOCUMENTS, IN WHICH HE SAID I'M GOING TO BE SUED IN 
THIS MATTER BY MR. THOMAS. I HAVE A PERSONAL INTEREST, I 
HAVE TO MAKE SURE THAT MR. THOMAS SOMEHOW GETS PAID. 
THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU, MR. DAVIES. 
MR. STEFFENSEN? 
MR. STEFFENSEN: FIRST OF ALL, YOUR HONOR, I 
APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND THIS MORNING TO THESE 
MOTIONS. I'D LIKE TO FIRST DEAL WITH THE ISSUE OF THE 
MOTION TO STRIKE AND THE ISSUE OF THE AMOUNT OF DOCUMENTA-
TION THAT WAS FILED IN THIS CASE. I SENSE A CONCERN ON THE 
PART OF THE COURT. WE APOLOGIZE FOR THE MATERIALS BEING SO 
VOLUMINOUS BUT — 
THE COURT: THIS IS A FUNDAMENTAL, EASY TRANSAC-
TION, IT SEEMS TO ME. AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT MY CONCERNS 
ARE LEGITIMATE ABOUT THE VOLUME, WHEN YOU CONSIDER THE 
COURT HAS A DUTY TO READ, AND I TAKE THAT VERY SERIOUSLY, 
THE MATERIAL THAT'S SUBMITTED TO THE COURT. I DON'T THINK 
THAT VERBOSE PLEADINGS ARE VERY HELPFUL TO THE COURT. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: I APPRECIATE THAT, YOUR HONOR. 
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AND IF I MIGHT EXPLAIN, AND PERHAPS YOU'LL UNDERSTAND. THE 
DEFENDANTS MADE A BIG DEAL OF — WELL, FIRST OF ALL, THIS 
IS AN EXTREMELY TROUBLESOME CASE FOR ME. AND THE MAIN 
REASON IS BECAUSE IT APPEARS TO ME THAT MUCH OF WHAT THESE 
DEFENDANTS DID PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT, IF THE 
FACTS AS ALLEGED BY THE PLAINTIFF ARE ASSUMED TO BE TRUE, 
IF THOSE FACTS ARE ASSUMED TO BE TRUE, THEN IT WOULD AP-
PEAR, BASED UPON THOSE FACTS, THAT MUCH OF THE CONDUCT OF 
THE DEFENDANTS, PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT, WAS 
ARGUABLY FRAUDULENT AND CERTAINLY VIOLATIVE OF THE IMPLIED 
COVENANT OF DUE CARE AND GOOD FAITH IN EVERY CONTRACT AND 
CONSTITUTES BAD FAITH. 
TO HIGHLIGHT, JUST BRIEFLY, AND MAINLY BY THE 
FACT THAT AFTER THERE WAS FINALLY A WRITTEN AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND THE DEFENDANTS THAT HAS CLEAR 
LANGUAGE AS TO WHAT THE AGREEMENT WAS BETWEEN THE PARTIES, 
THEY IMMEDIATELY REPUDIATED THE FACT THAT THEY EVER INTEND-
ED TO BE BOUND BY THAT AGREEMENT AND DENIED THEIR AGENT'S 
AUTHORITY. AND FRANKLY, YOUR HONOR, IF THE DEFENDANTS 
HADN'T TAKEN THAT STEP, I DOUBT IF MY CLIENT, MR. THOMAS, 
WOULD HAVE PROCEEDED AGAINST THESE INDIVIDUALS, BUT HE 
FELT, AT THAT POINT, THAT THAT WAS THE STRAW THAT BROKE THE 
CAMEL'S BACK. THAT IS WHEN THEY DENIED THE LANGUAGE OF A 
WRITTEN AGREEMENT, SIGNED BY MR. GORDON, THAT THAT WAS JUST 
TOO MUCH, THESE PEOPLE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO GET AWAY 
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WITH THIS. 
NOW, THEN, WE GET THIS — AND I BECAME CONCERNED, 
FRANKLY, YOUR HONOR, WHEN I RECEIVED THIS MOTION FOR SUMMA-
RY JUDGMENT FOR BASICALLY DISMISS — 
THE COURT: MOTION TO DISMISS. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: — WHICH, IF THE COURT CONSIDERS 
THE AFFIDAVIT, MUST BE CONSIDERED A MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. BASICALLY, THAT MOTION SAID THAT THE COMPLAINT 
HAS VIRTUALLY NO MERIT WHATSOEVER, EITHER THE FACTS ARE 
ILLEGAL, THAT I HAVE DONE SOME THINGS WRONG PERSONALLY IN 
REPRESENTING AND BRINGING THIS COMPLAINT, AND NOT ONLY 
SHOULD IT BE DISMISSED, AND I BE DISQUALIFIED AS COUNSEL, 
BUT THAT MY CLIENT HAVE SANCTIONS IMPOSED AGAINST THEM, 
BECAUSE IF THERE HAD BEEN REASONABLE INQUIRY INTO THE FACTS 
AND THE LAW IT SHOULDN'T HAVE HAPPENED. 
THE COURT: HOW CAN YOU AVOID BEING A WITNESS 
PERIOD? 
MR. STEFFENSEN: YOUR HONOR, I AGREE THAT THAT'S 
TROUBLESOME. I ADMIT THAT IN THE PLEADINGS. THAT A WIT-
NESS AT TRIAL — I MAY END UP BEING A WITNESS. I THINK THE 
RULES STATE THAT COUNSEL SHOULD ONLY BE DISQUALIFIED FROM 
TESTIFYING AT TRIAL, THEREFORE, I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT THAT 
I BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE TO REPRESENT THE PLAINTIFF UNTIL 
TRIAL. AND I HAVE MADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH RICK SUTHERLAND, 
WHERE I OFFICE, TO TRY THE CASE, IN THE EVENT THE COURT SO 
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REQUIRES. 
BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY, YOUR HONOR, I THINK THAT IF 
YOU RECALL THE AFFIDAVIT OF JOE THOMAS WHEN — FIRST OF 
ALL, BEFORE — WELL, LET'S GET, ON THE SECOND PAGE OF MR. 
THOMAS'S AFFIDAVIT. I WAS DISCUSSING WITH MR. THOMAS THE 
LANGUAGE OF HIS AFFIDAVIT AND I WAS EXPLAINING TO HIM THE 
CONCERNS THAT I HAD ABOUT THE DEFENDANT'S EFFORTS TO DIS-
CLAIM THAT MR. GORDON WAS THE AGENT OF 3D FOR THE PURPOSES 
OF HIS EXECUTING THE CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF THE SWITCH 
FOR $22,000.00. AND I EXPLAINED TO JOE THOMAS THAT BY SO 
DOING THEY WERE PUTTING MR. GORDON, I THOUGHT, IN A VERY 
DIFFICULT POSITION. BECAUSE CERTAINLY HE SIGNED THAT 
AGREEMENT AND HE IS PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR IT, NUMBER ONE. 
AND NUMBER TWO, IF RON DAVIES AND 3D PREVAIL IN 
THEIR EFFORT TO CLAIM THAT MR. GORDON WAS NOT THEIR AGENT, 
THEN MR. GORDON BREACHED HIS WARRANTY OF AGENCY WHICH WOULD 
MAKE HIM LIABLE FOR WHATEVER MR. THOMAS LOOSES AS A RESULT 
OF THE BREACH OF AGENCY. 
I WAS EXPLAINING THIS TO JOE THOMAS AND BOY, I 
DON'T THINK RON GORDON UNDERSTANDS THAT. I DON'T THINK HE 
UNDERSTANDS HE IS BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE HERE AND 
HIS OWN PEOPLE ARE SELLING HIM OUT. I SAID, WELL, APPAR-
ENTLY, HE CALLED MR. GORDON THAT NIGHT TO TALK TO HIM ABOUT 
THIS MATTER. 
IN THAT CONVERSATION ON PAGE 2, PARAGRAPH 5, JOE 
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THOMAS, THIS IS THE PLAINTIFF'S SON, YOUR HONOR, JOE THOM-
AS, WHO WAS BASICALLY HIS AGENT, AND MOST OF THESE THINGS 
HAPPENED THROUGH HIM, CONTACTED MR. GORDON, AND MR. GORDON 
EXPLAINED HE IS NO LONGER AN OWNER, AN EMPLOYEE OF 3D. AND 
THEN HE GOES ON TO SAY, MR. GORDON FURTHER INDICATES THAT 
3D HAS DISCOVERED THERE WERE ABSOLUTELY NO DOCUMENTS IN 
3D'S POSSESSION SHOWING ALLAN THOMAS HAD PURCHASED THE 
SWITCHING EQUIPMENT FROM 3D INSTEAD OF J.D. WEST. MR. 
GORDON TOLD DEFIANT HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PROVE HE HAD 
PURCHASED THE SWITCH. 
WELL, AT THIS POINT, JOE THOMAS WAS IN SHOCK AND 
HE SAID TO VON GORDON, HOW CAN YOU SAY THAT, VON? YOU KNEW 
THAT MY FATHER WAS BUYING THE SWITCHES, DIDN'T YOU? 
NEXT PARAGRAPH. HE SAYS MR. GORDON SAID THAT HE 
DIDN'T KNOW THAT THE PURCHASER'S NAME WAS ALLAN THOMAS BUT 
ADMITTED TO DEFIANT HE DID KNOW BACK THEN THAT "YOUR FATHER 
WAS GOING TO PURCHASE THE SWITCH." 
MR. GORDON INSISTED, THOUGH, THAT ALLAN THOMAS 
WOULDN'T BE ABLE TO PROVE THIS VERBAL CONTRACT. AND IT 
WENT ON TO SAY, I LOST A CASE LIKE THAT. YOU CAN'T PROVE 
VERBAL THINGS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE TOLD DEFIANT, 
FURTHERMORE, DEFENDANT UNDERSTOOD THAT PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY 
WOULD NOT HAVE TO WITHDRAW BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS HAD 
DISPUTED THAT ALLAN THOMAS WAS THE PURCHASER OF THE SWITCH. 
WELL, YOUR HONOR, THIS IS A DEFENDANT IN THIS 
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LAWSUIT TELLING THE AGENT OF THE PLAINTIFF THAT THEY DID 
KNOW THAT PLAINTIFF WAS GOING TO BE BUYING THIS SWITCH. 
BUT AFTER THE LAWSUIT HAD BEEN FILED, IN LOOKING THROUGH 
THEIR DOCUMENTS, THEY DISCOVERED THERE WAS, MR. THOMAS'S 
NAME WAS NOWHERE IN THE DOCUMENTS ON THEIR FILE AND SO THEY 
BRING THIS MOTION FOR TWO REASONS. 
NUMBER ONE, BECAUSE THEY DON'T THINK MR. THOMAS 
CAN PROVE HIS CASE, BECAUSE THERE ARE NO DOCUMENTS, AND 
THAT GIVES THEM THE ABILITY TO MAKE THESE MOTIONS TO DIS-
MISS, ON MOST OF THESE CAUSES OF ACTION AND, NUMBER TWO, 
BECAUSE NOW THEY CAN CLAIM THAT I NEED TO BE A WITNESS ON 
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER MR. THOMAS PURCHASED THE SWITCH. 
BEFORE THEY RAISED THAT ISSUE, YOUR HONOR, I 
DIDN'T NEED TO BE A WITNESS. THERE WAS NOTHING, THERE WAS 
NOTHING IN THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT TO WHICH I WOULD EVER 
NEED TESTIFY TO. ALL OF THE ALLEGATIONS IN THAT COMPLAINT 
RELATE TO CONTEXT AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN MR. ALLAN 
THOMAS AND/OR HIS AGENT, JOE THOMAS, AND THOSE DEFENDANTS 
AND I HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THOSE. 
AND YOU KNOW, YOUR HONOR, I JUST BELIEVE THAT 
THAT'S BAD FAITH AND FRAUD ON THIS COURT. I DON'T BELIEVE 
THAT THESE DEFENDANTS AND THEIR COUNSEL ARE ACTING IN GOOD 
FAITH IN THIS ACTION. 
NOW, I BECAME WORRIED THAT MAYBE I'M TOO CLOSE TO 
THIS CASE AND I DECIDED, AND I KNEW IT WOULD POSE A PROB-
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LEM, BEING BURDENSOME, BUT I DECIDED TO PUT BEFORE THE 
COURT EVERYTHING THAT WE KNEW FROM THE VARIOUS PARTIES THAT 
MIGHT BE CALLED AS WITNESSES ON OUR BEHALF AT THIS POINT, 
BECAUSE I WANTED THIS COURT TO UNDERSTAND WHAT WE KNOW AND 
WHY WE'RE BRINGING THESE ACTIONS AT THIS POINT IN TIME, AND 
TO GET SOME GUIDANCE FROM THIS COURT AS TO WHETHER OR NOT 
THIS SHOULD BE PARED DOWN. IF IT SHOULD BE, LET'S DO IT. 
IT'S BASED UPON THE FACTS THAT ARE ALLEGED IN OUR 
AFFIDAVIT — IF, BASED UPON THE FACTS, AS THE COURT NOW 
UNDERSTANDS THE AFFIDAVIT, SOME OF THESE CAUSES OF ACTION 
AREN'T BELIEVED BY THE COURT TO BE APPROPRIATE, FINE, I 
WOULD LIKE TO KNOW THAT NOW. AND SO WE WENT OVERBOARD. 
AND I APOLOGIZE TO THE COURT. I HOPE THE COURT UNDERSTANDS 
WHERE WE'RE COMING FROM. 
NOW, GETTING BACK TO THE ISSUE OF THIS MOTION AND 
DEFENDING THE MOTION. THE COURT IS WELL AWARE OF THE 
STANDARDS FOR MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THAT DEFEND-
18 I ANT'S MOTIONS CAN ONLY BE GRANTED IF, UNDER THE FACTS AS 
19
 ALLEGED BY THE OPPOSING PARTY, WHICH IS THE PLAINTIFF IN 
2 0
 THIS CASE, VIEWED MOST FAVORABLY IN OUR FAVOR, AND ALSO 
21
 REASONABLE INFERENCES DRAWN FROM THOSE, THERE IS NO POSSI-
2 2
 BILITY WE COULD RECOVER AS A MATTER OF LAW BASED UPON THOSE 
2 3
 FACTS. SO I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT TO LOOK AT THE FACTS THAT 
2 4
 WE HAVE BEFORE US, THE FACTS THAT ARE UNDISPUTED. 
2 5
 NOW, I WAS VERY INTERESTED TO HEAR MR. DAVIES 
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THIS MORNING SAY THAT THEY HAD PROVIDED AN AFFIDAVIT OF RON 
DAVIES IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION AND THAT NOWHERE WERE THE 
FACTS, THE ESSENTIAL FACTS OF MR. DAVIES AFFIDAVIT DISPUT-
ED. 
WELL, YOUR HONOR, HOW CAN HE SAY THAT? YOU READ 
THE THOUSANDS OF PAGES OF AFFIDAVITS IN OPPOSITION TO THIS. 
AND THEY ALL SAY THAT, NUMBER ONE, THEY SAY I WAS THE 
PERSON THEY DEALT WITH. MY AFFIDAVIT AND LANCE LARSON'S 
AFFIDAVIT SAY, AND THEY ARE UNDISPUTED, YOUR HONOR, SAY 
THAT LANCE LARSON CONDUCTED ALL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN 
3D AND J.D. WEST. AND I HAVE HAD HARDLY ANYTHING TO DO 
WITH IT. THAT POINT IS DISPUTED. 
THEY SAY WE DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WAS A 
SALE TO MR. THOMAS, WE UNDERSTAND IT WAS A SALE TO J.D. 
WEST. 
"•6 I MY AFFIDAVIT SAYS, YOUR HONOR, THAT ON NOVEMBER 
17 1ST, APPROXIMATELY, OF 1988, PHIL DAVIES CALLED ME IN A 
18
 PANIC AND SAID, OUR SALE TO THE LEASE COMPANY HAS FALLEN 
19 THROUGH, WHAT ARE WE GOING TO DO? AND I SAID, COME AND GET 
20 YOUR SWITCH. CAUSE WE NEVER INTENDED TO BUY THIS THING. 
21
 AND HE SAID OH, IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE YOU CAN DO? AND I 
2 2
 SAID, WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO FIND A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL TO BUY 
2 3
 THE SWITCH. OH, PLEASE, FIND SOMEBODY TO BUY THE SWITCH. 
2 4
 I SAID, I'LL SEE WHAT WE CAN DO. 
2 5
 JOE THOMAS STEPPED FORWARD AND SAID HIS FATHER 
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MIGHT BE WILLING TO BUY THE SWITCH. I SAID, CALL THEM. 
AND HE CALLED 'EM AND SAID MY FATHER, ALLAN THOMAS, MIGHT 
BE WILLING TO BUY THIS SWITCH. AND HE HAD A CONVERSATION. 
NONE OF JOE THOMAS'S STATEMENTS IN HIS AFFIDAVIT ARE REFUT-
ED BY THESE PEOPLE, THE STATEMENTS THAT I SET FORTH IN MY 
AFFIDAVIT CONCERNING MY CONVERSATIONS WITH PHIL DAVIES TO 
THE EFFECT THAT YOU HAVE NO AGREEMENT WITH US TO PURCHASE 
THE SWITCH, AND THERE'S NO ONE OUT THERE, UNLESS, PERHAPS, 
WE CAN FIND AN INDIVIDUAL. THOSE AREN'T DISPUTED BY THEM. 
AND THEY REFUTE RON DAVIES ASSERTION THAT THE 
SALE WAS TO J.D. WEST. 
SO HOW CAN HE SAY TO THIS COURT THAT NOWHERE WERE 
THOSE FACTS DISPUTED. HOW CAN HE SAY THAT? I HAVE A VERY 
DIFFICULT TIME WITH THIS CASE, YOUR HONOR. 
AND THEN OUR AFFIDAVITS SAY THAT AFTER MR. THOMAS 
TOLD ME HE WAS WILLING TO BUY THE SWITCH I CALLED PHIL 
DAVIES AND SAID MR. THOMAS APPARENTLY HAS AGREED TO BUY THE 
SWITCH. AND MY AFFIDAVIT SAID THAT PHIL DAVIES TOLD ME 
THAT'S WONDERFUL. THAT MIGHT BE HEARSAY BUT IT'S AN EXCEP-
TION TO THE RULE AS A STATEMENT ADVERSE TO INTEREST. CER-
TAINLY ADMISSIBLE. ALL OF THE THINGS IN OUR AFFIDAVIT ARE 
ADMISSIBLE. 
AND, YOU KNOW, I FIND HIS MOTION TO STRIKE TO BE 
VERY INTERESTING, YOUR HONOR. BASICALLY HE SAYS, ASKS THE 
COURT PLEASE, YOUR HONOR, I THINK THAT THEY ARE INADMISSI-
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BLE, WOULD YOU PLEASE TELL ME WHICH OF THE STATEMENTS YOU 
CONSIDER TO BE INADMISSABLE AND STRIKE THEM. I DON'T THINK 
THAT IS AN APPROPRIATE BURDEN TO PLACE UPON THIS COURT AND 
I DON'T THINK IT IS APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO HAVE TO TAKE EACH 
ONE OF MY STATEMENTS THAT I'VE SET FORTH IN OUR AFFIDAVIT 
AND ESTABLISH THAT THEY ARE ADMISSIBLE. THE PERSON DISPUT-
ING THE ADMISSABILITY OF EVIDENCE HAS THE DUTY AND BURDEN 
TO SPECIFICALLY STATE THE GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE SPECIFIC 
OFFERED EVIDENCE IS INADMISSABLE AND DEFEND THAT. IT'S NOT 
BEEN DONE HERE. AND I ASSERT AND RESPECTFULLY REQUEST OF 
THIS COURT TO THROW OUT, OUT OF HAND, HIS MOTION TO STRIKE, 
BECAUSE IT IS NOT SPECIFIC AND NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY SPECIF-
IC REASONS WHY IT SHOULD BE INADMISSABLE. BUT ANYWAY, I 
THINK IT IS FAIRLY CLEAR THAT OUR AFFIDAVITS HAVE GONE 
UNDISPUTED, YOUR HONOR. I WOULD SAY 90 PERCENT, 95 PERCENT 
OF THE ALLEGATIONS SET FORTH IN OUR AFFIDAVITS ARE TOTALLY 
UNDISPUTED. 
I WISH I HAD A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR 
THE COURT TODAY BECAUSE WE'D WIN ON OUR WHOLE CASE BECAUSE 
THEY'VE NOT DISPUTED ANY OF OUR ALLEGATIONS. AND THOSE 
ALLEGATIONS SAY — SO LET'S LOOK AT WHAT THOSE ALLEGATIONS 
SAY. 
THEY SAY THAT WHEN THESE DEFENDANTS WERE DESPER-
ATE BECAUSE, YOUR HONOR, THEY HAD BOUGHT THIS SWITCH FROM 
THEIR SOURCE, THEY HAD INSTALLED IT IN J.D. WEST'S PREMISES 
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ON THE COM — ON SPECULATION THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO 
CONVINCE, THAT THEY, WITH ONE OF THEIR LEASING COMPANIES, 
WOULD BE ABLE TO CONVINCE THAT LEASING COMPANY TO PURCHASE 
THE SWITCH FROM THEM AND THEN LEASE IT TO J.D. WEST. THEN 
THEIR LEASING COMPANY CONTACTS BACKED OUT AND TWO AND-A-
HALF MONTHS LATER THEY ARE IN A VERY DIFFICULT FINANCIAL 
POSITION. AND THEY COME TO US SAYING, WHAT ARE WE GOING TO 
DO, PLEASE HELP US. 
SO MR. THOMAS, WHO HAS $38,500.00 IN HIS BANK 
ACCOUNT, HE'S A RETIRED BUTCHER IN SPANISH FORK, HE AND HIS 
WIFE ARE LIVING ON SOCIAL SECURITY WITH THEIR SAVINGS PUT 
AWAY, SAYS, WELL, I MIGHT BE WILLING TO DO THAT BUT I'M 
VERY CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF J.D. WEST WENT 
UNDER AND WASN'T ABLE TO PAY ME THE LEASE PAYMENTS. 
SO JOE THOMAS CALLS THESE PEOPLE AND SAYS, TELL 
ME ABOUT THE MARKET, THE RESALE MARKET. AND THEY MADE 
CERTAIN REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES AS TO THE RESALE 
MARKET. NOW, THAT'S NOT PUFFERY AND THAT'S NOT OPINION, 
THOSE ARE REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES. AND THEY SAID 
THAT THE MARKET WAS EXCELLENT AND THAT MR. THOMAS COULD 
EXPECT TO RECOVER NO LESS, NO LESS THAN 80 PERCENT OF THE 
$38,500.00 HE WOULD PAY TO BUY THE SWITCH. AND THAT THEY 
COULD RESELL THIS WITHIN TWO MONTHS. 
WELL, WHY DID THEY SAY THAT TO HIM? BECAUSE THEY 
WERE DESPERATE TO GET HIS MONEY. AND THEY INTENDED HE 
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WOULD RELY UPON THOSE REPRESENTATIONS AND THOSE WARRANTIES. 
AND HE, IN FACT, DID. 
AND JOE THOMAS CAME BACK TO US AND SAID, THE ONLY 
RISK IN THIS TRANSACTION TO MY FATHER AND TO YOU IS THE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 38,500.00 AND 30,800.00. MY FATHER'S 
WILLING TO TAKE THE RISK, ARE YOU, GENTLEMEN? MR. STEF-
FENSEN, MR. ROSS, ARE YOU WILLING TO TAKE THAT RISK? FINE, 
THAT'S ACCEPTABLE. WE WILL LEASE IT FROM YOU AND GUARANTEE 
IT TO YOU. MY FATHER WILL BUY THE SWITCH. SO THEY ARE 
ECSTATIC AND ELATED TO HAVE MR. THOMAS BUY THE SWITCH FROM 
THEM. AND HE GIVES 'EM $38,500.00 AND THEY GIVE HIM A BILL 
OF SALE FOR THE SWITCH, UNFORTUNATELY, NOT BEING ABLE TO 
FIND IT. WE'RE TRYING ~ 
THE COURT: TO FIND THE BILL OF SALE? 
MR. STEFFENSEN: THE BILL OF SALE. WELL, THE 
NEXT THING THAT HAPPENS IS, ONCE EVERYTHING FALLS APART, 
YOUR HONOR WILL RECALL JOE THOMAS TALKS TO VON GORDON AND 
SAYS, YOU HAVE GOT TO HELP ME SELL THIS. AND HE SAID, I 
THINK WE CAN. HE SAID, NO, THERE WERE PROMISES MADE. WHAT 
RICH WOOD PROMISED TO HIM. VON GORDON SAID, I DON'T KNOW 
ANYTHING ABOUT THAT. RON DAVIES. THEY GET A CONFERENCE 
CALL. RON DAVIES CATEGORICALLY DENIES THIS. THIS IS A 
VERBAL STATEMENT, THIS IS A VERBAL CASE UP TO THAT POINT IN 
TIME. AND I RECOGNIZE THERE'S SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH THAT, 
BUT JOE THOMAS WAS IN SHOCK THEY WERE DENYING THAT. AND HE 
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THREATENS BACK AND FORTH. AND SO WE HAVE SEVERAL MONTHS OF 
DISPUTES BETWEEN THE THOMASES AND 3D AS TO WHAT 3D'S OBLI-
GATIONS ARE TO THE THOMASES WITH RESPECT TO THE SWITCH WITH 
THE THOMASES SAYING, YOU MADE CERTAIN VERBAL REPRESENTA-
TIONS AND PROMISES TO US AND YOU HAVE GOT TO COMPLY WITH 
THOSE. 3D IS SAYING NO, WE DIDN'T. WE DON'T HAVE TO 
COMPLY, BUT WE'LL TRY AND SELL. 
THE 22,000.00 OBLIGATION COMES UP. VON GORDON 
GOES TO MR. THOMAS AND SAYS, I THINK WE CAN RESELL THE 
SWITCH, BUT YOU WILL HAVE TO SELL IT TO US FOR 20,000.00. 
NEGOTIATIONS BACK AND FORTH. AND JOE THOMAS TALKED TO PHIL 
DAVIES, HE TALKED TO RON DAVIES AND HE TALKED TO VON 
GORDON. AND THEY WERE ALL IN AGREEMENT WHEN THEY FINALLY 
AGREED ON WHAT THE DEAL WAS ON THE $22,000.00. AND THE 
DEAL WAS THAT THEY WOULD SELL IT TO 3D FOR $22,000,00, BUT 
THERE WOULD BE NO RELEASE OR WAIVER OF ANY OF MR. THOMAS'S 
CLAIMS AGAINST 3D OR THE OTHER INDIVIDUALS. AND THE BROTH-
ERS, RON AND PHIL DAVIES, SAID, GO AHEAD, YOU FELL LIKE YOU 
CAN WIN A CASE AGAINST US, OUR BROTHER IS AN ATTORNEY, AND 
WE ARE NOT WORRIED ABOUT YOU SUING US. I SAID FINE, IF 
THAT'S OUR UNDERSTANDING, WE HAVE GOT A DEAL. 
SO VON GORDON, WHO PARTICIPATED IN ALL THESE 
NEGOTIATIONS, COMES TO PICK UP HIS SWITCH, AND HE SIGNS A 
DOCUMENT THAT SAYS NO WAIVER, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, AND WE 
WILL PAY "X" AMOUNT OF DOLLARS ON A CERTAIN DAY. MR. 
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THOMAS GIVES THEM BACK THE SWITCH. 
ON NOVEMBER 20TH, WHATEVER DAY IT WAS, THEY GIVE 
HIM A CHECK THAT DEMANDS A WAIVER, A RESTRICTIVE ENDORSE-
MENT. WELL, MR. THOMAS IS IN SHOCK, AND HE AND HIS SON, 
JOE, TELEPHONE THESE PEOPLE AND SAY, WHAT ARE YOU DOING? 
WE HAVE A WRITTEN AGREEMENT. IT SAYS HERE WHAT IT'S ALL 
ABOUT. WE'VE DISCUSSED THIS, ALL OF US. WHAT AGREEMENT, 
SAYS RON DAVIES. I NEVER KNEW THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT. 
WELL, MR. THOMAS IS A PLAIN SPEAKING MAN AND HE SAID, WHEN 
HE SAID THAT TO ME I KNEW I COULDN'T LET HIM GET AWAY WITH 
IT. AND THAT'S WHEN MR. THOMAS FINALLY CAME TO ME AND 
SAID, THESE PEOPLE HAVE NOT BEEN SQUARE WITH ME THROUGH 
THIS ENTIRE MATTER. SO WE'RE STANDING HERE TODAY, YOUR 
HONOR, THESE PEOPLE HAVE MR. THOMAS'S $38,500.00 AND THEY 
ALSO HAVE THE SWITCH. AND MR. THOMAS DESERVES SOMETHING 
BACK. 
NOW — 
THE COURT: WELL, THERE IS, APPARENTLY, A CHECK 
19
 I FOR $22,000.00 AVAILABLE. 
20
 I MR. STEFFENSEN: WITH A RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENT 
ON IT. I TALKED TO LYNN THE DAY THAT HE FILED HIS REPLY 
AND I SAID, LISTEN, THERE NEVER WOULD HAVE BEEN A LAWSUIT 
HERE IF YOUR PEOPLE HAD DELIVERED A CHECK WITHOUT ENDORSE-
MENT, WITHOUT A RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENT. 
THE COURT: WELL, STRIKE THE RESTRICTIVE ENDORSE-
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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MENT. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: NOW, THIS POINT IN TIME — 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I'M READY TO RULE. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: MR. DAVIES, I WANT TO KNOW IF YOU'LL 
SUBMIT THE CHECK WITHOUT THE RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENT. 
MR. DAVIES: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THE MOTION TO DISMISS IS 
GRANTED. 
THE MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVITS IS GRANTED. 
I WILL GIVE LEAVE FOR 10 DAYS TO FILE AN AMENDED 
COMPLAINT. SO THE MOTION TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT IS 
ALSO GRANTED. AND THAT IS FOR 10 DAYS FROM THE DATE HERE-
OF. THAT MEANS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT MUST BE FILED BY — 
WELL, LET'S SAY BY THE 31ST OF MAY AT 5:00 P.M. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: YES. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: I'M TROUBLED BY THIS BECAUSE OF 
OUR CAUSES OF ACTION IS ON THIS NOTE WHERE MR. GORDON 
SIGNED IT PERSONALLY, AND I CANNOT, FOR THE LIFE OF ME, SEE 
HOW THIS COURT CAN STRIKE THAT CAUSE OF ACTION. 
THE COURT: AS TO MR. GORDON'S PERSONAL LIABILI-
TY? 
MR. STEFFENSEN: THAT'S CORRECT. 
THE COURT: IF THERE'S — WHAT I WOULD LIKE YOU 
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TO DO IS, I WOULD LIKE YOU TO START AFRESH ON THE COMPLAINT 
AND PLEAD THE FUNDAMENTAL CLAIM THAT THERE IS AVAILABLE. I 
DON'T WANT ALL THE VERBIAGE OF EVERYTHING ELSE THAT'S 
PLEAD. THERE IS A RIGHT TO HAVE RECOVERY AND THERE IS A 
POTENTIAL FOR FILING THE COMPLAINT THAT CAN GRANT RECOVERY 
FOR THE UNDERLYING OBLIGATION. 
I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THERE'S A BASIS TO PIERCE 
THE CORPORATE VEIL. THERE MAY BE A BASIS ON THE NOTE 
ITSELF TO HAVE MR. GORDON PERSONALLY LIABLE BASED UPON THE 
WAY HE SIGNED THE NOTE. I DON'T HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO YOUR 
PLEADING THAT ASPECT OF IT, IF THAT CAN BE SHOWN. I MAY 
HAVE TO FACE ANOTHER MOTION TO DISMISS. 
I HAVE, UNFORTUNATELY, GOT TWO ATTORNEYS THAT ARE 
TOO CLOSE TO THIS WHOLE SITUATION. APPARENTLY, MR. DAVIES 
IS REPRESENTING HIS BROTHERS AND YOU'RE REPRESENTING YOUR-
SELF IN THE ASPECT THAT YOU MAY HAVE SOME CONTINGENT LIA-
BILITY. AND THAT CREATES A PROBLEM FOR ME. 
18
 I I WILL ALLOW YOU LEAVE TO, NOT YOU, BUT I WILL 
19
 ALLOW APPROPRIATE COUNSEL LEAVE TO FILE AN APPROPRIATE 
20 AMENDED COMPLAINT, HAVING REVIEWED THE FACTS AND DETERMINE 
21
 WHAT THEY BELIEVE THEY CAN PLEAD. 
22
 I I DON'T WANT TO PIERCE THE CORPORATE VEIL. I 
DON'T WANT TO PLEAD THE THINGS THAT HAVE BEEN PLEAD HERE 
BEFORE NOW. I WANT TO GET ON TO THE UNDERLYING ISSUE AND 
23 
24 
25
 THE OBLIGATION, WHICH IS FUNDAMENTALLY A COLLECTION CLAIM. 
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MR. STEFFENSEN: LET ME ASK YOU THIS, YOUR HONOR. 
AND I HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH MR. DAVIES A COUPLE OF WEEKS 
AGO, SPECIFICALLY ABOUT THE $22,000.00 ACTION, AND I TOLD 
HIM, LISTEN — AND I APPRECIATE WHAT YOU'RE SAYING, YOUR 
HONOR, ABOUT THE OTHER CAUSE OF ACTION — I SAID, LISTEN, 
FORGET ABOUT THOSE, MR. DAVIES, YOU HAVE GOT A PROBLEM WITH 
THIS $22,000.00 CLAIM. IT WAS DUE. YOU SHOULDN'T HAVE A 
RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENT ON IT. IT'S BEARING INTEREST AND 
IT'S GOT AN ATTORNEY'S FEES PROVISION, AND AT LEAST ONE OF 
YOUR CLIENTS, VON GORDON, IS LIABLE, SO LET'S RESOLVE THIS 
ON THAT MATTER. AND WE HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE TO DO THAT. 
THE COURT: WELL, RIGHT NOW — 
MR. STEFFENSEN: AT THIS POINT IN TIME WE DON'T 
WANT TO ACCEPT — WE BELIEVE WE ARE ENTITLED TO THE INTER-
EST THAT'S BEEN DUE ON THAT AND WE BELIEVE WE'RE ENTITLED 
TO A MODICUM OF THE ATTORNEY'S FEES THAT HAVE BEEN SPENT. 
NOT ALL OF THEM, BUT A MODICUM OF THOSE, GETTING TO THIS 
POINT IN TIME. 
AND SO I'D LIKE SOME CLARIFICATION, IF I MAY, AS 
TO HOW THAT ALL WOULD INTERACT WITH WHAT YOU'RE ASKING NOW. 
21
 | THE COURT: WHAT WAS THE DATE THAT THE $22,000.00 
2 2
 I WAS ORIGINALLY AVAILABLE TO BE TENDERED AND WAS TENDERED? 
MR. STEFFENSEN: I BELIEVE IT WAS NOVEMBER 20TH 
OF '89. 
MR. DAVIES: I BELIEVE THAT'S RIGHT. 
23 
24 
25 
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THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WHAT I WANT TENDERED IS I 
WANT 22,000.00 PLUS INTEREST — HAS IT BEEN IN AN INTEREST 
BEARING ACCOUNT? WHERE'S IT BEEN? 
MR. DAVIES: THE CHECK HAS BEEN IN THE POSSESSION 
OF THE PLAINTIFF, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: HAS IT BEEN — 
MR. DAVIES: HE COULD HAVE STRICKEN THE RESTRIC-
TIVE ENDORSEMENT AT ANY TIME. 
THE COURT: HAS IT BEEN — I MEAN, OBVIOUSLY, THE 
CHECK'S DRAWN ON AN ACCOUNT. 
MR. DAVIES: I THINK THE FUNDS HAVE JUST BEEN IN 
3D'S CHECKING ACCOUNT. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THAT'S AN 
INTEREST BEARING ACCOUNT OR NOT. 
THE COURT: WELL, I WILL ASSUME THAT IT IS FOR 
THE PURPOSE — MR. STEFFENSEN, DON'T INTERRUPT ME, PLEASE. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: I'M SORRY, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: I WILL ASSUME IT IS IN AN INTEREST 
18
 BEARING ACCOUNT AND I WILL ASSUME THAT THE INTEREST IS THE 
19
 MARKET RATE THAT IS AVAILABLE ON A CHECKING ACCOUNT. 
20
 MR. DAVIES: OKAY. 
21
 THE COURT: AND I WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT CHECK NOW 
2 2
 BE TENDERED IN AN AMOUNT FROM, NOVEMBER 21ST DID YOU SAY? 
2 3
 MR. DAVIES: THAT'S APPROXIMATELY CORRECT. 
2 4
 THE COURT: YOU FIND OUT THE DATE AND DO IT 
2 5
 ACCURATELY FROM A DATE IN NOVEMBER UNTIL THE PRESENT TIME 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 30 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
WITH INTEREST AT THAT WHICH THE BANKS AUTHORIZE ON A CHECK-
ING ACCOUNT. 
MR. DAVIES: ALL RIGHT. 
THE COURT: AND I WANT THAT TENDERED WITHOUT A 
RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENT IN THAT FACE AMOUNT. ALL OF THE 
OTHER ISSUES WILL BE RESERVED TO BE CONSIDERED AT THE TIME 
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT IS FILED. 
MR. DAVIES: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: WILL YOU PREPARE THE ORDER, MR. 
DAVIES? 
MR. DAVIES: I WILL, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. DOES THAT LEAVE — 
MR. STEFFENSEN: I DON'T WANT TO PRESS MY LUCK, 
YOUR HONOR, SO WE'LL COME BACK. 
15
 I THE COURT: DOES THAT LEAVE ANYTHING THAT NEEDS 
16
 TO BE RESOLVED BRIEFLY? 
17
 MR. STEFFENSEN: THE NOTE HAD AN INTEREST RATE. 
18
 ARE WE NOT ENTITLED, AT SOME POINT IN TIME, TO HAVE THAT 
19
 I INTEREST RATE? 
THE COURT: RIGHT NOW YOU ARE ENTITLED TO THE 
INTEREST RATE THAT I HAVE STATED. 
22
 I MR. STEFFENSEN: THANK YOU. 
23
 MR. DAVIES: ONE QUESTION FROM MY PERSPECTIVE, 
24
 YOUR HONOR. I WILL SUBMIT A PROPOSED ORDER. DO YOU WANT 
25
 ME TO OFFER THAT TO MR. STEFFENSEN? IN OTHER WORDS, IS HE 
20 
21 
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DISQUALIFIED AFTER HE REVIEWS THAT OR IMMEDIATELY? 
THE COURT: I THINK THAT WOULD BE BETTER, YES, 
MR. STEFFENSEN WILL BE DISQUALIFIED AFTER REVIEWING THE 
ORDER SO THAT YOU ARE MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE FACTS AT THIS 
TIME. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: AND YOU CAN APPROVE THE ORDER AS TO 
FORM. I WANT TO GET THAT PART OF IT RESOLVED AND I WANT TO 
GET BACK TO JUST THE UNDERLYING COMPLAINT. 
MR. DAVIES: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
(WHEREUPON, THE HEARING WAS CONCLUDED). 
* * * 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE 
COUNTY 
OF 
OF 
UTAH 
SALT LAKE 
) 
) 
SS. 
I, EILEEN M. AMBROSE, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I AM A 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH; THAT AS 
SUCH CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, I ATTENDED THE HEARING 
OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTER AT THAT TIME AND PLACE SET 
OUT HEREIN; THAT THEREAT I TOOK DOWN IN SHORTHAND THE 
TESTIMONY GIVEN AND THE PROCEEDINGS HAD THEREIN; AND THAT 
THEREAFTER I TRANSCRIBED MY SAID SHORTHAND NOTES INTO 
TYPEWRITING, AND THAT THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPTION IS A 
FULL, TRUE, AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF THE SAME. 
$i,*WQbJo*CM. 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 33 
TabH 
Les F. England (3646) 
SUTHERLAND & ENGLAND 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200 * ,
 wJ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 ' ' ' 
(801) 278-7755 
cr 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* 
* SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
* Civil No. 900900894 CN 
* Judge David S. Young 
Plaintiff, Allan B. Thomas ("Thomas"), by and through his 
undersigned counsel, for his causes of action against the 
defendants, alleges as follows: 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Plaintiff is an individual residing in Spanish Fork, Utah. 
2. Defendant 3D Communications, Inc. ("3D"), is a Utah 
corporation doing business in Salt Lake County, Utah. Defendants 
Von Gordon and Ron Davies are individuals residing in Utah County 
and Salt Lake County, State of Utah, respectively. 
3. Plaintiff's claims for relief are less than $10,000, thus 
jurisdiction in the Circuit or District Courts for the County of 
Salt Lake is proper. 
h 
ALLAN B. THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
3D COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 
VON GORDON, RON DAVIES, 
Defendants. 
4. In the late summer or early fall of 1988, a representative 
of 3D contacted J.D. West Associates, Inc., a Utah corporation 
doing business in Utah County, Utah ("J.D. West"), about purchasing 
a telephone switching system from 3D. J.D. West determined that it 
would like to purchase a Harris 20/20 switch and related equipment 
and software (the "Switch") from 3D, but did not have the financial 
ability to purchase the Switch. 
5. 3D helped J.D. West contact several commercial equipment 
leasing companies about the possibility of purchasing the Switch 
and then leasing it to J.D. West. J.D. West made application for 
an equipment lease for the Switch with several of these companies. 
6. 3D contacted the leasing companies independently from J.D. 
West and then told J.D. West that it was willing to install the 
Switch in J.D. West's Provo, Utah telemarketing facility even 
though 3D had not been paid for the Switch. Apparently 3D felt 
that the purchase of the Switch by the lease company for lease to 
J.D. West was close to being approved and finalized. Thereafter, 
3D installed the Switch at J.D. West's facility. 
7. Several months passed without the equipment lease being 
approved by the various equipment lease companies. 3D contacted 
J.D. West as to what J.D. West could do. J.D. West informed 3D 
that J.D. West still did not have the ability to finance the 
purchase of the Switch and that either a third party would have to 
be found to purchase and then lease the Switch to J.D. West, or 3D 
would have to remove and take the Switch back. 
2 
8. An employee of J.D. West, Joe L Thomas, approached his 
father, the plaintiff, about the possibility of the plaintiff 
purchasing the Switch from 3D and thereafter leasing it to J.D. 
West. The plaintiff indicated that he might be interested, but 
that he wanted to make sure that there was a ready market for used 
switches so that the Switch could be easily resold to a party other 
than J.D. West in the event that J.D. West was unable to meet its 
obligations under the proposed equipment lease. 
9. As agent for the plaintiff, Joe Thomas contacted 
representatives of 3D to inquire as to the market for used 
switches. Joe Thomas explained to Ron Davies and Rick Wood, 
principals of 3D, that Joe was contacting them on behalf of his 
father and that his father was concerned that J.D. West might not 
be able to make the payments on the proposed lease of the Switch 
and that he might need to find someone else to purchase and/or 
lease the Switch. Joe Thomas explained that the plaintiff would 
not be willing to purchase the Switch from 3D unless there was a 
good market for used switches so that he could easily remarket the 
Switch. 
10. After learning of plaintiff's concerns, Mr. Davies and/or 
Mr. Wood represented and warranted the following to plaintiff's 
agent, Joe Thomas: 
a. that the Harris 20/20 was a "top-of-the-line" switch 
and in very high demand; 
3 
b. that there was an excellent market for used switches 
like the Harris 20/20 and that 3D would be able to easily resell 
the switch for the plaintiff in just a few months in the event that 
J.D. West couldn't pay the lease payments; 
c. that the Switch had gone up in price and value since 
the time that it had been installed at J.D. West's facility; 
d. that the Switch could be resold within a few short 
months for no less than 80% of the price of $38,500 that 3D had 
originally quoted to J.D. West and was now quoting the plaintiff; 
e. that the only reason for the 20% discount was to 
cover a sales commission to 3D for reselling the switch and to 
cover the expenses of moving and installing the switch, and not 
that the resale value of the switch would be 20% less than the 
$38,500 price that 3D quoted to the plaintiff. 
11. In reliance upon these representations and warranties 
made to his agent, Joe Thomas, and communicated to the plaintiff, 
the plaintiff agreed to purchase from 3D the Switch which 3D had 
installed in J.D. West's facility in Provo, Utah. The total 
purchase price paid by the plaintiff for the Switch was $38,500.00. 
The purchase of the Switch by the plaintiff from 3D was completed 
on or about November 28, 1988. The representations and warranties 
set forth above in paragraph 10 above constitute an integral part 
of the original agreement between the plaintiff and 3D to purchase 
the Switch. 
4 
12. On March 10, 1989, J.D. West went out of business and 
informed the plaintiff that he should make arrangements to remove 
the Switch from J.D. West's premises. 
13. Joe Thomas immediately contacted Von Gordon of 3D on 
behalf of the plaintiff and informed Mr. Gordon of the problem. 
Mr. Gordon told Joe Thomas that he would help the plaintiff remove 
the Switch and that 3D would immediately begin looking for a new 
buyer for the Switch. 
14. Within a few days after the Switch was so removed, Mr. 
Gordon telephoned Joe Thomas and asked if 3D could also borrow the 
Central Processing Unit ("CPU") and other parts from the Switch for 
a few days. Prior to the removal of the Switch, Mr. Gordon had 
asked if he could borrow the monitor and key board from the Switch 
for a short while. Mr. Gordon explained that one of 3D's 
customers' switches had malfunctioned and that 3D did not have an 
extra CPU and other parts to install in the switch. Mr. Gordon 
represented that the CPU and other parts would only be borrowed for 
one week. With the understanding that the CPU would be needed for 
only one week, the plaintiff agreed to allow Mr. Gordon to remove 
the CPU and other parts from the Switch. 
15. Several weeks passed without the CPU and other parts 
being returned or anyone from 3D contacting the plaintiff 
concerning 3D's efforts to resell the Switch. Consequently, Joe 
Thomas contacted Von Gordon to inquire as to 3D's intentions. In 
his conversation with Mr. Gordon, Joe Thomas reviewed the 
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representations and warranties that had been made to the plaintiff 
through him with respect to the resale market for used switches and 
the resaleability of the Switch and 3D's agreement to help resell 
the Switch for the plaintiff. Mr. Gordon said that he would talk 
to Ron Davies about the matter. 
16. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Gordon and Ron Davies telephoned 
Joe Thomas. In this conversation, Ron Davies denied that anyone at 
3D had made any of the representations and warranties set forth in 
paragraph 10 above, and denied that 3D had any obligation to the 
plaintiff with respect to the resale of the Switch or otherwise. 
He did represent, however, that 3D would use its best efforts to 
resell the Switch for the best price that 3D could arrange. He 
further threatened to cease any efforts to resell the Switch in the 
event that the plaintiff brought suit against 3D. 
17. Joe Thomas responded that he had a clear recollection of 
the representations and warranties referred to in paragraph 10 
above because the plaintiff would never have agreed to purchase the 
Switch from 3D in the absence of such assurances and warranties. 
Mr. Thomas informed Messrs. Gordon and Davies that 3D needed to 
either comply with its obligations or the plaintiff would pursue 
legal action against 3D and its principals. Joe Thomas further 
stated to Mr. Davies that the plaintiff would appreciate 3D's 
efforts to sell the Switch, but that if 3D was unable to timely 
sell the Switch for a price that would net the plaintiff 80% of the 
$38,500.00 purchase price ($30,800), the plaintiff would sue 3D for 
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the difference, if not the entire $38,500 paid by the plaintiff for 
the Switch. 
18. Over the next several weeks, Joe Thomas contacted a 
number of potential purchasers of the Switch and inquired into 
prices on the national market for used telephone switches similar 
to the plaintiff's Switch. Through these inquiries, Joe Thomas 
learned that used switches seldom bring more than 50% of their 
original price. Joe Thomas learned that one reason for this is 
that the manufacturer of the Switch, the Harris/Lanier company, has 
a policy of charging a higher amount for software that it supplies 
to purchasers of used switches than it charges to purchasers of new 
switches. Consequently, sellers of its new switches have a 
competitive advantage over sellers of used switches unless the used 
switches are substantially discounted. 
19. Furthermore, after obtaining an indication of interest in 
the Switch from several parties over the next few months, Joe 
Thomas told the parties to contact 3D directly (at 3D's suggestion) 
to get the technical details concerning the Switch. After these 
parties contacted 3D, in every instance they indicated to Joe 
Thomas that they were no longer interested in plaintiff's Switch. 
At least one of these parties, Nuskin International, bought a new 
Harris 20/20 switch from 3D instead of purchasing the plaintiff's 
used Switch. 
20. In September of 1989, Von Gordon informed Joe Thomas that 
3D had found an entity that wanted a switch like the plaintiff's 
7 
Switch, but that the price had to be around $20,000 or else 3D 
would sell another switch to the entity instead of the plaintiff's 
Switch. Joe Thomas complained to Mr. Gordon that not only had 3D 
refused to fulfill its obligations arising from the representations 
and warranties set forth in paragraph 10 above, but had not even 
used its best efforts to sell the Switch as Ron Davies represented 
that it would in Joe Thomas' first conversation with him referred 
to in paragraph 16 above. Mr. Gordon responded simply that if the 
plaintiff wanted to sell the Switch he would have to agree to sell 
it to 3D for approximately $20,000. 
21. Joe Thomas discussed the situation with the plaintiff, 
who agreed to sell the switch to 3D for $22,000 so long as it was 
understood that the issue of whether 3D was liable to the plaintiff 
for additional damages was not resolved and waived thereby. 
Pursuant to these instructions by the plaintiff, Joe Thomas 
informed 3D of the foregoing offer. 3D agreed to the terms, and, 
specifically in response to the condition that plaintiff was 
reserving the right to pursue 3D for additional damages, Ron and/or 
Phil Davies stated that one of their brothers was an attorney and 
that the plaintiff was free to sue them if he so desired. 
22. On or about October 21, 1989, Von Gordon met with 
plaintiff's agent, Joe Thomas, to personally finalize the agreement 
between the defendants and plaintiff with respect to the purchase 
of the Switch. Mr. Gordon and Joe Thomas jointly drafted a simple 
agreement memorializing the terms that had been discussed by Joe 
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Thomas with all of the individual defendants, which agreement Von 
Gordon then signed on behalf of himself, Ron Davies and 3D for the 
purchase of the Switch from the plaintiff for $22,000. Through his 
statements and conduct in this meeting wherein the agreement was 
finalized and memorialized as set forth above, Von Gordon 
represented and warranted to plaintiff's agent, Joe Thomas, that 
Mr. Gordon was the agent of Ron Davies and 3D and that he had the 
authority to bind them to the terms of the agreement signed by him 
on their behalf. The agreement signed by Mr. Gordon provided that 
the Switch was to be paid for in full on or before November 20, 
1989. In the event that it was not paid for in full on that date, 
the agreement provides that plaintiff is to be paid interest on the 
purchase price of $22,000 at the annual percentage rate of 18% 
until paid in full, and that plaintiff is entitled to his 
attorney's fees and court costs. Furthermore, the agreement 
specifically states "... Payment constitutes purchase of the switch 
and not a settlement of differences. All rights reserved...." A 
true and correct copy of this agreement is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference. 
23. Either contemporaneously or within a few days after the 
signing of the aforementioned agreement, representatives of 3D took 
possession of the Switch from the plaintiff. At the time that 3D 
removed the Switch from the plaintiff's storage facility, Joe 
Thomas reiterated to 3D's representatives there present that the 
plaintiff was not waiving his rights to seek additional recourse 
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from 3D and its principals. 
24. On or about November 20, 1989, the plaintiff received a 
check from 3D in the amount of $22,000. However, on the reverse of 
the check, 3D had typed the following restriction: 
"Endorsement of this check in the amount of $22,000.00 
constitutes payment in full for 1 Harris 20/20 PBX & its 
contents, 1 WYSE Terminal, & 1 Optic Teleset. We agree 
to release 3D Communications Inc. and any of its agents or 
employees from any potential claims prior to 11-16-89." 
A true and correct copy of this check, both front and back, is 
attached hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated herein by reference. 
25. Upon receipt of the aforementioned check, the plaintiff 
and Joe Thomas telephoned 3D and complained that the restrictive 
endorsement violated the agreement of the parties as embodied in 
the October 21, 1989 Agreement referred to in paragraph 22 above. 
In this telephone conversation, Ron Davies and Von Gordon said that 
it was always their understanding that the $22,000.00 purchase 
price would settle all differences between the parties and accused 
the plaintiff of violating his agreement with 3D. The plaintiff 
responded that if 3D did not remove the restrictive endorsement 
from the $22,000 check, he would not accept it and would bring suit 
against 3D. 3D refused to remove the restrictive endorsement from 
the- check. 
26. On or about February 9, 1990, plaintiff filed his 
original complaint herein. 
27. On or about May 21, 1990, the Court heard argument on 
defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Disqualify Brian W. 
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Steffensen. At said hearing, the Court granted defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss, but with leave for plaintiff to file an amended 
complaint setting forth causes of action relating to the agreement 
signed by Von Gordon regarding the repurchase of the Switch. 
Thereafter, the defendants tendered a check for $22,000.00 together 
with interest at the bank rate (not 18%) to plaintiff that did not 
have any restrictive endorsement. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
BREACH OF AGREEMENT - $22,000 SALE AGREEMENT 
28. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference 
as if set forth in full all of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 27 above. 
29. The defendants' failure to deliver an unrestricted check 
for $22,000.00 for the Switch as was agreed as alleged in paragraph 
22 above, constituted a breach of said agreement that entitled the 
plaintiff to a judgment against the defendants for the sum of 
$22,000.00, together with interest thereon at the annual percentage 
rate of 18% from November 20, 1989, until paid in full, together 
with plaintiff's costs of suit and attorney's fees. Although the 
defendants tendered to plaintiff $22,000.00 together with interest 
at the annual percentage rate of approximately 6%, plaintiff was 
forced to bring this action in order to collect these amounts and 
is still entitled to recover from the defendants the balance of the 
interest due (the difference between that paid and the contract 
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rate of 18%) and all of his attorney's fees incurred herein. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
30. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference 
as if set forth in full all of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 29 above. 
31. In making the representations, warranties and/or promises 
referred to in paragraphs 10, 16 and 22 to the plaintiff, the 
defendants expected and knew that such representations, warranties 
and/or promises would induce the plaintiff to act, and such 
representations, warranties and/or promises did, in fact, induce 
the plaintiff to undertake to and to initially purchase the Switch 
from 3D, to then temporarily refrain from suing the defendants, and 
finally to allow the defendants to retake possession of the Switch 
for resale to a third-party. 
32. The purchase price paid for the Switch originally by the 
plaintiff, and the Switch itself when delivered to the defendants 
pursuant to the agreement referred to in paragraph 22, were of a 
definite and substantial character and were delivered solely at 
defendants' request and based upon the representations in 
connection therewith. A serious injustice would result if the 
defendants were allowed to contradict or repudiate the 
aforementioned representations, warranties and/or promises and 
escape liability therefor. Injustice can only be avoided by 
enforcement of defendants' representations, warranties and promises 
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alleged above and the granting of plaintiff's relief requested 
herein. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
BREACH OF WARRANTY OF AGENCY 
33. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference herein 
as if set forth in full all of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 32 above. 
34. In finalizing and signing the agreement referred to in 
paragraph 22 above, Von Gordon represented and warranted to 
plaintiff's agent, Joe Thomas, that he was the authorized agent of 
Ron Davies and 3D in connection with the agreement he signed on 
their behalf. If Ron Davies and/or 3D are able to prove that Mr. 
Gordon was not their agent for the purposes of said agreement, and 
are thereby able to escape liability to the plaintiff for the 
obligations that they were intended to have with respect to the 
plaintiff therein, then Von Gordon is liable to the plaintiff for 
breaching his express and/or implied warranty of agency vis a vis 
Ron Davies and/or 3D. 
35. As a result of the breach of his express and/or implied 
warranty of agency, Von Gordon is liable to the plaintiff for any 
damages that plaintiff may suffer as a result of the failure of 
such agency to bind Ron Davies and/or 3D to the terms of the 
agreement referred to in paragraph 22, including, but not limited 
to, the loss, if any, of the plaintiff's right to receive the 
$22,000.00 payment referred to in said agreement without giving up 
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plaintiff's right to pursue the claims against the defendants that 
he has alleged herein, including the plaintiff's costs of suit and 
attorney's fees in having to pursue this litigation. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for relief against the defendants 
as follows: 
1. With respect to the First, Second and Third Causes of 
Action, for judgment against the defendants, jointly and severally, 
for the interest on the principal amount of $22,000.00 at the 
annual percentage rate of 18% from November 21, 1989, remaining 
unpaid, and all of his costs of court and attorney's fees incurred 
herein. 
2. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just 
and equitable under the circumstances arising from and warranted by 
the facts set forth herein. 
DATED this C>Y day of //()V>0^ £fh , 1990. 
iSes F Y Engine 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's address: 
160 East 900 North 
Spanish Fork, Utah 
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LYNN S. DAVIES (A0824) 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLAN B. THOMAS, * 
* ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
Plaintiff, * MOTIONS TO DISMISS, 
* MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
vs. * BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN, 
* MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS, 
3D COMMUNICATIONS, INC., * AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
VON GORDON, RON DAVIES and * AMEND COMPLAINT 
PHIL DAVIES, * 
* Civil No. 900900894 CN 
Defendants. * Judge David S. Young 
Allan B. Thomas commenced this action by filing a 
seventeen-page Complaint consisting of eight Causes of Action. 
Defendants responded by filing Motions to Dismiss for Failure 
to State a Claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Specifically, the individual defendants 
moved the court to dismiss all claims against them and for 
attorney's fees and sanctions against the plaintiff and his 
counsel in bringing the action. Defendant 3D Communications, 
Inc. also moved the court to dismiss the First, Second, Fourth, 
tes 
Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action of plaintiff's 
Complaint insofar as such causes of action pertain to the 
original sale at issue in this litigation; for a dismissal of 
the Fifth Cause of Action; and for attorney's fees in obtaining 
a dismissal of those claims. All defendants further moved for 
a dismissal of the Eighth Cause of Action on the grounds that 
no cause of action existed as set forth in plaintiff's Eighth 
Cause of Action. Finally, defendants moved for the 
disqualification of Brian Steffensen as counsel for plaintiff. 
Plaintiff responded by submitting lengthy memoranda, 
four affidavits, and by moving to amend plaintiff's Complaint. 
In defendants' reply, defendants moved to strike plaintiff's 
supporting affidavits. 
The court, having read the filings of both parties, 
ordered a hearing for May 21, 1990 at 9:00 o'clock a.m. 
Brian W. Steffensen appeared as counsel for plaintiff. Lynn S. 
Davies appeared as counsel for all defendants. The court, 
having read all filings, having heard argument from both 
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
Defendants' Motion to Strike the four affidavits submitted by 
plaintiff on the grounds that such affidavits contain 
inadmissible and inappropriate affidavit testimony, 
objectionable hearsay, opinion testimony, irrelevant material, 
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speculation, lack of foundation, and are violative of the parol 
evidence rule, is hereby granted. 
The motions of the individual defendants, Von Gordon, 
Ron Davies and Phil Davies, to dismiss all Causes of Action 
against them on the grounds that they acted at all times as 
employees only of a bona fide corporation and that there have 
been no facts pled in the Complaint or proposed Amended 
Complaint which, if proved, would provide a sufficient basis 
upon which to pierce the corporate veil, are hereby granted. 
The Motion to Dismiss of Defendant 3D Communications, 
Inc., requesting a dismissal of the First, Second, Fourth, 
Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action, insofar as they 
pertain to the original sale of the subject telephone 
equipment, is hereby granted. Defendant 3D Communications' 
Motion to Dismiss the Fifth Cause of Action insofar as it is 
based on an alleged contract signed without authority from 3D 
Communications, is hereby granted. The Motion to Dismiss the 
Eighth Cause of Action on the grounds that it fails to state a 
cognizable cause of action, is hereby granted. 
The Motion to Disqualify Brian Steffensen as counsel 
for plaintiff, on the grounds that his representation of 
plaintiff is violative of Rule 3.7(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct and may be violative as well of 
Rules 1.8(b) and 1.9(b), is also granted. 
-3-
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Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint is granted, 
but not the proposed Amended Complaint previously filed with 
the court. Leave is granted only to file a new Amended 
Complaint that briefly and concisely states any cause of action 
remaining to plaintiff; based on the record before the court, 
if any cause of action remains herein, it would be for breach 
of contract, if any, arising out of 3D Communications' resale 
of the telephone switch for plaintiff Thomas. 
Upon stipulation of counsel for defendants, defendant 
3D Communications, Inc. will tender a check in the amount of 
$22,000.00 to plaintiff, without a restrictive endorsement. 
The court further orders that 3D Communications pay interest to 
plaintiff from the date of issuance of the original $22,000.00 
check, i.e., from November 16, 1989, to the date of this 
order. Interest is set at the market rate on interest-bearing 
check accounts. 
DATED this . 1990. 
Third District 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid 
on this day of , 1990, to the following 
counsel of record: 
Brian W. Steffesen 
Huntsman Building, Suite 2 00 
3760 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
THOMAS/LSD 
10112-005 
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Brian W. Steffensen, P.C. (3092) 
Huntsman Building, Suite 200 
3760 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801) 273-3962 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT
 YLAKEj:^UN^Y 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALLAN B. THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
3D COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 
VON GORDON, RON DAVIES and 
PHIL DAVIES, 
Defendants. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Objection to Proposed 
Order re Defendants' 
and Plaintiff's Motions 
Civil No. 900900894 CN 
Judge David S. Young 
Comes Now the plaintiff, Allan B. Thomas, by and through his 
undersigned counsel, Brian W. Steffensen, and objects to the 
proposed Order prepared by counsel for defendants in connection 
with Defendants1 and Plaintiff's Motions on the following grounds: 
1. The Court indicated at the hearing on the defendants' and 
plaintiff's motions that it wanted the defendant 3D Communications, 
Inc., to pay $22,000.00 plus bank interest to the plaintiff, and 
that the plaintiff could then bring another complaint against the 
defendants thereafter if it so desired subject to certain 
restrictions; 
2. The Court further indicated that it did not think that any 
causes of action for piercing the corporate veil were appropriate; 
3. The plaintiff's counsel does not recall the Court saying 
that the only cause of action that the plaintiff may ref ile against 
the defendants would be the claim relating to the failure of the 
defendants to pay the $22,000.00 check to the plaintiff upon the 
terms set forth in the written agreement signed by Von Gordon on 
behalf of himself, Ron Davies and 3D Communications, Inc.; 
4. The plaintiff ought to at least be able to pursue the 
following causes of action: 
(a) Against the corporation for breach of representation 
and warranties in connection with the original purchase of the 
switch by Mr. Thomas (even if the facts were to coincide with the 
defendants' assertion that they sold the switch to J.D. West first, 
and that the switch was then sold to Mr. Thomas, the UCC provides 
that a seller under circumstances such as these is liable to a 
third-party repurchaser or financier for the representations and/or 
warranties which it makes to such repurchaser or financier); 
(b) Against new proposed defendant Rick Wood as the 
individual who made the alleged misrepresentations and actionable 
warranties to Mr. Thomas through Mr. Thomas' agent; 
(c) Against Von Gordon, Ron Davies and 3D 
Communications, Inc. for breach of the contract Von Gordon executed 
in connection with the repurchase of the switch for $22,-000.00, 
plus interest at 18% and attorney's fees if the purchase price 
wasn't paid on time; 
(d) Against these same defendants for denying their 
obligations under this $22,000 purchase agreement vis-a-vis the 
non-waiver language that is clearly on the face of said written 
agreement; such a denial is a violation of the covenant of good 
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faith and fair dealing implicit in every agreement and triggered 
the instant litigation; and 
(e) Plaintiff replead his theory of equitable estoppel as 
the Eighth Cause of Action of the Proposed First Amended Complaint 
and this theory would still be applicable to estop Rick Wood and 3D 
Communications, Inc. from avoiding liability to Mr. Thomas for the 
verbal representations and warranties that they made to Mr. Thomas' 
agent before Mr. Thomas purchased the switch originally (Ron Davies 
was also present for a portion of the conversation in which these 
representations and warranties were made to Mr. Thomas); further, 
this same theory would estop Von Gordon, Ron Davies, Phil Davies 
and 3D Communications, Inc. from avoiding liability for the 
promises that these individuals, and therefore 3D Communications, 
made to Mr. Thomas that the repurchase of the switch from Mr. 
Thomas for $22,000 would not involve the waiver of any causes of 
action that Mr. Thomas believed that he had against 3D 
Communications, Inc., et al. 
These causes of action would only be against entities that had 
direct and personal involvement in the events that are the bases of 
the causes of action; they do not involve vicarious liability 
based upon an alter ego theory. And, even though the Court has 
indicated that it will strike plaintiff's affidavits, if the 
factual matters asserted therein were to be proven at trial, the 
plaintiff would be entitled to judgment against the proposed 
defendants upon the theories set forth above. 
For these reasons, the plaintiff simply requests the Court to 
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make the language of the Order less restrictive with respect to the 
causes of action that the plaintiff may still bring against the 
proposed defendants. 
The plaintiff also asks that the language of the Order provide 
that the dismissal of plaintiff's causes of action in his Complaint 
and the disqualification of plaintiff's counsel is conditioned upon 
the payment by the defendants to the plaintiff of the $22,000.00, 
and that the $22,000.00 payment shall be due upon the execution of 
the Court's order. 
Respectfully submitted this J day of ^ ^ ± _ _ , /fff<>. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the y day of 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Lynn S. Davies 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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Les F. England (3646) 
SUTHERLAND & ENGLAND 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801) 278-7755 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-
ALLAN B. THOMAS, * / 
J 
Plaintiff, * Memorandum in Opposition 
* To Defendants^ Motion for 
vs. * Summary Judgment * 
1OTI€ 
3D COMMUNICATIONS, INC., * / 
VON GORDON, RON DAVIES, * ^(oC^siy 
* Civil No.. 903012990 CV 
* / 
Defendants. * Judge Dennis M. Fuchs 
* / 
Plaintiff respectfully submits the following Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS 
1. The original complaint herein alleged among other things 
breach of warranty, fraud and fraud in the inducement against 3D 
Communications, Inc. in connection with its sale of a telephone 
switch to the plaintiff and sought damages in the amount of 
$38,500.00 and punitive damages. The original complaint also 
sought to pierce the corporate veil and hold the shareholders of 3D 
Communications, Inc. liable for the obligations of the corporation 
to the plaintiff. The complaint also alleged a breach of contract 
in connection with the purchase back by 3D Communications and 
others of the switch from plaintiff. A copy of the hand-written 
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agreement for the repurchase of the switch for $22,000.00 is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. Said agreements states the 
following: 
"Von Gordon — Ron Davies 3D Communications 
agrees to pay to Allan B. Thomas the sum of $22,000.00 
(twenty-two thousand) for the purchase of his Harris 
20/20 phone switch and all internal parts and software. 
This sum is to be paid on or before November 20, 1989, 
after which time interest will be charged at the rate of 18% 
3D Communications agrees to pay all attorney's fees & court 
cost if necessary to collect the $22000. Payment constitutes 
purchase of the switch and not a settlement of differences. 
All rights reserved 
(18% is an annual rate) [initials of Von Gordon and J. Thomas] 
x[signature of Von Gordon] 
10/21/89" 
(See verification of Brian W. Steffensen hereafter). 
2. A hearing on defendants' motions to dismiss and to 
disqualify counsel, and on plaintiff's motion to amend complaint 
was held by Judge David S. Young on June 4, 1990. Judge Young 
indicated that he did not think much of the fraud and fraud in the 
inducement claims of plaintiff with respect to the original 
purchase of the switch, nor did he think much of the attempt to 
pierce the corporate veil to reach all of the shareholders of 3D 
Communications. With respect to the claim for breach of the 
contract to repurchase the switch from plaintiff, Judge Young then 
turned to defendants' counsel and asked him if defendants would 
stipulate to immediately paying $22,000.00 plus bank interest to 
the plaintiff. Defendants' counsel indicated that his client would 
be willing to immediately pay $22,000.00 plus bank interest to the 
plaintiff, (See verification of Brian W. Steffensen) 
3. Plaintiff's counsel objected and pointed out that the 
contract signed by Von Gordon, individually and on behalf of 3D 
Communications, Inc. and Ron Davies, provided for the payment of 
interest at 18% per annum and attorney's fees. Judge Young 
responded that plaintiff could amend its complaint to sue on any of 
its contractual claims, including without limitation to collect 
said additional interest and attorney's fees, but that the fraud 
and fraud in the inducement claims for $39,000.00 plus punitive 
damages were to be dismissed, as well as the "pierce the corporate 
veil" claims. Judge Young then ruled that if defendants would pay 
the $22,000.00 with bank interest immediately to plaintiff, he 
would grant their motion to dismiss but allow the plaintiff to file 
a substantially abbreviated complaint on the contract based causes 
of action. The plaintiff did not stipulate to this action, it was 
forced upon him by the Court. If there was a stipulation, it was 
between the Court and the defendants. (See verification of Brian W. 
Steffensen) 
4. Defendants' counsel prepared a proposed order and served 
it upon counsel by mail on May 23, 1990. Under the Rules, 
plaintiff had until on or before June 4, 1990 to serve its 
objections, if any, to the proposed order on the Court and opposing 
counsel. Plaintiff placed its objection to the proposed order in 
the mail on Friday, June 1, 1990. A copy of the plaintiff's 
objection is attached hereto as Exhibit B. (See verification of 
Brian W. Steffensen) 
5. Judge Young, however, signed the proposed order on June 4, 
1990, before the expiration of the time period for objecting 
thereto and without the benefit of considering the plaintiff's 
objections thereto. Plaintiff's then counsel, Brian W. Steffensen, 
raised the issue of the premature execution of the proposed order 
to Judge Young. Judge Young told Brian w. Steffensen that he would 
be happy to vacate the order if the plaintiff desired and made the 
appropriate motion. (See verification of Brian W. Steffensen) 
6. The defendants had not moved for the dismissal of the 
Third Cause of Action in the original complaint, which alleged 
breach of contract and damages of $30,500.00. When the defendants 
did not file a responsive pleading to this undismissed cause of 
action within the required time limits, the plaintiff moved for 
judgment by default against the defendants under the Third Cause of 
Action. (See verification of Brian W. Steffensen and Les F. 
England) 
7. The defendants opposed this motion for default judgment, 
and Judge Young informally told new counsel for plaintiff that he 
had anticipated plaintiff filing a new complaint alleging all of 
the remaining breach of contract causes of action and would not 
allow a default judgment. (See verification of Les F. England) 
8. Thereafter, new counsel for plaintiff and defendants' 
counsel agreed that plaintiff would file a new amended complaint 
with whatever non-fraud and non-pierce-the-corporate-veil causes of 
action that he wanted to bring. The plaintiff would withdraw its 
motion for default judgment and defendants would respond in due 
time to the plaintiff's new amended complaint. Further, there 
would be no need to seek an amendment to Judge Young's order 
w 
because defendants agreed that plaintiff could sue on the breach of 
repurchase agreement cause of action for additional interest and 
attorney's fees. The fact that defendants' counsel understood that 
the interest rate issue was not resolved by the order signed by 
Judge Young is clearly evidenced by his letter to Les England dated 
July 6, 1990, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
(See verification of Les F. England) 
9. The plaintiff filed its Second Amended Complaint pursuant 
to the stipulation of counsel with the Court and served a copy of 
the same upon defendants counsel on November 26, 1990. This Second 
Amended Complaint seeks simply to recover the difference in the 
interest due between the 18% per annum provided for in the contract 
signed by Von Gordon and the bank interest that defendants had paid 
pursuant to their agreement with Judge Young, together with 
attorney's fees as also provided for in the agreement signed by Von 
Gordon. The complaint also includes a cause of action against Von 
Gordon, the only signer of the agreement in Exhibit A, for breach 
of warranty of agency if either 3D Communications or Ron Davies are 
able to prove that Mr. Gordon did not have authority to represent 
them in negotiating and executing the agreement to repurchase the 
switch. (See verification of Les F. England) 
10. The defendants did not file an answer to this Second 
Amended Complaint within ten days as required by the Rules, so 
plaintiff entered their default and obtained a default judgment for 
the additional interest due on the contract signed by Von Gordon, 
with the issue of the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded 
reserved for evidentiary hearing. (See verification of Les F. 
England) 
11. Defendants moved to set aside the default judgment, 
claiming that they were somehow confused and did not realize that 
they needed to file an answer in a timely fashion to the Second 
Amended Complaint. In their memorandum in support of their motion 
to set aside default judgment, its is interesting to note that the 
only "defense" that they cite to the new Second Amended Complaint 
is that "defendant Gordon had no authority to obligate defendant 3D 
Communications or defendant Ron Davies to any contract to pay 
interest over and above what has previously been paid herein." 
(See verification of Les F. England; Defendants' Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Set Aside Default, bottom of page 8 and top of 
page 9) 
12. This Court set aside the default judgment and directed 
that the matter proceed to trial. The defendants have now filed 
a Motion for Summary Judgment in which they allege for the first 
time that Judge Young's order in essence does not allow plaintiff 
to bring any further causes of action against the defendants of any 
nature. (See Order setting aside default judgment; Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment) 
13. The facts set forth in defendants' Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities are not supported by affidavit, a specific 
reference to the record herein, etc., as required by Rule 56 in 
order to be deemed sufficient to form the basis for a motion for 
summary judgment. 
The foregoing statement of disputed facts effectively refutes 
all of the allegations set forth in defendants' Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, except paragraphs 2 and 3. 
ARGUMENT 
The defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied 
because all of the facts upon which defendants base their motion 
are disputed. The Court can only grant a Motion for Summary 
Judgment when the facts, as viewed in the light most favorable to 
the party against whom the summary judgment is sought, indicate 
that there is no possibility of that party prevailing on the 
merits. 
Furthermore, the facts set forth in defendants' pleadings, and 
upon which defendants rely in making their motion for summary 
judgment, are not supported by affidavit or specific reference to 
admissions, answers to interrogatories, or other appropriate parts 
of the record in this case. Under Rule 4-501 (2 (a), Rules of 
Judicial Administration, and under Rule 56, Rules of Civil 
Procedure, defendants' statement of facts is insufficient to 
support the granting of a motion for summary judgment. 
Judge Young's Order Clearly Contemplates The Filing of An 
Additional Complaint. Judge Young's order expressly allows the 
plaintiff to file a new complaint based upon the contractual causes 
of action. The stipulation between Judge Young and the defendants' 
counsel was that the other causes of action would be dismissed if 
plaintiff was immediately paid the principal amount of $22,000.00 
plus bank interest. If Judge Young did not think that plaintiff 
had the right to pursue the contractual interest of 18% or 
attorney's fees due under the contract attached hereto as Exhibit 
A, he would have ended the entire matter back on June 4, 1990 and 
not allowed plaintiff to file an additional complaint. 
Further, Lynn Davies' letter to Les England dated July 6, 1990 
(Exhibit C attached hereto) itself clearly indicates that the 
defendants understood that Judge Young's order did not cut off 
plaintiff's right to seek the payment of additional interest from 
the defendants. If defendants truly believed that all causes of 
action had been dismissed by Judge Young's order, as they now 
allege, they would have filed an Motion to Dismiss instead of an 
answer to plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. 
Plaintiff has the absolute right to continue to pursue his 
rights under the agreement in Exhibit A to collect the full 18% 
interest due him under said agreement. 
Judge Young's Order Does Not Preclude Plaintiff From Suing the 
Actual Parties to the Contract to Repurchase the Switch. The 
agreement to repurchase the switch set forth in Exhibit A states 
clearly that the purchasers of the switch were: "Von Gordon — Ron 
Davies 3D Communications." The plaintiff clearly has a right to 
sue the entities, including individuals, expressly named in the 
agreement for breach of contract. Judge Young did not intend to 
deny plaintiff the right to sue the parties who are actually named 
as purchasers in the agreement itself. Judge Young intended solely 
to preclude the plaintiff from suing individuals solely on the 
basis of alter ego and/or piercing the corporate veil. 
Plaintiff does not believe that Judge Young's order must be 
construed to deny plaintiff the right to sue the actual parties to 
the repurchase contract. Further, if Judge Young's order does deny 
plaintiff that right, the order would almost certainly be reversed 
on appeal. This Court should avoid protracted litigation on this 
point and construe the Order to allow plaintiff to bring the causes 
of action that it has brought. 
This most certainly must be the result with respect to the 
Third Cause of Action in the Second Amended Complaint. Von Gordon 
represented and warranted, by the negotiation and execution of the 
agreement to repurchase the switch set forth in Exhibit A, that he 
had authority from 3D Communications and Ron Davies to execute said 
agreement. He also must have understood that he was himself a 
party, individually, thereto since his name is the first one 
mentioned as one of the purchasers. If nothing else, the plaintiff 
has the right to collect the interest and attorney's fees he has 
incurred herein from Von Gordon pursuant to the agreement that Von 
Gordon himself negotiated and signed. Under no circumstances would 
it be proper for the Court to dismiss any of the causes of action 
in the complaint against Von Gordon. 
If There Has Been Any Bad Faith In This Matter, It Has Been On 
the Part of Defendants For Filing the Present Motion for Suimnary 
Judgment. The defendants allege that the plaintiff has acted in 
bad faith in bringing his Second Amended Complaint. It is 
inconceivable that defendants could even make this argument given 
the language of repurchase agreement between the parties in Exhibit 
A, Judge Young's specific order that "plaintiff's motion to amend 
the complaint is granted ...", and defendants' own attempts 
exemplified by Mr. Davies' letter in Exhibit C to settle this 
matter subsequent to the June 4, 1990. 
The defendants have alleged in their motion for summary 
judgment that, in essence, the agreement to repurchase the switch 
set forth in Exhibit A must be totally ignored through a strained 
construction of Judge Young's prior order, such that plaintiff has 
no additional causes of action whatsoever against anyone. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' own actions, by (1) failing to file a motion to 
dismiss rather than an answer and (2) communicating with plaintiff 
by letter dated July 6, 1990 (Exhibit C), and the specific language 
of Judge Young's order allowing plaintiff to file an amended 
complaint, precludes this court from granting defendants' motion 
for summary judgment. 
DATED the f£{ day of dac,^ >, , M / . 
Ifes F. EjKjland 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
VERIFICATION 
Salt Lake County 
State of Utah 
I, Les F. England, being first sworn and under oath, do hereby 
affirm that I have read the foregoing instrument and that based 
upon my personal knowledge the factual allegations contained 
therein in numbered paragraphs 6 through 13 are true and correct. 
Dated this /yday of fJr&M'f 1*1 ( 
.SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o be fore me t h i s / ^ ' ^ H d a y of 
A^"r r /??/ -
*>* iKXiti 
m£> Commissi*)- \ ^ \ 
| 7 ^ Expires 4/^'-3 - $ 
%W\ Salt Lake C\v - V 7 
UT8410S 
^S£*-
N03PARY PUBLIC 
Res id ing a t : 
VERIFICATION 
Salt Lake County 
State of Utah 
I, Brian W. Steffensen, being first sworn and under oath, do 
hereby affirm that I have read the foregoing instrument and that 
based upon my personal knowledge the factual allegations contained 
therein in numbered paragraphs 1 through 6 are true and correct. 
Dated this /3 day of Al^O ^ , / % / . 
Brian W.I Stef fenseii \^  
. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to Before me /J day of 
/? 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
-J 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this n day of 
In i , i caused a true and correct copy of 
j-
instrument to be mailed, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
the foregoing 
Lynn S. Davies 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON 
Post Office Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
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EXHIBIT " B " 
LYNN S. DAVIES (A0824) 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLAN B. THOMAS, * 
* ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
Plaintiff, * MOTIONS TO DISMISS, 
* MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
vs. * BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN, 
* MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS, 
3D COMMUNICATIONS, INC., * AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
VON GORDON, RON DAVIES and * AMEND COMPLAINT 
PHIL DAVIES, * 
* Civil No. 900900894 CN 
Defendants. * Judge David S. Young 
Allan B. Thomas commenced this action by filing a 
seventeen-page Complaint consisting of eight Causes of Action. 
Defendants responded by filing Motions to Dismiss for Failure 
to State a Claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Specifically, the individual defendants 
moved the court to dismiss all claims against them and for 
attorney's fees and sanctions against the plaintiff and his 
counsel in bringing the action. Defendant 3D Communications, 
Inc. also moved the court to dismiss the First, Second, Fourth, 
Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action of plaintiff's 
Complaint insofar as such causes of action pertain to the 
original sale at issue in this litigation; for a dismissal of 
the Fifth Cause of Action; and for attorney's fees in obtaining 
a dismissal of those claims. All defendants further moved for 
a dismissal of the Eighth Cause of Action on the grounds that 
no cause of action existed as set forth in plaintiff's Eighth 
Cause of Action. Finally, defendants moved for the 
disqualification of Brian Steffensen as counsel for plaintiff. 
Plaintiff responded by submitting lengthy memoranda, 
four affidavits, and by moving to amend plaintiff's Complaint. 
In defendants' reply, defendants moved to strike plaintiff's 
supporting affidavits. 
The court, having read the filings of both parties, 
ordered a hearing for May 21, 1990 at 9:00 o'clock a.m. 
Brian W. Steffensen appeared as counsel for plaintiff. Lynn S. 
Davies appeared as counsel for all defendants. The court, 
having read all filings, having heard argument from both 
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
Defendants' Motion to Strike the four affidavits submitted by 
plaintiff on the grounds that such affidavits contain 
inadmissible and inappropriate affidavit testimony, 
objectionable hearsay, opinion testimony, irrelevant material, 
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speculation, lack of foundation, and are violative of the parol 
evidence rule, is hereby granted. 
The motions of the individual defendants, Von Gordon, 
Ron Davies and Phil Davies, to dismiss all Causes of Action 
against them on the grounds that they acted at all times as 
employees only of a bona fide corporation and that there have 
been no facts pled in the Complaint or proposed Amended 
Complaint which, if proved, would provide a sufficient basis 
upon which to pierce the corporate veil, are hereby granted. 
The Motion to Dismiss of Defendant 3D Communications, 
Inc., requesting a dismissal of the First, Second, Fourth, 
Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action, insofar as they 
pertain to the original sale of the subject telephone 
equipment, is hereby granted. Defendant 3D Communications' 
Motion to Dismiss the Fifth Cause of Action insofar as it is 
based on an alleged contract signed without authority from 3D 
Communications, is hereby granted. The Motion to Dismiss the 
Eighth Cause of Action on the grounds that it fails to state a 
cognizable cause of action, is hereby granted. 
The Motion to Disqualify Brian Steffensen as counsel 
for plaintiff, on the grounds that his representation of 
plaintiff is violative of Rule 3.7(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct and may be violative as well of 
Rules 1.8(b) and 1.9(b), is also granted. 
3oX 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint is granted, 
but not the proposed Amended Complaint previously filed with 
the court. Leave is granted only to file a new Amended 
Complaint that briefly and concisely states any cause of action/ 
remaining to plaintiff; based on the record before the court, \ 
if any cause of action remains herein, it would be for breach 
of contract, if any, arising out of 3D Communications' resale \ 
of the telephone switch for plaintiff Thomas. / 
Upon stipulation of counsel for defendants, defendant 
3D Communications, Inc. will tender a check in the amount of 
$22,000.00 to plaintiff, without a restrictive endorsement. 
The court further orders that 3D Communications pay interest to 
plaintiff from the date of issuance of the original $22,000.00 
check, i.e., from November 16, 1989, to the date of this 
order. Interest is set at the market rate on interest-bearing 
check accounts. 
DATED this of JUHA4> , 1990. 
3^3 
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July 6, 1990 
Les F. England 
SUTHERLAND & ENGLAND 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106-4206 
Re: Thomas v. 3D Communications, IncM et al. 
Our File No. 10112-005 
Dear Les: 
Enclosed please find a check from 3D Communications 
payable to your client, Allan B. Thomas, in the amount of 
$22,660.90. This amount constitutes the $22,000.00 which we 
stipulated at the time of the hearing in this matter we would 
subsequently pay. In addition, we have added $660.90 in interest. 
This was calculated at 4 3/4 percent interest per annum, for 231 
days. 3D Communications banks at Brighton Bank, which pays 4 
3/4 percent per annum on its NOW checking accounts. Even though 3D 
initially deposited the money in its regular checking account, on 
which it did not draw any interest, we have decided to go along 
with the suggestion of the court that we pay interest at the rate 
normally earned on interest-bearing checking accounts. 
This letter will also confirm our telephone conversation 
today, in which you suggested that I hold off on your Motions to 
Enter Default and to Enforce Compliance with the court's Order, as 
well as your Request for Hearing. As I pointed out to you, I 
understood that if the case in fact proceeded further, Judge Young 
wanted a new Amended Complaint, so it was not necessary for me to 
respond to the outstanding Third Cause of Action until or if I 
received the Amended Complaint. Also, the $22,000.00 plus interest 
had not been paid since the signing of the Order for two reasons: 
First, there was some delay while we were waiting for a 
determination about the objections to the form of the Order that 
had been filed, and second, 3D has recently been involved in 
attempting to settle this matter with Allan Thomas. 3D offered to 
pay 10 percent interest in exchange for a final resolution of this 
matter, whereas Allan Thomas insisted on the payment of 18 percent 
interest. 3D attempted to negotiate this matter with Allan Thomas, 
but was subsequently referred to Joe Thomas. We had been hopeful 
that such a good faith showing by 3D would serve to resolve this 
July 6, 1990 
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case, because Brian Steffensen had contended that the case had been 
filed only because Allan Thomas felt offended by the restrictive 
endorsement. I thought that if Allan Thomas could see that 3D was 
acting in all good faith, that the matter would be resolved. I was 
disappointed to see that Joe Thomas intervened to insist on the 
payment of 18 percent interest anyway. 
Finally, I was concerned that despite the 
disqualification of Brian Steffensen as counsel in this case, that 
you had now entered an appearance. You said that although Brian 
Steffensen was renting office space from your firm, you* also 
referred to him as an "associate." Please bear in mind that our 
Motion to Disqualify Brian Steffensen was based on Rules 1.8(b), 
1.9(b) and 3.7(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Rule 1.10 provides that "While lawyers are associated in a firm, 
none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of 
them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by 
Rule . . . 1.9 . . . ." 
Notwithstanding, we would prefer to avoid another change 
of counsel and you indicated that it might be possible to resolve 
this matter after further discussion with either Allan or Joe 
Thomas. I certainly hope so. If Mr. Thomas is now interested in 
accepting the offer of 10 percent interest (an additional 
5.25 percent), then we would be happy to pay that in exchange for a 
dismissal of all claims. Thank you for your attention to this 
matter. 
Sincerely, 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
:LS0N/ 
LSD/pm 
TabL 
(I h^J^ruLil 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATb OF UTHH 
ALLAN B. THOMAS, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
3D COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 
VON GORDON, & RON DAVIES, 
DEFENDANTS. 
CASE NO. 900900894. CV 
903012990 CV 
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
PROCEEDINGS OF MAY 16, 1997 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, 
REPORTED BY GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, CSR, RPR 
"is\ 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
DAVID STEFFENSEN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
675 EAST 2100 SOUTH, SUITE 350 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84l06 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
LYNN DAVIES 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 6c NELSON 
50 SOUTH MAIN STREET #7 00 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84144 
MAY 21, 1997 SALT LAKE CITY., UTAH 
P R O C E E D I N G S . 
THE COURT: THE FIRST MATTER, THEN, IS 
ALLAN B, THOMAS VS. 3D COMMUNICATIONS, INC., VON 
GORDON AND PON DAVIES. CASE NUMBER 900900894. 
STATE YOUR APPEARANCES, PLEASE. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: DAVID STEFFENSEN FOR THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
MR. DAVIES: LYNN DAVIES FOR DEFENDANTS. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. YOU MAY PROCEED. 
MR. DAVIES: I BELIEVE THIS IS ACTUALLY OUR 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: IT IS, YES. 
MR. DAVIES: I DON'T KNOW IF YOU HAVE HAD A 
CHANCE TO LOOK AT EVERYTHING PERTINENT, BUT THIS 
ACTUALLY STEMS FROM THE ORDER THAT THE COURT 
PREVIOUSLY ENTERED IN THIS CASE. 
PRIMARILY JUST TO REFRESH YOUR 
RECOLLECTION, THERE WERE A LONG COMPLAINT AND A 
VARIETY OF MOTIONS FILED AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS 
CASE. WE CAME BEFORE YOUR HONOR, AND YOU SUGGESTED 
THAT TO EXPIDITE MATTERS WE RESOLVE THE MAIN PART OF 
THE CLAIM, WHICH WAS $22 THOUSAND, AND ASKED US IF 
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WE WOULD STIPULATE TO THAT. IN A GOOD FAITH EFFORT 
TO TRY AND RESOLVE THE CASE, WR AGREED TO THAT. FVRN 
THOUGH WE FELT WE HAD DEFENSES. 
SO WE PAJD THE $22 THOUSAND. THK COUKT 
THEN INDICATED THAT THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION 01^ 
THE INTEREST AND ATTORNEYS FEES WAS — ATTORNEY FEES 
WERE NOT APPROPRIATE, AND THAT INTEREST SHOULD BE 
SET AT THE AMOUNT THAT MY CLIENTS WOULD HAVE EARNED 
IF THEY PUT THE MONEY IN THE BANK, IN AN INTEREST-
EARNING CHECKING ACCOUNT. WHICH, BY THE WAY, THEY 
DID NOT DO. SO THEY HAD NOT ENTERED ANY INTEREST 
FOR THAT PERIOD OF TIME. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
MR. DAVIES: WE DID IT ANYWAY, AS ORDERED 
BY THE COURT. AND SO THE AMOUNT OF $22 THOUSAND 
PLUS INTEREST AT 4 3/4 PERCENT INTEREST WAS PAID, 
WHICH WAS THE AMOUNT THAT IS PAID BY THEIR BANK AT 
THAT TIME ON INTEREST-BEARING CHECKING ACCOUNTS. 
SO WE DID EVERYTHING THE COURT REQUESTED. 
WE PAID EVERYTHING, AND WE THOUGHT THE CASE WAS OVER 
AND DONE WITH. 
SUBSEQUENTLY, THE PLAINTIFF DECIDED TO MAKE 
ANOTHER RUN AT TRYING TO RECOVER INTEREST. THE 
COURT HAD INDICATED THAT IF THE PLAINTIFF WAS GOING 
TO FILE ANY FURTHER ACTION ON THAT CASE, THAT SHOULD 
5 
BE A BRIEF AND CONCISE CLAIM FOR WHATEVER THE 
REMAINING AMOUNTS WERE CLAIMED. THEY FILED A 14 
PAGE COMPLAINT WHTCH RAST^ALLV A^KRO FOR MORE 
INTEREST, 16 PERCENT, INSTEAD OF 4 3/4 PERCENT. 
THE MAIN THING I WANT TO POINT OUT L)\J THAT, 
YOUR HONOR, IS THAT WHEN WE WERE FIRST BEFORE YOU, 
YOUR ORDER INCLUDED A RULING ON THE FIFTH CAUSE OF 
ACTION, WHICH WAS OUR CLAIMS, SUPPORTED BY 
AFFIDAVITS, THAT THE 3D COMMUNICATIONS EMPLOYEE WHO, 
SIGNED THIS SUPPOSED CONTRACT, DID NOT HAVE 
AUTHORITY TO DO SO. 
AND THE COURT RULED AT THAT TIME THAT THAT 
EMPLOYEE DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO SIGN THAT 
CONTRACT AND TO BIND EITHER 3D COMMUNICATIONS OK THE 
INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS, AND DISMISSED THAT CAUSE OF 
ACTION ON THAT BASIS. 
THE ONLY BASIS FOR THE CLAIM FOR 18 PERCENT 
INTEREST, AS OPPOSED TO THE SO-CALLED BANK INTEREST, 
IS THAT SUPPOSED CONTRACT, WHICH THE COURT HAS FOUND 
THE EMPLOYEE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO SIGN. SO 
AS I LOOK BACK THROUGH AND LOOKED AT YOUR ORDER, 
YOUR HONOR, AS NEAR AS I CAN TELL, THIS CASE IS 
DONE. WE HAVE PAID THE AMOUNTS OWING. THERE IS 
NOTHING FURTHER BEFORE THE COURT, THAT I CAN SEE. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. 
MR. STEFFENSEN. 
MR. STKRRRMSFN: YOUR HONOR, LET'S TALK 
ABOUT THESE POINTS ARE THAT ARE PRESENTED IN THE 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. I BELIEVE THE FIRST 
ISSUE THAT'S RAISED IS THE ISSUE OF INTEREST. 
BASICALLY WHAT MR. DAVIES HAS PRESENTED THE 
COURT IS AN ASSERTION THAT THE COURT DECIDED THE 
INTEREST ISSUE. AND THEN BASICALLY ON THAT 
ASSERTION AND THAT PREMISE, THAT THE COURT HAS 
DECIDED THAT ISSUE, IS MAKING A CLAIM THAT THAT 
DECISION IS NOW RES JUDICATA TO PREVENT FURTHER 
ARGUMENT OR FURTHER ADJUDICATION OF THAT INTEREST 
ISSUE. 
NOW, OF COURSE RES JUDICATA ONLY APPLIES IF 
YOU HAVE A FINAL DECISION ON THE MERITS OF A CLAIM. 
AND I DON'T THINK — I DON'T UNDERSTAND HOW THERE 
CAN BE ANY DECISION ON THE MERITS OF THE CLAIM WHEN 
WE'RE TALKING ABOUT A MOTION TO DISMISS, OBVIOUSLY 
SUPPORTED BY AFFIDAVITS. 
BUT IF YOU RECALL, YOUR HONOR, PART OF THE 
DECISION AGREEMENT OR STIPULATION THAT WAS ENTERED 
INTO WAS THAT THE COURT STRUCK THE FOUR AFFIDAVITS 
THAT WERE PRESENTED BY THE PLAINTIFFS. THEIR 
CERTAINLY WAS CONTRARY WITNESS TESTIMONY TO BE 
PRESENTED, AND SO FORTH, ON THESE ISSUES. BUT 
7 
THAT'S WHAT HAPPENED. 
THE COURT: MOW CAN ANYBODY THINK THAT 
THIS CASE WAS NOT OVER, WHEN TWRRR'S KKFN MO ACTION 
1^ THIS C^SE SINCE 1991? 
I CERTAINLY THOUGHT THE CASE WAS OVER. I 
THOUGHT IT WAS RESOLVED, AND THAT THE INTEREST WAS 
PAID. AND MY DOCKET, UNLESS IrM LOOKING AT THE 
WRONG DOCKET.. THERE WERE ACTIVITIES ON THIS CASE 
BEFORE JUDGE FUCHS, AND THEN ACTIVITIES BEFORE ME. 
AND SO THAT WAS IN THE CIRCUIT COURT AT THE 
TIME, WHICH IS NOW DIVISION TWO. BUT HAS THERE BEEN 
ANY ACTIVITY ON THIS CASE RECENTLY, SINCE 1991? 
MR. STEFFENSEN: TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTION, 
YQUK HONOR, I'M NOT AWARE OF ANY RECENTLY BROUGHT IN 
THE CASE. I THINK THAT THE CASE BASICALLY GOT LOST 
IN LIMBO SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE CIRCUIT COURT AND 
THIS COURT. I THINK THAT WE HAD A PENDING 
RESOLUTION OF THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
THE COURT: CASES DON'T GET LOST HERE. 
WHAT HAPPENS IS THAT IF A CASE IS THOUGHT TO BE 
ACTIVE BY THE COURT AND THERE IS NO ACTIVITY ON THE 
CASE IN A SIX MONTH PERIOD OF TIME, THERE IS AN 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ISSUED AS TO WHY THE CASE IS NOT 
MOVING FORWARD, AND DATES ARE SET AND THE CASE IS 
MOVED FORWARD. THERE IS NO ACTIVITY ON THIS CASE 
BECAUSE I BELIEVED, AND EVERYBODY ELSE BELIEVED, AS 
FAR 4^ T KNEW -- EXCEPT APPARENTLY YOU -- THAT THE 
CAUSE WAS CONCLUDED WITH THE COURT ORDER PFEVIOUSLY. 
SO WE RESOLVED THE $22 THOUSAND, THEY PAID 
INTEREST THAT WAS ORDERED BY THE COURT. IT RESOLVED 
THE WHOLE CASE EXCEPT FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO FILE AN 
AMENDED COMPLAINT. AND THEN I'M INFORMED THAT THERE 
WAS WAS AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED OF 18 PAGES, 
MULTIPLE CAUSES OF ACTION. AND THAT'S CERTAINLY NOT 
CONSISTENT WITH WHAT THE COURT HAD RULED OR 
EXPECTED. 
I WAS TRYING TO ALLOW THERE TO BE LEEWAY 
FOR DAMAGES IF THEY HAD HAS BEEN INEQUITABLY 
CONSIDERED, BUT I WASN'T LOOKING AT THIS CASE AS NOT 
RESOLVED. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: YOUR HONOR, LET ME JUST 
FOCUS ON THOSE ISSUES. I WILL BE HAPPY TO ADDRESS 
THOSE. YOUR HONOR'S ORDER SPECIFICALLY ALLOWS THE 
THE PLAINTIFFS TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT. THE 
ORDER READS, "PLAINTIFFS* MOTION TO AMEND THE 
COMPLAINT IS GRANTED." THAT DOESN'T TELL ME THAT 
THE CASE IS OVER. 
NOW, THE PLAINTIFFS PROCEEDED AND AMENDED 
THEIR COMPLAINT. NOW, THE COMPLAINT DIDN'T ASK FOR 
ANYTHING UNDER THE SUN, THE COMPLAINT BASICALLY 
ASKED FOR TWO THINGS, IN TERMS OF THE EQUITIES AND 
TO FORTH. THE PARTIES HAD A WRITTEN CONTRACT. THE 
WRITTEN CONTRACT — AND THE ISSUE Ot INTEREST IS 
FAIRLY CLEAR. WHAT THE CONTRACT SAYS IS THAT IF THE 
$22 THOUSAND IS NOT PAID IN TIMELY FASHION, THAT 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO 18 PERCENT. THAT'S WHAT 
THE CONTRACT PROVIDES. 
NOW, THE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT WANT TO GO AND 
DO SOMETHING CONTRARY TO YOUR HONOR'S DECISION AND 
ALLEGE A LOT OF NEW CAUSES OF ACTION, AND SO FORTH. 
IT LIMITED THEIR CLAIMS IN CAUSE OF ACTION TO THE 
THINGS THAT WERE SPECIFICALLY ALLOWED IN THAT 
CONTRACT THAT HAD NOT BEEN RESOLVED BY YOUR HONOR'S 
RUblNG. 
THAT'S THE INTEREST DIFERENTIAL, WHICH 
UNDER AN EQUITABLE ARGUMENT IS A FAIR ARGUMENT. THE 
OTHER ARGUMENT IS THE CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES, 
WHICH THERE IS NO REFERENCE IN THE ORDER AT ALL 
RELATIVE TO ATTORNEYS' FEES, AND THAT'S WHAT IT'S 
LIMITED TO. 
THAT'S THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH IS 
IN THAT COMPLAINT, IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT. THE 
OTHER CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT IS, 
AGAIN, A CLAIM DERIVED OUT OF EXPRESS CONTRACT UNDER 
THE UNDERSTANDING, AND PLAINTIFFS' INTERPRETATION OF 
YOUR HONOR'S ORDER THAT THE PLAINTIFFS COULD MOVE 
FORWARD ON TH^IR COWTK&CT <"L&IMS ONLY. 
THE COURT: WHY DIDN'T THEY MOVE FORWARD? 
WHY DIDN'T YOU FILE THE COMPLAINT; THEN, AND AMEND 
THE COMPLAINT AND hK)T LET IT SIT FOR SIX YEARS? 
MR. STEFFENSEN: YOUR HONOR, I DON'T 
HAVE — I DON'T KNOW WHY THAT HAPPENED. I WAS 
RECENTLY BROUGHT INTO THE CASE AND DON'T HAVE AN 
EXPLANATION FOR YOUR HONOR. I DON'T THINK, THOUGH, 
THAT ANY DOCTRINE OF LACHES APPLIES TO ANY OF THESE 
CASES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: I DO. I THINK LACHES APPLIES 
TO THIS. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: I DON'T BELIEVE SO. I 
WOULD PRESENT YOUR HONOR WITH A CASE OF — I'D BE 
HAPPY TO GIVE THIS TO YOU. IT BASICALLY SAYS THAT 
LACHES APPLIES TO THE BRINGING OF CASES. THERE ARE 
TWO ELEMENTS TO A LACHES CLAIM. THE FIRST IS THAT A 
CASE BE UNTIMELY BROUGHT, DELAYED IN BRINGING A 
CASE. THAT IS A CASE THAT WAS PENDING, YOUR HONOR. 
SECONDLY, YOU HAVE TO SHOW THAT IN SOME 
WAY, SHAPE, OR FORM THE DEFENDANTS HAVE BEEN 
PREJUDICED BY THE DELAY. I DON'T THINK THERE IS ANY 
PREJUDICE HERE. WE ARE NOT ASKING FOR ANY MORE NOW 
THAN WE WOULD BE ASKING FOR THEN. WE ARE ASKING FOR 
II 
AN INTEREST FATE DIFFERENTIAL, NOT FROM THEN UNTIL 
NOW, RUT FOS THE PERIOD OF TIME BETWEEN NOVEMBER 16 
WHEN THESE FOLKS PRESENTED THIS CHECK WITH THE 
NON-CONFORMING ENDORSEMENT ON IT UNTIL JULY 6,199u; 
WHEN THEY ACTUALLY MADE THE PAYMENT. THAT'S THE 
PERIOD OF TIME WE ARE TALKING ABOUT. 
WE'RE NOT TALKING ABOUT INTEREST BEYOND 
THAT DATE. WE:RE TALKING ABOUT ATTORNEY FEES. I 
DON'T SEE ANY PREJUDICE WHATSOEVER TO THE DEFENDANTS 
IN THIS MATTER, AND I DON'T BELIEVE THE LACHES IS 
AVAILABLE. 
THE COURT: SO YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT 
EFFECTIVELY ELEVEN PERCENT INTEREST IN ABOUT THE SIX 
MONTH PERIOD OF TIME. SO THAT WOULD BE ABOUT A 
THOUSAND DOLLARS. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: THIRTEEN AND A QUARTER 
PERCENT, YES. BUT 232 DAYS. 
THE COURT: THIRTEEN AND A QUARTER 
PERCENT. SO WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THE TWELVE TO 
FIFTEEN HUNDRED DOLLARS, SOMEWHERE IN THAT RANGE. 
AND WHAT'S THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS4 FEES YOU ARE 
ASKING FOR. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S, 
BELIEVE TO DATE EXCEEDS OVER SEVEN THOUSAND DOLLARS. 
THERE'S BEEN A LOT OF TIME SPENT IN THAT INITIAL 
12 
PERIOD TRYING TO RESOLVE THESE CLAIMS. 
THE COURT: SO REALLY THIS IS A CLAIM BY 
THE ATTORNEYS SEEKING THEIR FEE. YOUR CLIENTS ARE 
NOT INTERESTED IN THE INTEREST DIFFERENTIAL. THEY 
HAVEN'T PURSUED THAT FOR SIX YEARS. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: MY CLIENTS ARE ENTITLED TO 
THAT INTEREST DIFFERENTIAL, AND I DON'T THINK THEY 
ARE ASKING FOR THAT FOR THE NEXT PERIOD. 
THE COURT: NO, I'M I AM TALKING ABOUT 
EVEN THAT PERIOD. YOU'RE HERE BECAUSE YOU HAVE 
THIRTEEN TO FIFTEEN HUNDRED IN INTEREST CLAIM THAT 
YOU'RE PURSUING, AND SEVEN THOUSAND DOLLARS 
ATTORNEYS' FEES. SO YOU'RE ASKING ME, PROBABLY, TO 
TRY THIS CASE FOR ATTORNEYS FEES. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: I THINK THAT IT'S NOT JUST 
ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
NOW LET ME MENTION ONE THING, YOUR HONOR, 
ON THIS INTEREST ISSUE. MR. DAVIES, JULY 6,1991, 
WHEN HE PRESENTED THE THE PAYMENT FROM THE 
DEFENDANTS IN THIS MATTER, THE $22 THOUSAND, HE'S 
EXPLAINING TO THE PLAINTIFFS WHY HE DIDN'T 
IMMEDIATELY PAY IT. WHY THERE WAS A LITTLE BIT OF 
DELAY IN PAYING THAT. 
HE SAYS THERE WERE, FIRST OF ALL, THAT THEY 
WERE WAITING TO WORK OUT SOME THE OBJECTIONS IN THE 
13 
FORM OF THE ORDER. AND THEN SECONDLY HE SAYS THIS: 
HE SAYS, "SECOND,. 3D IS RECENTLY BEEN INVOLVED IN 
ATTEMPTING TO SETTLE THIS MATTER WITH ALLAN THOMAS." 
NEXT SENTENCE, n3D OFFERED TO PAY TEN 
PERCENT INTEREST IN EXCHANGE FOR FINAL RESOLUTION OF 
THIS MATTER. ALLAN THOMAS INSISTED ON THE PAYMENT 
OF 18 PERCENT INTEREST. 
DEFENDANTS KNEW THIS MATTER WAS NOT OVER, 
YOUR HONOR. I TAKE EXCEPTION TO THEIR 
CHARACTERIZATION WHEN THEY SAY THEY THOUGHT IT WAS 
OVER. THEY ARE TRYING TO SETTLE THIS CASE AND 
RESOLVE THAT REMAINING OPEN ISSUE, INTEREST ISSUE, 
BACK THEN. 
THAT'S bhEN THE POSTURE OF THE CASE. MOW, 
I DON'T HAVE AN ADEQUATE EXPLANATION FOR WHY THIS 
CASE SAT DORMANT FOR SIX YEARS, BUT THE POINT OF THE 
MATTER IS THERE IS NO PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT. I 
DON'T BELIEVE LACHES APPLIES TO PENDING CASES, AND 
THIS MATTER NEEDS TO GO FORWARD. 
FRANKLY, WHEN YOU HAVE AN EXPRESS CONTRACT 
THAT ALLOWS FOR A GIVEN PERCENT INTEREST, I DON'T 
UNDERSTAND HOW THE COURT CAN UNILATERALLY AWARD THE 
DEFENDANTS FOUR AND THREE QUARTERS. 
AS I UNDERSTAND IT, THE THE COURT DOES NOT 
FIND THAT THERE WAS AN EXPRESS CONTRACT. THE COURT 
1 SPECIFICALLY FOUND THAT THE EMPLOYEE WHO ALLEGEDLY 
2 ENTERED INTO THE AGREEMENT DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO 
3 DO THAT. AND THEREFORE, IT WASN'T ME MODIFYING THE 
4 AGREEMENT. 1 THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS A STIPULATION 
5 HERE IN OPEN COURT THAT THEY WOULD PAY SOME INTEREST 
6 AND THAT PEOPLE WOULD BE ENTITLED TO SOME 
7 COMPENSATION AND INTEREST. 
8 THAT THEY'D BE ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION AND 
9 INTEREST, AND THAT WE SIMPLY DID IT ON THE BASIS 
10 THAT IF THE FUNDS THAT THEY HAD TENDERED EARLIER HAD 
11 BEEN PLACED IN A SAVINGS ACCOUNT, THOSE FUNDS WOULD 
12 HAVE YIELDED THE RATE THAT WE ENDED OUT ADDING TO 
13 IT. 
14 SO THE RATE WAS SET IN THE ABSENCE OF A 
15 CONTRACT RATE, AND YET TO PROVIDE THE BENEFIT TO 
16 YOUR CLIENTS, SO THAT THEY'D NOT BE PREJUDICED BY 
17 HAVING HAD $22 THOUSAND PREVIOUSLY TENDERED, NOT YET 
18 RECEIVED, SIT IDLE FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME OF THAT 
19 INTERIM. AND I THOUGHT THAT WAS THE WHOLE 
20 RESOLUTION OF THE CASE. 
21 MR. STEFFENSEN: LET ME BRING YOUR 
22 ATTENTION TO ONE THING RELATIVE TO THE CONTRACT. 
23 EVEN ASSUMING THAT YOUR HONOR DISMISSED THAT FIFTH 
24 CAUSE OF ACTION ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT MR. GORDON 
25 DID NOT REPRESENT 3D, IF YOU'LL LOOK AT THE CONTRACT 
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ITSELF — AND I DON'T KNOW IF YOUR HONOR HAS A COPY 
TO LOOK AT — YOU'LL NOTICE WHAT THE NAMES OF THE 
PURCHASERS ARE FOR THAT CONTRACT. THE FIRST NAME— 
ACTUALLY THREE NAMES. THE FIRST NAME IS VON GORDON, 
THE SECOND NAME IS RON DAVIES, AND THE THIRD NAME IS 
3D COMMUNICATION. IT HAS THOSE THREE PEOPLE NAMED. 
AND THEN SAYS.. "AGREES TO PAY ALLAN V. 
THOMAS $22 THOUSAND," AND SO FORTH. 
SO IN ADDITION TO 3D COMMUNICATIONS BEING A 
PARTY TO THIS AGREEMENT, MR. GORDON WAS A PARTY TO 
THIS AGREEMENT. MR. GORDON ALSO SIGNEDD THE 
CONTRACT. I DON'T BELIEVE THERE IS ANY BASIS UNDER 
WHICH THE CONTRACT HAS BEEN VOIDED WITH THE 
DISMISSAL OF THE FIVE CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST 
MR. GORDON. 
MR. GORDON SAYS HE'S A PURCHASER. HE SIGNS 
IT. HE WRITES IT OUT IT, AND HE'S SITTING ON IT. 
THERE IS NO BASIS TO SAY THERE'S NO CONTRACT WITH 
RESPECT TO MR. GORDON. AND THAT'S REALLY THE 
ESSENCE OF OUR OBJECTION. 
AND ON NUMBER TWO OF THEIR MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHERE THEY ARE SAYING THAT THIS 
COURT DISMISSED ALL THE INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS AGAINST 
INDIVIDUALS, NO. WHAT THE COURT DID WAS DISMISS THE 
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL TYPE ARGUMENT, WHICH THE 
1 COURT WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT IMPRESSED WITH. 
2 BUT THAT DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE DIRECT 
3 CONTRACT CLAIMS THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS ALLOWED TO 
41 MOVE FORWARD ON. WHEN WE'RE TALKING ABOUT A DIRECT 
5 CONTRACT CLAIM, WE LOOK AT WHAT THE CONTRACT IS AND 
6 WE SAY WHO ARE THE PARTIES. VON GORDON IS A PARTY. 
7 HIS NAME IS NAMED AS THE PURCHASER. HE SIGNED IT, 
8 AND THAT'S A CONTRACT CLAIM. 
9 WE OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD ON THAT 
10 BASIS, EVEN IF THE CLAIM IS DISMISSED AGAINST 3D 
11 COMMUNICATIONS. 
12 NOW, IN ADDITION, RELATIVE TO 3D 
13 COMMUNICATIONS, I UNDERSTAND THAT THE FIFTH CAUSE OF 
14 ACTION WAS DISMISSED, BUT 3D COMMUNICATIONS PAID THE 
15 $22 THOUSAND. THEY PAID IT. I DON'T THINK THERE'S 
16 ANY QUESTION THAT 3D COMMUNICATIONS WAS THE 
17 PURCHASER UNDER THIS CONTRACT. 
18 VERY CANDIDLY, VERY HONESTLY AND CANDIDLY, 
19 I DON'T UNDERSTAND HOW, WHEN YOU HAVE AN EXPRESS 
20 CONTRACT THAT IT PROVIDE FOR 18 PERCENT INTEREST AND 
21 ATTORNEYS FEES, AND WHERE THESE FOLKS AGREE THAT 
22 THERE IS GOING TO BE NO RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE IN 
23 THE CONTRACT AND ALL RIGHTS ARE RESERVED, THEN THEY 
24 PRESENT MY CLIENT WITH A CHECK WHICH HAS A 
25 RESTRICTED ENDORSEMENT ON IT, SAYING, YOU'D BETTER 
1 TAKE THIS CHECKS WITH THE RESTRICTED ENDODORSEMENT 
2 WAIVING ALL OF YOU* CLAIMS. 
3 WE SAY, "NO, WE'RE NOT GOING TO DO THAT." 
4 THEN WE HAVE TO LITIGATE IN ORDER TO HAVE A 
5 PRESERVATION OF RIGHTS AND CLAIMS. I DON'T 
6 UNDERSTAND WHY MY CLIENT HAS TO TAKE FOUR AND THREE 
7 QUARTERS PERCENT INTEREST WHEN THE CONTRACT SAYS 18 
8 PERCENT. AND I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY MY CLIENT CAN'T 
9 RECOVER ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR THIS ACTION WHEN THE 
10 CONTRACT SAYS THEY ARE ALLOWED TO GET ATTORNEYS' 
11 FEES. I DON'T UNDERSTAND THAT. 
12 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. 
13 ANYTHING FURTHER? 
14 MR. STEFFENSEN: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
15 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THE OTHER 
16 MR. STEFFENSEN WANTED TO VISIT WITH YOU BEFORE YOU 
17 SAT DOWN. 
18 (COUNSEL CONFER OFF THE RECORD.) 
19 MR. STEFFENSEN: WE'RE DONE. THANK YOU, 
20 YOUR HONOR. 
21 MR. DAVIES: YOUR HONOR, I GO BACK TO THE 
22 ORDER THAT WAS WAS FILED. THE ORDER DISMISSED ALL 
23 THESE CAUSES OF ACTION. I AM LOOKING AT PAGE THRE 
24 OF THE ORDER, WHICH SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT THE 
25 MOTIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS VON GORDON, RON 
1 DAVIES TO DISMISS ALL CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THEM 
2 ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY ACTED AT ALL TIMES AS 
3 EMPLOYEES OF THE BONA FIDE CORPORATION WERE 
4 DISMISED. 
5 ALL CLAIMS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS WERE 
6 DISMISSED. NOW, THE COURT OPENED THE DOOR TO THE 
7 POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL CLAIMS IF THERE WERE SOME 
8 NEW CLAIMS THAT HAD NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY ASSERTED BY 
9 THE PLAINTIFF. 
10 BECAUSE OF THAT, AND BECAUSE WE WANTED A 
11 FINAL RESOLUTION, WE DID ATTEMPT TO SETTLE THIS AND 
12 NEGOTIATED THIS CASE IN THE SENSE THAT THERE WOULD 
13 BE NO ADDITIONAL CLAIMS ASSERTED, OR ANYTHING ELSE. 
14 AND THAT'S WHY WE TALKED ABOUT TEN PERCENT INSTEAD 
15 OF FOUR AND THREE QUARTERS PERCENT, BECAUSE — IT 
16 WAS NOT BECAUSE WE DIDN'T THINK THIS CASE WAS 
17 RESOLVED AT THAT POINT IN TIME. 
18 WHEN I SENT THAT LETTER IT WAS WITH THE 
19 CHECK ATTACHED, SAYING, "THIS IS A SETTLEMENT OF THE 
20 CASE PURSUANT TO THE COURT ORDER." 
21 AND THEN WE GOT THE COURT ORDER, AND THE 
22 COURT'S ORDER SAYS LEAVE IS GRANTED ONLY TO FILE A 
23 NEW AMENDED COMPLAINT. IT'S THAT BRIEF AND CONCISE. 
24 IT STATES, "ANY REMAINING CAUSE OF ACTION REMAINING 
25 TO THE PLAINTIFF." 
NOW, THE NEW COMPLAINT THAT WE GOT 
BASICALLY IS JUST FOR INTEREST. THE PRAYER OF THE 
COMPLAINT, AS I JUST READ IT A MOMENT AGO, ASKS FOR 
NOTHING MORE THAN INTEREST. BUT THE COURT HAD 
PREVIOUSLY RULED IN ITS ORDER THAT DEFENDANT 3D 
COMMUNICATIONS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIFTH CAUSE OF 
ACTION, INSOFAR AS IT IS BASED ON AN ALLEGED 
CONTRACT SIGNED WITHOUT AUTHORITY FROM 3D 
COMMUNICATIONS, WAS GRANTED. 
ANOTHER PART OF THE COURT ORDER ALSO SAYS— 
AND THAT IS RIGHT AT THE VERY END — "UPON 
STIPULATION OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS, DEFENDANT 3D 
COMMUNICATIONS, INC., WILL TENDER A CHECK IN THE 
AMOUNT OF $22 THOUSAND TO PLAINTIFF WITHOUT A 
RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENT. THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS 
THAT 3D COMMUNICATIONS PAY INTEREST TO PLAINTIFF 
FROM THE DATE OF ISSUANCE OF THE ORIGINAL $22 
THOUSAND CHECK, I.E., FROM NOVEMBER 16, 1989 TO THE 
DATE OF THIS ORDER. INTEREST IS SET AT THE MARKET 
RATE ON INTEREST-BEARING CHECKING ACCOUNTS." 
MY POINT ON ALL THIS, YOUR HONOR, IS JUST 
THIS: YOU ENTERED ORDERS ON THE TWO PERTINENT PARTS 
THAT REMAIN IN THIS CASE RIGHT NOW. ONE IS THE 
DISMISSAL OF ALL THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL 
DEFENDANTS. AND THE ORDER SAYS THAT THAT THERE IS 
20 
1 NO BASIS FOR A CLAIM. 
2 THE ORDER ALSO SAYS THAT THERE IS NO BASIS 
3 FOR A CONTRACT IN THIS CASE, BASED ON THIS ONE-PAGE 
4 FRANKLIN DAY PLANNER ALLEGED CONTRACT, BECAUSE THE 
5 EMPLOYEE WHO SIGNED IT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO 
6 DO SO. 
7 HE CERTAINLY HAD NO AUTHORITY TO SIGN, NOT 
8 ONLY ON BEHALF OF 3D, BUT ON BEHALF OF INDIVIDUALS. 
9 THE ALLEGED CONTRACT ITSELF ONLY TALKS ABOUT 
10 OBLIGATIONS OF 3D COMMUNIDATIONS, NOT OBLIGATIONS OF 
11 ANY INDIVIDUAL. SO THERE IS NO CONTRACT ON BEHALF 
12 OF ANY INDIVIDUALS. 
13 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. 
14 MR. DAVIES: FINALLY, THE COURT ORDER 
15 INCLUDED A PROVISION ABOUT THE INTEREST, AND THAT'S 
16 BEEN TAKEN CARE OF, SO WE ARE DONE, YOUR HONOR. 
17 THE COURT: OKAY. THE COURT FINDS THAT 
18 THE CASE HAS BEEN DISMISSED, THAT IT IS RESOLVED. 
19 AND I WILL ASK YOU, MR. DAVIES, TO PREPARE AN ORDER 
20 CONSISTENT WITH THAT. 
21 MR. DAVIES: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
22 (WHEREUPON, PROCEEDINGS IN THIS MATTER WERE 
23 CONCLUDED.) 
24 
25 
1 
2 C E R T I F I C A T E 
3 
4 STATE OF UTAH 
5 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
6 I, GAYLE CAMPBELL, CERTIFIED SHORTHAND 
7 REPORTER AND NOTARY PUBLIC FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, 
8 CERTIFY: 
9 THAT I AM AN OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER IN THE 
10 THIRD JUDICIAL COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH; 
11 THAT I WAS PRESENT DURING THE ENTIRE 
12 PROCEEDINGS IN THE BEFORE-ENTITLED CAUSE; 
13 THAT THE PROCEEDINGS WERE REPORTED STENO-
14 GRAPHICALLY BY ME, AND WERE THEREAFTER TRANSCRIBED; 
15 THAT SAID TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTES TO THE 
16 BEST OF MY ABILITY A TRUE AND COMPLETE RECORD OF THE 
17 PROCEEDINGS HAD. 
18 IN WITNESS THEREOF, I HAVE SUBSCRIBED MY 
19 NAME AND AFFIXED MY SEAL THIS 29TH DAY OF MAY, 1997. 
20 
21 
221 GAYLE CAMPBELL, CSR, RPR 
23 
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RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801)531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLAN B. THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
3D COMMUNICATIONS, INC., VON 
GORDON, and RON DAVIES, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900900894 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing before this 
court, The Honorable Judge David Young presiding, on May 16, 1997. Plaintiff was represented 
by his attorney, David Steffensen. Defendants were represented by their attorney, Lynn S. 
Davies. Having reviewed the pleadings and file herein, the memoranda of both parties 
pertaining to this motion, and having heard argument of counsel for the parties, the court enters 
the following Order. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This action was initiated by plaintiffs Complaint dated February 9, 1990. 
Plaintiffs Complaint contained allegations pertaining to the sale of certain telephone equipment 
in 1988, and subsequent disputes between the plaintiff and defendant 3D Communications (and 
allegedly some 3D Communications employees) pertaining to that equipment and the resale of 
that equipment in 1989. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, and the court held a hearing on 
May 21, 1990, regarding that Motion to Dismiss, Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Brian W. 
Steffensen as counsel, Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavits, and Plaintiffs Motion to Amend 
the Complaint. The court entered an Order regarding those motions on June 4,1990. 
The court's Order included the following rulings: 
The motions of the individual defendants, Von Gordon, Ron 
Davies and Phil Davies, to dismiss all causes of action against 
them on the grounds that they acted at all times as employees only 
of a bona fide corporation and that there have been no facts pled in 
the Complaint or proposed Amended Complaint which, if proved, 
would provide a sufficient basis upon which to pierce the corporate 
veil, are hereby granted. 
. . . Defendant 3D Communications' Motion to Dismiss the Fifth 
Cause of Action insofar as it is based on an alleged contract signed 
without authority from 3D Communications, is hereby granted. 
. . . Leave is granted only to file a new Amended Complaint that 
briefly and concisely states any cause of action remaining to 
plaintiff; based on the record before the court, if any cause of 
action remains herein, it would be for breach of contract, if any, 
arising out of 3D Communications' resale of the telephone switch 
for plaintiff Thomas. 
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Upon stipulation of counsel for defendants, defendant 3D 
Communications, Inc. will tender a check in the amount of 
$22,000 to plaintiff, without a restrictive endorsement. The court 
further orders that 3D Communications pay interest to plaintiff 
from the date of issuance of the original $22,000 check, Le., from 
November 16, 1989, to the date of this Order. Interest is set at the 
market rate on interest-bearing check accounts. 
The parties agree that subsequent to the entry of that Order on July 6,1990, 
defendant 3D Communications did in fact pay $22,000 to plaintiff, plus 43A% interest, the rate at 
which defendant 3D Communications' bank paid interest on checking accounts. 
Plaintiff filed a 14-page Second Amended Complaint dated November 21,1990, 
against defendants 3D Communications, Inc., Von Gordon and Ron Davies. The gravamen of 
the Second Amended Complaint was a handwritten document allegedly constituting a contract 
between plaintiff and defendant 3D Communications, Inc , signed by defendant Gordon. 
Defendants had asserted that defendant Gordon signed the alleged contract without authority 
from 3D Communications; the court's Order of June 4,1990 had ruled that it was signed without 
authority. The prayer of the Second Amended Complaint asked for the following damages: 
1. With respect to the First, Second and Third Causes of 
Action, for judgment against the defendants, jointly and severally, 
for the interest on the principal amount of $22,000 at the annual 
percentage rate of 18% from November 21,1989, remaining 
unpaid, and all of his costs of court and attorney's fees incurred 
herein. 
2. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just 
and equitable under the circumstances arising from and warranted 
by the facts set forth herein. 
3 
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Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on July 31,1991. That motion 
asserted that the court's Order of June 4, 1990 had already resolved all issues that plaintiff 
attempted to raise in the Second Amended Complaint, including plaintiffs claims for interest 
and the claims against the individual defendants, and further asserted that plaintiffs Second 
Amended Complaint was without merit and not brought in good faith. Plaintiff submitted a 
responsive memorandum on August 14,1991. 
Thereafter, this case was transferred to Third Circuit Court. At Circuit Court, 
Judge Dennis Fuchs entered a Decision and Order on September 27,1991, indicating that it was 
not appropriate for Judge Fuchs to interpret the Order and Decision of Judge Young in the Third 
District Court, remanding this matter to Third District Court and Judge Young. No further 
activity occurred in this matter, and the plaintiff took no further steps to show an interest in 
prosecuting this matter, until new counsel for plaintiff. David W. Steffensen, filed a Request for 
Ruling on the nearly six-year old motion on March 24,1997. The court reviewed the 
outstanding pleadings, the memoranda pertaining to the Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
heard argument from counsel on May 16,1997. 
Based on the foregoing, and for the reasons set forth in Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted. All issues 
raised in plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint have been previously disposed by the court's 
Order of June 4,1990. The court has previously ruled on the issue of interest. The court has 
"5~r> 
previously ruled that the alleged contract was signed by Von Gordon without authority from 
3D Communications, and therefore there is no basis for plaintiffs claim for attorney's fees. The 
court also found previously that plaintiff has no basis for claims against the individual 
defendants, Von Gordon, Ron Davies and Phil Davies. 
2. No activity has occurred in this matter since September 27,1991, 
suggesting that the parties consider this matter either to be resolved, or not to warrant further 
action. 
3. Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, and all remaining claims in this 
matter, are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
4. Each party is to bear its own costs and attorney's fees. 
DATED this j 2 Y ? £ y of ^ K ^ J J ^ , 1997. 
M1 ! $K BY THE COURT: 
0^ ' THEHONO 
THIRD DIS 
V 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DAVID W. STEFFENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10112-005 
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DAVID W STEFFENSEN, P.C 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
675 East 2100 South, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 485-1818 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
'Clerk 
PROBATE DIVISION 
ALAN B.THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
3D COMMUNICATIONS, INC., VON 
GORDON, and RON DAVES, 
Defendants. 
OBJECTION TO FORM OF ORDER 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900900894 
Judge David S. Young 
Plaintiff, by and through his counsel of record, respectfully objects to the form of Order 
Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment submitted by counsel for defendants, for 
and on the following grounds: 
1. The proposed order fails to reflect the fact that the court's Order dated June 4, 
1990, and specifically, the stipulation of counsel for defendants that 3D Communications would 
immediately tender a check for $22,000 provided that the court strike plaintiffs affidavits in 
opposition to defendants' pending Motion to Dismiss (thus leaving plaintiff with no grounds to 
object to the Motion to Dismiss), were objected to by plaintiff and were, in effect, forced upon 
plaintiff by the court over plaintiffs objections. 
2. The proposed order further fails to reflect that the Second Amended Complaint 
dated November 21, 1990, and filed by plaintiff in the Third Circuit Court pursuant to leave of the 
court to file the same, pleads contract claims (interest and attorneys' fees), consistent with the 
court's grant of leave to amend. Importantly, the order fails to accurately reflect the Second 
Amended Complaint's allegations that where Ron Gordon signed the contract in question, he 
either did so under an express representation to plaintiff that he was authorized to sign the same 
on behalf of 3D Communications and Ron Davies, a representation which, given the court's June 
4, 1990 Order was clearly false, or he did so on his own behalf. Either way, the Second Amended 
Complaint states, at a minimum, a claim against Ron Gordon for which he is personally liable. 
3. The proposed order fails to reflect that in addition to the filing of a Motion for 
Summary Judgment by defendants on July 31, 1991 with Judge Fuchs of the Circuit Court, and 
the filing of a memorandum in response thereto by plaintiff on August 14, 1991 with Judge Fuchs 
of the Circuit Court, the following events occurred: 
a. Plaintiff filed a Request for Trial Setting on April 8, 1991 with Judge Fuchs 
of the Circuit Court. 
b. Plaintiff filed a Request for Decision on defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on August 26, 1991 with Judge Fuchs of the Circuit Court. 
c. Judge Fuchs, in a Decision and Order dated September 27, 1991, remanded 
the matter back to the Third District Court and Judge Young with the recommendation that the 
matter be set for trial or the Motion for Summary Judgment should be heard by Judge Young. 
d. Despite the filed Request for Trial Setting and Request for Decision, Judge 
Young took no action on this case for over six years, until new counsel for plaintiff, David W. 
2 
Steffensen, filed a Request for Ruling on March 24, 1997. 
4. Paragraph 1 on pages 4 and 5 of the proposed Order should read only: 
"Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted." The reasons therefor include 
the following: 
a. All issues raised in the Second Amended Complaint were not previously 
disposed of by the court's order dated June 4, 1990, as evidenced by the court's specifically 
granting plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to assert breach of contract claims. 
b. Plaintiff does not believe that the court previously ruled on the issue of 
interest. Indeed, the issues of (i) the differential between the contract interest rate of 18% and the 
4 3/4% interest paid by defendants, and (ii) plaintiffs contractual entitlement to attorneys fees, 
were the only remaining contract claims assertable in any amended complaint to be filed in light of 
Judge Young's June 4, 1990 Order. 
c. While the court did previously rule that the alleged contract was signed by 
Von Gordon without authority from 3D Communications (which ruling plaintiff strongly 
disputes), the Proposed Order fails to reflect the contract claims asserted against Von Gordon 
individually (after all, he signed the contract), and against Von Gordon for breaching his 
warranties of agency in stating to plaintiff that he was signing on behalf of 3D Communications 
and Ron Davies. 
d. Finally, the court only previously ruled that plaintiff could not assert 
personal liability against the individual defendants, Von Gordon, Ron Davies and Phil Davies 
under plaintiffs pierce the corporate veil theory. In its previous ruling, the court did not rule on 
the question of such persons' individual contract liability arising out of the contract, and gave 
plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to assert such contract claims. 
5. Paragraph 2 of the Proposed Order on page 5 should only state: "In light of there 
being no activity on this matter between September 27, 1991 and Mr. David W. StefFensen's 
Request for Ruling on March 24, 1997, plaintiffs claims are barred under the doctrine of laches." 
DATED this Z^/c/day of July, 1997. X^\ 
David W. Steffensen 
Attorney for PlaintiffT1 
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SLC,UT QAXOG 
Circuit Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
ALLAN B . THOMAS 
Plainiifffs) 
-vs-
3D COMMUNICATIONS, INC. et al 
Defcndant(s) 
REQUEST FOR TRIAL 
SETTING 
Case No. 9 0 3 0 1 2 9 9 0 C V 
J u d g e F u c h s 
L e s F . E n g l a n d Attorney for P l a i n t i f f .hereby 
requests that the above entitled case be set for (Check one): 
x x x x x x Non-jury trial 
Jury trial, for which the jury fee of $25.00 is enclosed. 
It is certified that the above case is now at issue and that copies of this request have been furnished to the 
following: 
NAME 
(List counsel of record or party, if 
without counsel) 
L y n n S . D a v i e s 
ADDRESS 
P . O . B o x 2 4 6 5 
PHONE NO. 
531-1777 
S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 0 
Dated A / p s t 
f.Si^naJ^rfe of counsel or party) 
Counsel for 
'Address) 
'Citw State, Zip) 
(Phono 
z-\r 
LES F. ENGLAND (#3646) 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone (801) 278-7755 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLAN B. THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
3D COMMUNICATIONS, et al 
Defendants 
: REQUEST FOR DECISION 
: Civil No. 903012990CV 
: Judge Fuchs 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
plaintiff Allan Thomas hereby notifies the clerk of the above-
entitled court to submit for decision Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Dated this ^C day of August, 1991. 
Les F. Ejaf'gland 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document on the ^ day of August, 
1991, to the following: 
Mr. Lynn Davies, Esq. 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84110 
q.si?3 
DAVID W. STEFFENSEN (A4677) 
DAVID W. STEFFENSEN, PC. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
675 East 2100 South, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 • 
Telephone: (801) 485-1818 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
PROBATE DIVISION 
ALAN B. THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
3D COMMUNICATIONS, INC., VON 
GORDON, and RON DAVIES, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 900900894 
Judge David S. Young 
I hereby certify that on the » a y of July, I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Plaintiffs Objection to Form of Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, along with a copy of this Certificate of Service and addressed to the following: 
Lynn Davies 
Richards Brandt Miller & Nelson 
50 South Main Street, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Dated this J£_ day of July, 1997. 
